




JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

19980203 364

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161



Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-91-071

CONTENTS

22 October 1991

NEAR EAST

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Saudi Aid to Mujahidin, Refugees in Pakistan [Riyadh AL-RIYAD 2 Aug]	1
Task Forces Formed To Study Unified Gulf Army [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 29 Aug]	3
Restructuring of Arab League Justice Court Discussed [Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD 16 Aug]	4
GCC Information Director on Broadcasting Plans [Riyadh AL-RIYAD 31 Aug]	6

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PNSF Chairman Al-Fahum on PNC, Peace Conference [Jerusalem AL-MANAR 23 Sep]	8
West Bank Notables on PLO Role in Peace Process [Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI 17 Aug]	10
Hanan 'Ashrawi on Peace Process Developments [Jerusalem AL-MANAR 23 Sep]	13
Hakam Bal'awi Expected To Assume Abu-Iyad Post [London AL-MAJALLAH 9 Oct]	15

ISRAEL

Settlements Develop, Integrate Rapidly [HA'ARETZ 6 Sep]	15
Finance Committee Chairman Feldman Proves Formidable [HA'ARETZ 4 Sep]	21
HA'ARETZ Discusses IDF Policy on Homosexuals [HA'ARETZ 1 Sep]	23

JORDAN

Impact of Economic Problems After War [London AL-HAYAH 3 Sep]	25
---	----

KUWAIT

Minister on Rebuilding, Improving Communications [Paris AL-DUWALIYAH 26 Aug]	27
--	----

LEBANON

Historical Overview of Conflict Among Maronite Leaders [London AL-HAYAH 28, 29 Aug]	28
Government Said To Take on Practices of Militias [AL-SHIR'A 12 Aug]	34
Overview of Arms Trafficking Situation [London AL-HAYAH 9 Aug]	36
Smuggling Activities at Al-Naqurah Viewed [London AL-HAYAH 9 Aug]	39

SAUDI ARABIA

Fahd, Ministers Discuss Policy, Law Changes [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 28 Aug]	41
Projections for Role of International Firms [London AL-HAWADITH 16 Aug]	42

SUDAN

Ministry Issues New Regulations on Foreign Press [AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH 21 Jul]	44
--	----

SYRIA

CP Leader Bakdash: Jews Behind Ruin of Communist State [Beirut AL-KIFAH AL-'ARABI 29 Jul]	45
--	----

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

German-Arab Center Planned To Promote Commerce [London <i>AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT</i> 3 Sep] ..	49
Seaports Handle Record Number of Ships [AL-BAYAN 13 Aug]	49

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Fundamentalist Deputy on Problems Facing North, South [AL-ISLAH 26 Aug]	50
Police Journal on Causes of Highway Robbery, Car Theft [AL-HARIS 19 Aug]	53

SOUTH ASIA

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Afghanistan Seen at Crucial Crossroads	55
'Peace Hangs by Thread' [Lahore <i>THE NATION</i> 17 Sep]	55
Pakistan Policy Contradictory [Lahore <i>THE NATION</i> 18 Sep]	56
Iran Role Limited [Lahore <i>THE NATION</i> 12 Sep]	57
Further Jihad Unnecessary [Karachi <i>DAWN</i> 24 Sep]	59
Urgent Need for Peace [Karachi <i>DAWN</i> 21 Sep]	60
Regional Cooperation Indispensable for Afghan Peace [Lahore <i>VIEWPOINT</i> 19 Sep]	62
Tehran, Islamabad Cooperate on Afghan Peace [Lahore <i>VIEWPOINT</i> 19 Sep]	62
Unsettled Regional Scene Viewed [Lahore <i>VIEWPOINT</i> 12 Sep]	63
Ambassador Sattar Stresses Bilateral Understanding [Lahore <i>VIEWPOINT</i> 19 Sep]	64
Regional Implications of Recent Soviet Changes Viewed [Islamabad <i>THE MUSLIM</i> 21 Sep]	66
Article Urges South Asia Dialogue [Lahore <i>VIEWPOINT</i> 12 Sep]	68
Subcontinental Neighbors Renew Tensions [Lahore <i>VIEWPOINT</i> 12 Sep]	69

AFGHANISTAN

Kabul To Buy Arms If Mujahedin Receive Military Aid [Tehran <i>KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL</i> 19 Sep]	70
--	----

IRAN

Kuwaiti-U.S. Pact, Damascus Declaration Viewed [Tehran Radio]	70
Ahmad Khomeyni Says U.S. Sowing Seeds of Discord [Tehran Radio]	71
West's Stance on Soviet Asian Republics Reviewed [ETTELA'AT 4 Sep]	71
Paper Urges Recognition of Soviet Muslim Republics [JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI 4 Sep]	72
Importance of Communication to Revolution Noted [ABRAR 5 Sep]	73
Velayati Meets With Air Transport Official [Tehran Radio]	73
Paper Reviews Electoral Role of Guardians' Council [SALAM 28 Aug]	73
Commentary Evaluates Nonaligned Movement [ABRAR 4 Sep]	74
Daily Discusses Economic Plan, Implementation [RESALAT 4 Sep]	75

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Saudi Aid to Mujahidin, Refugees in Pakistan

91AE0613C *Riyadh AL-RIYAD* in Arabic 2 Aug 91 p 8

[Article by 'Abdallah al-Razin: "Seven Years of Charitable Activities by Saudi Relief Committee in Afghanistan"]

[Text] As its exalted work on behalf of the oppressed, helpless, and displaced Afghan mujahidin expanded, the General Organization To Receive Contributions for the Afghan Mujahidin decided to form the Saudi Relief Committee to take charge of conveying contributions and defining needs. The contributions go to provide centers of Islamic education for Afghanistan's children and orphans, and so that the banner of Islam might continue fighting for God against the communist tide in Afghanistan. The committee's actual work in Pakistan began in 1403 A.H. [Hijra calendar] (1982-83). In the interval, the committee has acquired adequate experience in aid, relief, and operating educational and social projects. To date, the organization has opened seven offices in the cities of Riyad, Jiddah, al-Madinah, Buraydah, 'Unayzah, Ha'il, and Tabuk, in addition to its offices in Pakistan, and is on the way to opening more offices in other cities, God willing.

A report published by the General Organization To Receive Contributions for the Afghan Mujahidin details the Saudi Relief Committee's activities in Pakistan.

Support for Holy War

Since beginning its work, one of the organization's fundamental goals has been to support the holy war and help it continue. Expenditures for the cause have gone through a number of periods. In the first period, 1400-3 (1979-80 to 1982-83), before the Saudi Relief Committee was formed, 133,926,666 Saudi riyals were remitted to the mujahidin.

From 1983 to 1990, after the Saudi Relief Committee was formed, a total of 538,484,489 Saudi riyals were remitted and spent on the committee's projects for mujahidin and refugees and other projects. The money for the mujahidin was disbursed in one of two ways:

Some of the money was turned over, in cash, to the Islamic Union and then to the Afghan organizations and field commanders inside Afghanistan. There were fees for sending supply convoys into the country (this was done with the help of Arab mujahidin). Also, some fighters were equipped and their families that remained behind were supported in the program of stipulated contributions. The cash total of all these payments over eight years was 1.147 billion Pakistani rupees.

As one of its latest accomplishments, last winter the committee distributed to the mujahidin and refugees 82,812,318 rupees worth of food—tens of thousands of [packages of] sugar, rice, lentils, tea, wheat, flour, beans, and oil. During the winter of last year, goods worth

64,995,700 rupees were conveyed to the mujahidin and refugees—hundreds of coats, sleeping bags, shoes, blankets, quilts, tents, and wheelchairs. This is in addition to what was spent on health and educational projects, orphans' schools, cash assistance, worker salaries, support for widows and the disabled, and aid to build rooms for the refugees.

Relief Program—Food, Clothing, Temporary Housing

These services are provided to refugees in general, but especially to refugees from mass disasters. The committee inspects the camps and gives food cards to new families not receiving any food assistance from the Pakistani Government. Coordination with the Pakistani government sometimes takes place. For example, when attacks recently intensified on Jalalabad and many families fled, the Relief Committee supported 1,454 families in all their needs through the Pakistani commissioner for refugee affairs. When some of the camps were subjected to flooding last year, the Relief Committee, in coordination with the Pakistani Government, took responsibility for 12,000 families and is still giving them monthly support.

Building Rooms for Refugees

Housing is built at the rate of one room for each family that has been examined. The rooms are built of mud and wood. During a period of eight years the relief committee has built 25,797 rooms at a cost of 28,494,200 Pakistani rupees.

Digging Regular and Artesian Wells

The Relief Committee delivers water by truck to those who need it. It also digs regular wells next to committee-built mosques, mostly to be used for ablutions, but also for the needs of residents near the mosque. Some 171 regular wells have been built in various camps, each costing 5,000 Saudi riyals to dig. Six artesian wells have been dug, each costing 100,000 Saudi riyals; they are normally dug in the middle of large camps. Pipes have been run into homes from some of the wells. The various kinds of wells (regular, artesian, and hand-pumped) dug by the committee have eliminated many of the diseases resulting from water pollution.

Education

Because of the large numbers of refugees in Pakistan (about 3.5 million), the Relief Committee acted within its available means and began opening schools for orphans to achieve the two great goals of caring for orphans, and for the families of those killed in the war. Orphans studying in the schools are provided with all their needs, and an additional allowance is paid to each orphan's guardian to support the orphan and his family. There are 14 schools in Peshawar, Shamshattu camp, Haripur camp, Mansehra, Nasirbagh camp, Karachi, Bajaur, Rashkai, [Ajriya], Kunar, [Jakkher Dhora], and Quetta. The committee appoints school directors and

two or three teachers for each school—they are Arabs—to implement the curriculum and concentrate on teaching the Arabic language.

Koranic Schools

The committee has opened four schools to teach memorization of the Koran. The first is the House of the Noble Koran in Peshawar, which has already produced 164 graduates who have memorized and can recite God's holy book properly. There are three other schools for memorizing the Koran in the camps. Preparations to open a large new school for memorizing and teaching the Koran are under way.

Vocational Schools

The committee has opened a vocational school to train orphans in trades that will afford them an honorable living—tailoring, carpentry, metalwork, shoemaking, blanketmaking, tentmaking, electrical work, mechanics, and construction.

Supporting Afghan Schools

The committee gives in-kind aid—bedding and blankets, clothing, shoes, and food—to schools of [mujahidin] organizations or any schools that take in refugees.

Courses of Study

The committee has taken care to select courses of study in which it has confidence. The Islamic University in al-Madinah has contributed by freeing four of its professors to work with the committee in supervising its schools and preparing their curricula. The elementary curricula have already been prepared. God willing, the committee will distribute them to schools that wish to implement them, whether these be primary schools of the [mujahidin] organizations or schools of any other relief organizations.

Arabic Language and Islamic Religion Courses

The committee gives Arabic language courses to Afghan refugee children, as well as courses in Islamic religion, in cooperation with Imam Muhammad ibn-Sa'ud Islamic University.

Social Care

When the Saudi Relief Committee in Pakistan undertook its social welfare project, it wanted to preserve the dignity of these oppressed men, women, and children. It wanted to assure them the means of a dignified life by enabling them to earn a living, or by an adequate yearly allowance. This is the least that martyrs who have given their lives for God deserve. The Saudi Relief Committee also cares for the disabled who have lost limbs in combat. Most of them can no longer work, which gives them priority for care and concern. The committee provides them with wheelchairs, artificial limbs, and crutches, and has already dispensed hundreds of wheelchairs, each costing from 2,300 to 2,500 [riyals]. By the

end of 1990, 4,565 disabled persons had been fitted with artificial limbs. Those who can still do some work are trained in jobs that will make it unnecessary for them to beg and enable them to earn their living by their own hands—trades such as tailoring, tentmaking, weaving, and shoemaking—and the committee tries to arrange job opportunities for them. The committee has begun a plan to pay monthly salaries to the handicapped and has set the support payment for each disabled person at 2,500 riyals per year. The third group of people who receive special care from the committee are widows. The committee provides some of them with jobs sewing women's clothes and making quilts. It issues sewing machines to some of them, in addition to paying them monthly salaries in the program of stipulated contributions. The committee has set the yearly support of a widow at 1,500 riyals.

Health Care

Having been among the refugees since the beginning of their emigration and holy war, the Saudi Relief Committee understood the importance of filling the gap that Western health agencies were trying to exploit. The committee was quick to respond to the repeated appeals of the mujahidin for Muslim doctors and medicine. Health work is the responsibility of the Saudi Red Crescent, which, with a budget of 15 million riyals per year, fully covered by the Government of the Arab Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, has opened 22 clinics in refugee camps to date, treating at least 61,170 patients a month. It has also opened a tuberculosis hospital and a medical institute to graduate medical assistants, and pays for treating difficult cases in private hospitals. Nevertheless, the Saudi Relief Committee also contributes greatly to the medical work. It has established the Mecca Surgical Hospital in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan. This hospital had a capacity of 120 beds. After it moved to a new building rented by the committee, it was expanded to 160 beds. In this hospital, difficult operations have been performed on patients transferred from other hospitals. Nearly 15,000 operations have been performed there on mujahidin. The hospital has a yearly budget of \$1.5 million and is directed by a Saudi physician. Its outpatient clinics treat an average of 3,948 patients a month. The committee opened a medical treatment clinic in Peshawar six years ago and provided it with the most modern equipment. God has made it a blessing to many of those injured in the holy war. It was recently turned over to the management and operation of the Saudi Red Crescent. The committee also provides medicines for the Mecca Hospital. At the beginning of its operation, the committee provided Afghan hospitals with medicines worth 21 million Pakistani rupees. It provided equipment to some hospitals and opened a central laboratory in the city of Quetta to serve all the health facilities in the region. The Mecca Hospital has recently been incorporated into a medical complex in a new building. The committee pays for transporting sick and wounded patients who cannot be treated in Pakistan to specialized hospitals in Saudi Arabia. The committee

provides medical treatment and preventive health care for the orphans it supports in boarding schools. It visits bedridden hospital patients and distributes money to them, improving their spirits and helping them provide a living for their families. It buys the blood needed for certain operations. There is little interest in giving blood, due to lack of awareness among some and bad nutrition among many.

Charity Projects

An emigration of 3.5 million persons into a poor neighboring country demands great efforts and huge budgets. Although the Saudi Relief Committee has found that the areas for supporting and relieving our Afghan brothers are too many to be counted or covered, it has done its best to meet some of the refugees' general needs through charity projects. The refugees have begun to enjoy clean water from wells. Children have begun to find their way to an educational complex that gathers them into school buildings that the committee has built. The men of the community now gather for worship in committee-built mosques, instead of worshipping in the open in the wind, dust, and cold. The committee has built over 200 mosques to date. Some are large mosques built of reinforced concrete, costing an average of 200,000 riyals; some are medium-sized mosques costing about 50,000 riyals each; and some are temporary adobe mosques in the camps, costing between 5,000 and 10,000 riyals. Because of the great interest in contributing for building these mosques, the camps almost have enough of them, and the committee is now concentrating on permanent mosques. The Afghan refugees will benefit from them, but they will not lose their usefulness when, God permitting, the refugees return to Afghanistan, because the sites have been chosen to be in or near Pakistani villages. The committee has begun to provide preachers and muezzins. Thirty preachers have been appointed to date. Another important project is a center to train the disabled, orphans, and widows in the Nasirbagh camp near Peshawar. It takes in nearly 700 disabled persons and orphans, and contains work rooms in various departments, dormitories, a mosque, a restaurant, a bakery, and a school. It also includes departments for making clothes; weaving blankets; repairing shoes; making tents; a metalworking shop to make wheelchairs, beds, and classroom chairs for the orphan schools; an electrical shop; a mechanical shop for cars and plumbing; a carpentry shop; and a quilt department. Nearly 4,000 widows benefit from this center and work at making quilts and sewing women's clothing. Each receives wages for her work, and the production goes into the committee's storehouses for distribution to refugees in the relief programs. Special training courses in these trades are held, and those who complete training are given diplomas and issued whatever will help them work outside the center. Some of the tailors graduated from the center have been appointed to jobs in the committee's orphanages to make clothes for the orphans. A smaller center has been established in the city of Quetta and will be developed, God willing. As for schools, the

committee has constructed some buildings for orphanages; some of them are still in rented houses. The committee is developing its work according to the resources available.

Task Forces Formed To Study Unified Gulf Army

91AE0613A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
29 Aug 91 p 4

[Article by 'Isam Hashish: "Special Teams Formed To Study Creating Unified Gulf Army"]

[Text] Muscat, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau—Army chiefs of staff from the GCC countries ended their two-day emergency meeting in the Omani capital of Muscat yesterday. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss technical aspects and details of the ideas that the Higher Security Committee, chaired by Sultan Qabus bin Sa'id had formulated concerning the creation of a unified Gulf army capable of preserving the independence and national sovereignty of the GCC countries and deterring any aggression against them.

It was decided to form a number of working groups that would be entrusted with the task of discussing the details needed to translate the concept of creating a unified Gulf army into the realm of reality and implementation.

In statements to the press after the final session, GCC Secretary General 'Abdallah Ya'qub Bisharah said that the task placed before the chiefs of staff is not an easy one. The goal is to build a unified, capable Gulf army within a set timeframe to embody the principle of self-reliance, defend the national soil, and preserve independence and national sovereignty.

Responding to a question about whether the Gulf army would be incorporated into the "peninsula shield" forces, he said: "The subject was brought up in the deliberations of the chiefs of staff, but the details will be discussed in the working groups that have been formed."

He noted that the deliberations had taken account of the Kuwait tragedy and its ramifications in all areas, and that the ideas need to be worked out in detail. The chiefs of staff decided to form working groups to discuss the details; the chiefs of staff will then meet again this autumn.

A responsible source in the General Secretariat thought that the meeting would probably take place early in October.

The concluding session of the chiefs of staff met at 0800 yesterday at the al-Ghabrah guesthouse in Muscat and was attended by GCC heads and delegations. It lasted more than two and a half hours.

The chairman of the session, Staff Lieutenant General Khamis ibn-Hamid al-Kalbani, chief of staff of the Omani armed forces, delivered a speech, in which he said: "The prevailing spirit of cooperation among the

delegation heads promoted the making of timely recommendations that will contribute effectively to the future course of Gulf cooperation in the military and security area to achieve the security and stability we seek."

Al-Kalbani stated that responsibility for realizing peace in the region is undoubtedly the responsibility of the region's people. He said, "God has given us many of his blessings. Harnessing them for the sake of the security we seek is a goal we are all striving to realize."

Al-Kalbani pointed to the sincere interest that the chiefs of staff had shown during their meeting regarding the preliminary concept for the formation of a joint independent force for the GCC countries. He said this reflected awareness, comprehension, and a sense that the security of the Gulf is the responsibility of its people.

In closing remarks, 'Abdallah Ya'qub Bisharah thanked Sultan Qabus bin Sa'id for his great contribution to the course of military and security cooperation as chairman of the Higher Security Committee. He also thanked the government and people of the Sultanate of Oman and the Omani armed forces for all the efforts they had made to prepare well for the meeting.

Bisharah described the meeting as special, held under special circumstances and for a special purpose. He said that the deliberations had been clear, the discussions candid, and the goals manifest. He hoped that the next meeting in the fall would be on the way to implementing this mission as a big step toward realizing greater Gulf cooperation in the military and security areas.

A number of delegation heads left the sultanate yesterday by air and land. Staff Lieutenant General Khamis al-Kalbani, chief of staff of the Omani armed forces, and Staff Major General 'Ali ibn-Rashid al-Kalbani, commander of the Royal Omani Army, and a large number of officers of the Sultan's armed forces bade them farewell.

Restructuring of Arab League Justice Court Discussed

*91AE0613B Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic
16 Aug 91 p 7*

[Article by Dr. Muhammad al-Majdhub: "Plan for an Arab Justice Court To Solve Disputes Peacefully"]

[Text] At the next Arab League council session, to be held this September, Arab foreign ministers will discuss a plan to create a court of justice whose basic mission will be to resolve disputes between Arab states in peaceful ways. The idea of the plan is old; its history goes back to the period of the League's birth. Article 19 of the League charter states: "This charter may be amended to create an Arab court of justice with the approval of two-thirds of the League's states."

There were intensive efforts during the fifties and sixties to create such a court, but they were not crowned with

success. At the beginning of the seventies, Mahmud Riyad, then secretary general of the League, asked some Arab jurists to draft a basic statute for the court. They completed the task in 1973, and the draft was submitted to the committee of experts commissioned to amend the charter. The committee approved the draft in 1981. It was then submitted to each individual Arab state. They studied it and introduced several amendments to it. Last year the plan won the approval of a majority of member states. It will be submitted next month to the League's council for approval and for final submission to the Arab summit conference. Thus, we see that the plan's journey has been a long one.

League's Role in Solving Disputes

The desire to create such a court comes from the Arab League's inadequacy in performing its role of resolving Arab disputes and conflicts. Turning to the legal texts concerning this role, we find that the most important of them is Article 5 of the League's charter. It states the following:

"Force shall not be employed to resolve conflicts between two or more states of the League. If a conflict arises between them unrelated to the state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity; and the parties to the conflict turn to the League to resolve the dispute, its decision shall be operative and binding."

"In this case, the countries in the dispute shall not participate in the council's deliberations and decisions."

"The council shall mediate any dispute that threatens to cause war between a League state and any other state, whether a League member or not, to reconcile the two. Arbitration decisions and mediation resolutions shall pass by majority vote."

A quick reading of this text suggests the following important observations:

First, when the founders of the League drafted Article 5, they were influenced by Western conventions in the period between the [world] wars, particularly the spirit of the League of Nations charter. Before the League of Nations was created, a trend emerged that aimed at regulating the use of force in certain relevant cases. This trend was embodied in such theories and agreements as:

- the [Darjeau] theory that a state should not be compelled by force to repay its public debts;
- the Porter Agreement on not resorting to armed force to recover the contractual debts of a state's subjects;
- the [Bryan] Treaty, mandating submission of every dispute between contracting parties, which is not resolved diplomatically, to a permanent investigating committee and prohibiting the use of force before completion of the investigation.

When the League of Nations was established, its charter (Articles 10-16) contained several principles and rules for peacefully resolving disputes between states. These

principles obliged member states, whenever a conflict endangering world peace arose between them, not to resort to arms before exhausting peaceful means. The most important of these means were submitting the matter to the assembly or council, to arbitration courts, or to the permanent court of international justice. During the era of the League, a number of agreements were signed to prohibit the use of force.

Second, as an international regional organization, the Arab League was heavily influenced by the ideas and attitudes that dominated the work of the allied powers' jurists, who met in the fall of 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks in the United States to lay the foundations for the United Nations. The idea of regional organizations was raised for discussion and debate during the drafting of the UN charter. Many believed that such organizations aimed, or should aim, at realizing two important goals:

- Strengthening ties between geographically neighboring states or between states similar in civilization, ideology, nationality, culture, or economy,
- Coordinating cooperation between such states in various areas and helping them protect their interests, defend their borders and sovereignty, and achieve security, peace, and understanding among themselves.

But the officials divided into two groups. One group advocated making do with the world organization. They opposed the establishment of regional organizations, which they saw as a danger threatening the international community with the proliferation of hostile blocs and increased international tension. The other group supported the establishment of such organizations. They recognized the strength of the regional bonds linking certain countries and affirmed that the UN would need the help of such organizations in political, economic, and cultural matters.

The drafters of the UN charter followed the view of the second group. They recognized that regional organizations could play an effective role in serving peace, achieving world prosperity, settling regional conflicts peacefully, and helping the UN in many of its tasks. The charter devoted its eighth section to discussing regional agreements and organizations.

Third, the Arab League adopted a compromise in Article 5 of its charter to reconcile two lines of thought: one favoring compulsory arbitration, the other favoring voluntary arbitration. Thus, the expression, "Force shall not be employed," was used, but all disputes involving a state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity were exempted from the matters over which the League was empowered. Member states were left free to turn to the League's council, which was assigned the role of mediator and reconciler.

Fourth, like other regional organizations, the Arab League embraced the principle of replacing the inclination to resort to force or war by the inclination to resolve

conflicts by peaceful methods. We can deduce from the UN charter and various international agreements that there are four main ways to resolve conflicts amicably: diplomatic methods (negotiation, benevolent efforts, and mediation); political methods (submitting conflicts to world and regional organizations); arbitration methods (submitting conflicts to voluntary or compulsory arbitration); and judicial methods (submitting conflicts to international courts of justice).

The Arab League charter left to the League council the task of arranging settlements by peaceful means, but alluded in Article 19 to the possible creation of an Arab court of justice to settle Arab conflicts judicially. But as we have seen, this possibility remained a mere hope in the mind of some people.

Fifth, Article 5 does not order member Arab states to submit their disputes and conflicts to the League council; it leaves them freedom of choice and conduct. This position agrees with the tendency toward caution that states still show regarding the phenomenon of international organizations. States that agree to join an international organization in response to popular demand or specific needs often act with caution within the organization and show ambivalence to any plan aimed at strengthening the organization at the expense of their sovereignty. The overwhelming majority of the world's countries still consider their freedom to choose the method of resolving their conflicts with other countries one of the manifestations of their full sovereignty.

In addition to Article 5 of the charter, we find another article (the first article of the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty, signed by the League's states in 1950) announcing more explicitly the Arab states' resolve to settle all their international conflicts peacefully, whether involving relations among themselves or relations with other countries.

This is the legal aspect that confronts us when we examine the principles the League uses to settle conflicts between members. However, in the Arab League, law has not yet been able to become a tool capable of ordering overall relations and coordinating the mutual links between Arab states. Thus, it is not enough to rely solely on the legal aspect in any study of Arab relations and conditions, for this will not allow us to learn the facts, realities, and background. Only an examination of actions can provide the researcher with correct information.

Actions Reveal Truths

When we take an overview of the method the Arab League has followed in resolving Arab conflicts, we reach the following important conclusions and impressions:

1. In all conflicts that have been submitted to it or that it has confronted and treated, the Arab League has preferred to use political and diplomatic methods. It has never attempted to rely on arbitral or judicial methods. Although the League has made do with the

NEAR EAST

method of political negotiation, its efforts have not been successful in all cases. Although the League has had the opportunity to deal with dozens of conflicts, it never has dared to issue a single judgment condemning any party to any conflict. The League's inclination toward mediation, reconciliation, and friendly efforts has always led it to avoid assuming the role of judge or arbiter.

2. The League's activity in the area of conflict resolution has always been characterized by wavering, slowness, and hesitation. Some countries have submitted urgent complaints to the League's general secretariat, but it has taken days or weeks before the League council met to consider them.

3. Many conflicts that have proved intractable to the League have found their solution outside the League. Sometimes a solution has come about because of a change of regime or a change of conditions in one of the Arab countries—in other words, because of circumstances unrelated to the League's will or action.

4. Some Arab conflicts submitted to the League have been clothed in a personal character or have reflected personal antagonism or mistrust between political leaders.

5. On occasion the League has taken an attitude of indifference to certain Arab conflicts, as if they did not concern it or damage its authority and standing.

6. Corresponding to the League's attitude of indifference, the attitude of member states is frequently marked by lack of confidence in the League and its ability to resolve Arab disputes.

7. One type of Arab conflicts arose before one of the parties to the conflict joined the League or because one of the parties wanted to join the League.

8. Some Arab disputes really have not been conflicts between two parties, but have been over a position on certain problems or issues.

9. The League's role has not been limited to attempts to resolve conflicts between member states; it has extended to interceding (always with the agreement of the parties involved) to resolve internal conflicts and civil wars (e.g., the Lebanese civil war, with the sending of Arab deterrent forces).

10. None of the Arab disputes and antagonisms that the League has treated has gone beyond the bounds of skirmishing, troop mobilization, muscle flexing, threats, exchanging accusations, broadcasting rumors, closing borders, and sometimes provocations and attacks along common borders.

11. Some Arab conflicts that have erupted suddenly can be explained only by the desire of some Arab regimes to create problems and difficulties for Arab countries about to become independent or newly independent, in order to absorb them, obtain part of their resources, or benefit from their position.

12. The outward or stated reason for a large number of Arab conflicts was a cover for the real or actual reason. Many disputes about boundaries were not really border disputes, but ideological, or between regimes following different political and social schools. Unfortunately, the League busied itself dealing with the outward causes without concerning itself with the real causes—if it did not prefer to stand with its hands tied.

13. The League's role in settling Arab disputes has been influenced by the changing climate and divergent interests dominating relations between the different international camps.

14. The League's role in settling Arab disputes has been, and still is, greatly influenced by the politics of the Arab world.

In short, the League's role in resolving Arab disputes has been disappointing. Some have justified this feeling of disappointment by saying that the League is only a reflection of Arab conditions and relations. This justification is wrong. When the League was established and evoked hopes, it was seen as charting a course of solidarity that would pave the way for Arab unity.

Some think that one of the reasons for the League's inability is its lack of an Arab court of justice. Will the creation of a court help alleviate Arab conflicts? Will the national disaster produced by the Gulf war be a lesson and warning to the Arab states, which have never been adept at settling their disputes peacefully? Now that these states have resolved to revitalize the League, will they become convinced of the need to look to the law, reason, and the pan-Arab interest in all their dealings, even if the matter involves a dispute with an Arab brother?

We can only hope and wish.

GCC Information Director on Broadcasting Plans

91WT0184Z Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic
31 Aug 91 p 6

[Interview with Dr. 'Abdallah al-Jasir, the general information director in the Gulf Cooperation Council secretariat, by 'Aqil Muhsin al-'Anzi [?]; place and date not given]

[Text] In an interview with AL-RIYAD, Dr. 'Abdallah al-Jasir, the general information director in the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] secretariat, and the supervisor of AL-TA'AWUN [Cooperation] magazine, denied that foreign television broadcasts were being beamed directly at the GCC countries.

He stated that an idea to establish an international radio station with advanced capabilities and a highly qualified staff was presented to, and approved by, the GCC information ministers in their sixth meeting, held recently in Kuwait. The secretariat has commissioned

the studies needed to establish the station, which will promote the GCC's goals and views.

Dr. al-Jasir expressed the hope of being able to tune in shortly to an international Gulf broadcast.

Al-Jasir added that the Gulf press has achieved considerable technological progress, having introduced computers, photographic typesetting, automatic layout, etc.

He stated that coordination and cooperation between Gulf press agencies and affiliates will continue to be a primary GCC concern and line of activity.

In response to a question regarding the volume of information programs provided by the Joint GCC Program Production Organization to television stations in member countries, Dr. al-Jasir stated:

"The Joint Program Production Organization was established to serve radio and television activity; highlight the characteristics of the Gulf population; link their modern history to their ancient heritage; present aspects of Arab literature and arts on radio and television; revitalize Gulf heritage, especially the popular arts, by documenting them to serve as an historical source; present the geographical, population, and tourism aspects of all areas of the GCC countries; improve the technical abilities and professionalism of television and radio station employees in the GCC countries; allow these employees to gain different skills through continuous contact among production staff; discover, train, encourage, and display the talents of promising people in various artistic, literary, and scientific fields; and develop the artistic, literary, and scientific potential of the domestic cadres. Finally, the organization produces programs on Islamic heritage that present Islam's distinguished persons and glorious heroes and leaders. Outstanding efforts were made to establish the organization. It has addressed many diversified groups of viewers. A series called "Your Welfare" deals with health issues, and for children, there is the "Open Sesame" series and many other programs, such as "Discoverer" and heritage and documentary programs. The organization is a technical agency specializing in radio and television broadcasting for the GCC. It will be focusing on a number of economic, political and social fields; areas of interest to children, women, and persons with intermediate and higher education; the dubbing of foreign films, etc. The organization has a good budget, in which the information ministries of the six GCC countries share. However, the organization is seeking private funding for several programs. On this occasion, I call on government organizations and companies and private-sector companies to fund several programs in exchange for truthful advertising. I make this call after the GCC information ministers, at their fifth meeting on 6 June 1990 at the general secretariat's headquarters in Riyadh, approved the broadcasting of television programs produced for GCC countries with funding from their private sectors, especially joint companies, under the supervision of the general secretariat. It has now been decided to produce a

fourth generation of the "Open Sesame" series. We hope that state and national companies wishing to provide funding and be advertised on this series will contact the GCC general secretariat. Companies and organizations that provide funding will be mentioned in the introduction to the series. In addition, the general secretariat, through the organization's 1992 program plan, is relieving many of the concerns of joint television and radio production and putting at ease domestic stations, because they have their separate concerns. The general secretariat is also seeking financiers to produce, through the organization, films on the importance of planning, counternarcotics issues, environmental pollution, the maintenance of public utilities, the instilling of a feeling of individual and collective responsibility regarding these issues, water and electricity conservation, etc."

Regarding measures taken by the GCC to confront the so-called satellite television invasion, Dr. al-Jasir stated:

"Based on a decision by the five information ministers, the general secretariat has commissioned the King Sa'ud University Engineering School to conduct a technical study on direct television transmission via satellites in the Gulf region. This study explains television transmission via satellites from a technical standpoint, and explains how new technology in this area differs from older methods, such as television transmission via communication satellites and domestic television transmission via television towers. The study also explains how direct television transmission systems operate and the difference between the facts of television transmission and what people are hearing and reading in the media, which has created widespread misunderstanding. The study indicates that:

"Household television antennas, whether fixed on televisions or roofs, cannot pick up or receive microwaves. Consequently, they cannot receive television programs beamed at the ground, regardless of the strength or amplification of the signal. In order to receive television programs from satellites, we need a ground station. In order for a ground station to receive satellite-transmitted television programs, it must be precisely aimed at the transmitting satellite. In order for a small ground station with an antenna having a diameter of less than 1 meter to pick up television transmission from a direct broadcast satellite, the satellite transmission would have to be radiated at a power of 55 to 65 decibels [above] watt over a frequency range of 11,700 to 12,700 megahertz. Ground stations, such as the small ground stations in Europe operating with the TDF [expansion not given] direct transmission satellite or ASTRA, cannot receive television programs clearly from satellites transmitting at weak radiating powers. Such stations would not be able to pick up any satellite in the Gulf region, given their smallness and the weakness of the power of the waves falling on the Arab Gulf countries. No direct transmission satellite covers the Gulf at present. Direct television transmission satellites are currently limited to several European countries, America, and Japan. The

North African Arab countries are influenced by European direct transmission television satellites. Arab press reports and statements made by senior officials regarding the direct beaming of foreign television broadcasts at the GCC countries are absolutely incorrect.

"The important thing here is not to go overboard regarding theoretical theses on cultural hegemony, the intellectual invasion, and other such matters presented in the media. All of us believe that negative factors exist. However, we also welcome positive factors. Protection comes from within the individual and the family. As long as the domestic media are unable to improve their product and treat the people's issues and concerns, as long as they cannot avoid traditionalism in their presentation, the effects of domestic broadcasting might not be less dangerous or worse than the negative effects of direct transmission. It is useless for developing countries to utilize their capabilities to mount technical resistance through satellite mines or electronic countermeasures. Instead, programs should be improved to attract viewers. The competition is intense. Ending it might be technically difficult in the future. The general secretariat is especially concerned about this and will form a technical team to research satellite communications, oversee satellite specifications, and advise officials. It is also important to have a strong influence internationally on the formulation of legislation and technical regulations issued by the international federation, in addition to the legislation regulating the entry of ground stations that has been enacted in almost every country, including the GCC countries."

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PNSF Chairman Al-Fahum on PNC, Peace Conference

92AE0016C Jerusalem AL-MANAR in Arabic
23 Sep 91 p 9

[Interview With Khalid al-Fahum, Palestinian National Salvation Front Chairman (PNSF); place and date not given; "Salvation Front Chairman Khalid al-Fahum: We Want To Attend Peace Conference as Independent Party"]

[Text] [AL-MANAR] Before you explain the disagreement between the PLO leadership and the Salvation Front at the political and organizational levels, I would like to know your opinion of the preceding phase, i.e., since the PNC [Palestine National Council] met in Algeria.

[Fahum] In truth, the procession has been characterized by decline and retreat since 1988. One of the reasons for this is the official PLO position on the Gulf war and the PLO's alignment with Iraq's occupation of and aggression against Kuwait. This position has caused the PLO to lose extensive Arab and international support. It has also created numerous problems to a large number of Palestinians who have been compelled to leave Kuwait.

These Palestinians provided support for our kinsmen in the occupied territories and for the intifadah. This support has been halted. Therefore, the PLO's position and the Palestinians' position is weak. To put it briefly, the PLO's past procession has been characterized by retreat.

[AL-MANAR] Without bringing up the circumstances and events that materialized last year, what is your assessment of the political procession?

[Fahum] Our disagreement began with the PLO leadership, and I don't say with the PLO, because we are a part of the PLO, over the large number of concessions that the leadership made free of charge, such its acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, its renunciation of armed struggle, and its abolition of the charter. Moreover, the PLO has spoken officially and repeatedly about its willingness to establish a federal union or confederacy with Israel. This is a big mistake that deprives the Palestinian struggle of all its components. This is why our disagreement with the organization has reached this stage. The PLO has nothing to offer because it has made all its concessions free of charge. What we see and feel now is the U.S. and Israeli determination not to let the PLO participate in the settlement process.

Between Statements and Official Positions

[AL-MANAR] According to my information, the proposed federal union or confederacy is with Jordan, not Israel.

[Fahum] More than one statement has been made by the PLO leadership to the effect that it extends its hand to Shamir and that it is prepared to establish a relationship with Israel.

[AL-MANAR] Shouldn't we make a distinction between a statement made for media consumption and official statements that are binding to the PLO, of whose leadership you are a member?

[Fahum] Of course, such a statement [media-oriented] is not binding to us. But when a statement issues from the PLO leadership, it is considered binding.

[AL-MANAR] But the PNC resolutions are binding to the PLO politicians and information people, meaning that the statements that come from here or there have no legal or binding power.

[Fahum] If they are not binding, then they are damaging, especially when they come from the leadership, because they create great confusion and division in the Palestinian ranks.

[AL-MANAR] How do you view the settlement process?

[Fahum] We support the settlement process and insist on the presence of the PLO as an independent party on an equal footing with the other parties.

[AL-MANAR] What is your assessment of the outcome of Baker's tours?

[Fahum] We are for peace and we want a just and comprehensive peace. We want a just and comprehensive peace and we want the PLO to be present as an independent party. This is what Baker rejects to this moment and this is why we object to this aspect of his policy. We want international legitimacy to be applied and we want the PLO to be present. This is why we object to this aspect of Baker's policy. As for whatever concerns the peace conference, we have no objection to it.

[AL-MANAR] The peace conference in its proposed forms?

[Fahum] We insist on the presence of the PLO as an independent party or as part of a single Arab delegation.

[AL-MANAR] But not within a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation?

[Fahum] We have struggled for 20 years to establish the Palestinian character and identity. We do not wish to be fused.

[AL-MANAR] But the fusion will also occur within a joint Arab delegation.

[Fahum] We prefer to participate within a delegation formed of more than two countries.

[AL-MANAR] Do you agree with the phased policy proposed for the peace conference?

[Fahum] A phased policy serves Israel and we believe that it is an attempt to avoid implementing the resolutions of the United Nations and of the international legitimate authority.

[AL-MANAR] What do you propose for putting the "Palestinian house" in order?

[Fahum] I propose that a comprehensive dialogue be initiated. The PLO is not in a strong position. It is in a weak position at the Arab, international, and Palestinian levels. This is why a true and comprehensive national unity is essential. This unity is achieved by organizing a comprehensive dialogue in which all agree on a political and organizational program, and by forming a preparatory committee to arrange for holding the new PNC. Without comprehensive unity, the PLO will remain weak and with little influence in the international policy balance.

Participation By All

[AL-MANAR] All speak about the necessity of unity. What practical steps do you propose?

[Fahum] All the resistance movement factions, national figures, and representatives of the Palestinian groupings, wherever they may be, must take part in the unity about which I have spoken. The PNC must include a good percentage of members from the occupied territories,

meaning that it must be a national council for all Palestinians, at home and abroad. The PNC must also establish—and this is most important—a collective leadership, not an individual leadership. A collective leadership is a must for Palestinian action. Else, we will slip into numerous mistakes and pitfalls.

[AL-MANAR] What is the participation proportion and on what quota basis should it be?

[Fahum] The truth is that the resistance factions are important. But the Palestinian people are more important. The majority of the Palestinian people do not belong to factions. This is why most of the seats must go for independents, for Palestinian capabilities, and for representatives of refugee camps and Palestinian concentrations.

There must be some sort of balance, not to mention equality, between the factions. But predominance in the PNC must not belong to just one faction.

[AL-MANAR] But independents are present in the current PNC.

[Fahum] The number of independents in the current PNC does not exceed 150, i.e., they comprise no more than one-third. Believe me, two-thirds of these 150 belong to factions. They are independent in name only.

We Have No Conditions

[AL-MANAR] You had the beginnings of a serious dialogue with the PLO leadership. But then obstacles surfaced. What are these obstacles and how can they be overcome?

[Fahum] The truth is that we conveyed to brother Yasir 'Arafat, the Executive Committee chairman, our agreement to hold a dialogue. But we have received no response from brother Yasir 'Arafat to date. We have no conditions. All we want is dialogue. We have no conditions other than adherence to the singularity of the PLO's representation of the Palestinian people and to its independence, as well as adherence to the resolutions of the successive PNC sessions, to the national consensus program, and to the program of repatriation, self-determination, and an independent state. These are not conditions. These are axioms. This is why we are prepared to go for a dialogue with brother Yasir 'Arafat and with the other factions. We wish the dialogue to be comprehensive and to include everybody, because we want true national unity.

[AL-MANAR] Practically, what are the obstacles that impede the progress of dialogue?

[Fahum] We are in the direst need of national unity. Otherwise, we will not be able to confront the forthcoming serious phase, which will witness a peace conference in which the PLO must be represented as an independent party through national unity.

In my opinion, the obstacles are much less significant than the serious nature of the coming phase. One of these obstacles, for example, is: Should brother Abu-Musa attend as representative of Fatah-Intifadah or in his own behalf? Brother Abu-Musa insists on attending in his organization's name. Should 'Arabi 'Awwad attend in his own name or in the name of his organization, the Revolutionary Communist Party? These organizations have been in existence for more than eight years. So why shouldn't they attend as organizations, and why the insistence on their participation as independent individuals? This is one of the most significant obstacles facing a dialogue. The Salvation Front welcomes participation by all.

[AL-MANAR] There are those who call for holding dialogue at two levels: First, a dialogue between you and the PLO leadership and, second, between the PLO leadership and Hamas Movement and the [Palestinian] Islamic Jihad. Do you support this distinction?

[Fahum] I prefer a comprehensive dialogue that encompasses everybody. But if Hamas or Jihad don't favor a comprehensive dialogue, then we are prepared to hold a separate dialogue with the PLO.

[AL-MANAR] There have been repeated reports that Jamal al-Surani will succeed Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Sa'ih. Do you approve of al-Surani's nomination?

[Fahum] This is something to which the PNC is entitled. I have no objection to anybody as long as he has PNC approval.

[AL-MANAR] And you personally?

[Fahum] Brother Jamal is an honorable brother and I am proud of his friendship.

West Bank Notables on PLO Role in Peace Process

*9IAE0619A Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 17 Aug 91 pp 17-20*

[Article: "Dialogue on Palestinian Phase and Regional Conference: Palestinian Unity and What PLO Must Do"]

[Text] The current peace initiatives in the region, which have been stepped up because of Baker's trips to the area since the end of the Gulf war to meet with area leaders, including Palestinian national leaders, have become the round-the-clock concern of our Palestinian people, young and old, and the focus of their attention.

This is because, if such efforts are destined to continue, they could have a future historic impact on the Palestinian leadership and the future of the Palestinian people.

In the face of differing viewpoints in the Palestinian arena concerning the analysis and comprehension of the given facts, and the consequent disparate visions of the

proposed peace conference, in terms of its ability to offer relevant definitive answers about the Palestinian issue, AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI decided to make this issue of the hour—the regional conference and Palestinian participation—its first order of business during its panel discussions which, in the coming weeks, will attempt to take up other fateful topics related to our people's political, economic, educational, social, and other issues.

Accordingly, AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI sent an invitation to each of the following Palestinian notables: Radwan Abu-'Ayyash; Samiyyah Khalil; Dr. Riyad al-Maliki; Dr. Peter Qamari; and Prof. Ghassan al-Khatib, who was unable to attend.

The panel, which was held at AL-BAYADIR's headquarters and lasted about two and a half hours, was moderated by a group of AL-BAYADIR journalists in the presence of the managing editor.

We are full of hope that this step by AL-BAYADIR will offer answers to some questions our readers have about the whole host of Palestinian positions vis-a-vis the regional peace conference.

AL-BAYADIR's coverage of the panel will not be confined to the notables who have been invited to offer their views. We welcome any input or response to the opinions of the panelists, which we shall publish in an effort to ensure the continuation of internal Palestinian debates on various important issues.

We hope this panel will offer our readers a new door through which they can interact with all the Palestinian panelists.

Regional Conference and Palestinian Participation

Dr. Peter Qamari: "I believe that the Palestinian question is an equation consisting of the PLO as the first half, which is equal to the second half, namely, the entire Palestinian people and their leadership, including the Palestinian National Charter. I am absolutely certain that any deficiency in the components of the second half has a negative impact on the first half and vice versa."

"Current American policy is seeking change the second half in an effort to render the notion of the PLO, which is based on the whole equation, meaningless. Furthermore, America continues to toy with the Palestinian people in an attempt to find Palestinian alternatives to the PLO."

"Moreover, the American-Israeli memo of understanding underscores the fact that the American initiative is aimed not so much at charting a peace map, as at subjugating the Arab and Palestinian people to American policy, the sole post-Gulf war policy in the region."

"I do not think that Palestinian participation will be effective, even if the PLO were to announce that the delegation would act on its behalf, for, in light of general Arab impotence, the collapse of the military option, and national propositions steering clear of Palestinian

action, the peace process basically flows into the crucible of a surrenderist solution imposed upon the Arab side.

"Consequently, the peace conference is nothing but a post-Gulf war "face-saving concoction at the American and Arab levels," prepared under the guise of legitimacy and American pledges to the Arabs to resolve the issue. This prompted America to try to wash its hands of the Palestinian problem before its people and the Arabs.

"Therefore, I reject the regional conference that, under the weak Arab status quo, will lead to the liquidation of the cause. Invoking realism is an unacceptable act of capitulation, and using the absence of an alternative as an excuse is also an unacceptable condition forcibly imposed on the Arab region, particularly after the Gulf war."

Mrs. Samihah Khalil (Umm Khalil):

"Our people endorsed the national constants in 1989 in Algiers, which represented the minimum level of rights for which the Palestinian people will settle. The Palestinians must rally around this level, given the many concessions we made in 1948, 1967, and 1978. Besides, the PLO has presented peaceful initiatives guaranteeing peace and security to Israel, but they have been turned down. Therefore, we must continue our efforts to achieve our goals.

"In the most recent phase, the United States stepped up its efforts right after the Gulf war to put its peaceful proposals on the world map, as it perceives it, to achieve two goals:

"First, to abolish the Arab boycott. Second, to realize universal Arab recognition of Israel by each country separately. Despite the fact that the United States has rejected the policy of pre-conditions by the Arab Palestinians, it upholds this right for Israel, who refuses to attend the conference unless its conditions, related to the conference's every detail, substance, and participants, are met.

"We, as Palestinians, introduced our initiative at the Algiers meetings and passed it to end the suffering and for the sake of peace. I do not suspect for a minute that those meetings with Baker or the PLO will waive the Palestinian constants, because to do that is to give up their souls, unless such concessions are meant to imply to the world that we are not the ones rejecting peace.

"I personally refuse to sit with the Americans or the Israelis under any circumstances while our rights are oppressed. What is important is not the form of the conference, but rather, its substance and expected benefits—which will determine whether we will participate or not—benefits we ought to make known in advance: a state, Jerusalem, repatriation, and total withdrawal via the international conference."

Dr. Riyad al-Maliki:

"In order to address the issue of whether or not to participate in the proposed conference, many detailed questions on the conference ought to be answered, such as:

"Definition: Is it an international conference, as defined in the Palestinian peace plan? Is it regional? Is it peace or is it surrender? Is it an agreement or a forced peace? Is it a settlement? It is obvious that it is regional, that it is surrenderist, that it is imposed on the Palestinian side, and, ultimately, that it is a settlement.

"What is the conference required to do? According to the American-Israeli proposition, it is required to end the state of war and the boycott; to normalize relations and popularize Camp David; and to put an end to the Palestinian problem in exchange for continued occupation of the land.

"On what bases will it be convened? These bases, as far as America and Israel are concerned, can be summed up as follows: 'No to the PLO; no to withdrawal as a condition; no to an international conference; no to the UN; no to the right of repatriation; no to talks on Jerusalem; no to the right of self-determination; and no to a Palestinian state.' This is to say nothing of the Israeli conditions related to the composition of the Palestinian delegation. All these bases favor the other side. From the outset, the Israelis presented their position, as did the Palestinians, and Baker's mission was to draw the Palestinians to the Israeli position rather than to reconcile the two.

"What results are the conference expected to achieve? The results that can be attained, should the conference be held, are:

- "Putting a stop to the current state of affairs. This may be in the form of an Israeli precondition before the conference gets under way, or that holding of negotiations would lead to the suspension and neutralization of events.
- "The moment the PLO participates, not as an independent delegation but as part of a joint delegation, means that it has relinquished its independence.
- "An attendant agreement would be signed by Palestinian elements, and not the PLO, and such an agreement would be on a Palestinian self-rule that falls short of the Palestinian constants, thereby thwarting any future attempts by any Palestinian side to obtain a higher ceiling. Should this occur, what reason would the PLO have to persist and to survive after Palestinian self-rule is ratified?
- "Results attained through negotiations will fall short of self-rule. To be content with that is to waive the Palestinian constants. Is this what we want or what we aspire to? Is this what is required at this stage?

"We can thus assess the reality of the conference and participation in it. We, as a people and as a leadership, must not refuse for the sake of refusing. Indeed, we are

on the side of a just and lasting peace that can achieve the constants. We are ready to go anywhere and sit with anyone if the conference is held in accordance with Palestinian conditions as a preconception."

Mr. Radwan Abu-'Ayyash:

"The facts, the dimensions, and the reasons for holding the conference must be understood, and we must not say yes or no just to be saying something. We must ascertain where the conference stands on legitimate Palestinian rights as part of a universal political vision at the Arab and international levels, and within the proposed Palestinian alternatives.

"At the Arab level, most of the Arab countries, Syria and Jordan in particular, have endorsed the conference and agreed to participate in it. The Palestinians have not said their final word yet, which means that the Arabs have waived all viable options outside the American will.

"At the Palestinian level, the Israeli Government knows that it needs peace with the Arabs at the expense of the Palestinians, as was the case with the first Camp David. Right now, the Palestinians do not have any strategic depth, even though their historic national dimension is still there.

"From the international standpoint, what is international legitimacy in the absence of the Soviet Union, in the absence of international balance, and in the absence of the European givens? These things rest on America. Legitimacy is the Security Council that America convenes or adjourns at will.

"International legitimacy has a single, clear-cut, American dimension. The Palestinians have two options, which are:

- "First, try to enhance the conditions for joining the conference by adding Palestinian conditions, if possible.
- "Second, turn down and disrupt the conference, and try to find a true alternative with national dimensions. So far, the Palestinians have not reached a decision in this regard.

"The conference, as we know it, is replete with pitfalls and perils, and may be a historic turning point. Therefore, everything must be known—this is the right of every Palestinian—and carefully examined before rushing to make affirmative or negative decisions, because the decision to participate belongs to the constitutional establishments. If the conference is within the Palestinian constants, and might expand our rights, we will agree to it."

What Must the PLO Do At This Stage?

AL-BAYADIR posed this question to the panelists who responded, as follows:

Dr. Riyad al-Maliki: "The PLO must adopt a clear position vis-a-vis the people, their contributions, and

their cause, by not waiving the constants, and by unanimously unifying the national position and holding national conferences inside and outside the occupied territories so that the people may know what is going on. Furthermore, an agreement on principles established by the leadership outside the territories, and upheld by all Palestinians, must be announced. We must bear in mind what Baker said in his last press conference with King Husayn in 'Amman: 'The Palestinians will be the biggest winners if they attend and the biggest losers if they refuse.' This means that Palestinian attendance is basic to the holding and the success of the conference, and, if Palestinian presence is that important, participation must be accorded the same importance."

Umm Khalil: "Unity among the Palestinians is necessary. We also ask those who are meeting with Baker to disclose everything to us because we want to know what is going on, and whether it is truly in the interest of the cause, our trust in the leadership notwithstanding. We have the right to know what Baker is saying to them and what they are saying to Baker."

Dr. Peter: "Palestinian factions must base their judgment on the National Charter, which is the PLO's launch pad, and its articles are clear. The same applies to the established Palestinian constants that have not been challenged by any Palestinian, so to speak.

"Factions should also base their judgment on the national dimension of the cause, which is more national than regional. How can one embark on settlements while steering clear of its national concept and amid American and Israeli interpretations of Resolutions 242 and 338?

"The factions, moreover, must also base their judgment on the strategic dimension, rather than the interim, which may lead to the establishment of a mini-state. The Palestinian people must always work toward establishing their state on their historic land that has been recognized from time immemorial."

Radwan Abu-'Ayyash: "What is required is an elaborate, detailed study of all proposals, and not to be hasty in replying one way or another—if what is being proposed is inconsistent with Palestinian conditions—in order to realize the Palestinian people's inalienable rights."

Dimensions of Palestinian Refusal

When AL-BAYADIR interposed to ask about the likelihood of the United States and Israel exploiting a Palestinian refusal in order to accuse the PLO and Palestinians of impeding the peace process, and, conversely, Palestinian participation making Israel look to the world as the one refusing to implement the international legitimate authority's [UN's] resolutions, the panelists gave the following replies:

Dr. Peter: "The contention that failure to participate would lead America and its allies to blame the PLO is conceivable. As an Arab and Palestinian, I believe that the peace concept is relative. Israel's concept is the

security of a state established on historic land, and the Palestinian concept is the attainment of inalienable Palestinian rights. What is causing the disequilibrium and fostering the chances of failure is the disparity between these two concepts."

Dr. Riyad: "The PLO must be unequivocal with its people and with the world. We are not against peace. We are on the side of a just solution, and will be the first one to participate in it. Emphasis should be placed on the 1988 initiative and its principles, on international legitimacy, and on all UN and Security Council resolutions, from Resolution 181 up to the last resolution. We have nothing to lose when we realize that what is being proposed is self-rule rather than withdrawal, the right to self-determination, and the establishment of a state."

Umm Khalil: "I doubt that the PLO will waive the constants. There has to be an opposition, because it is healthy to do so. Israel and America must realize that the Palestinian people will not surrender, and are committed to their constants. Rather than ask the Palestinians to offer concessions or accuse them of impeding peace efforts, they must understand who refused the Palestinian initiative and who refuses to accept the PLO as the legitimate representative of our people, as was established in Rabat and at the UN."

National Unity

Asked about national unity as they perceived it, the panelists said:

Dr. Riyad: "Coordination must not be limited to the four factions, but must include all powers and establishments. For this is an important and pivotal issue in which everyone must take part. It must not be left to the executive committee and the four factions. The Palestinian card is strong and fundamental, and we must fully understand that the importance of our card lies in our unity."

Dr. Peter: "The rationale that the PLO represents the four factions is a fallacy, because the PLO is a framework that combines all the various factions and Palestinian leaders. There are four parties that benefit from the National Fund, but this does not preclude assistance to others. At this stage, the [Palestinian] National Council [PNC] must convene to chart the PLO's future policy within the framework of Arab and Palestinian constants. This is the best way to confer upon unity its true concept."

Dr. Riyad: "I did not mean to exclude any of the factions. In order to practice unity, everyone must have the desire to pursue it, and the PNC must be convened with a new format."

Radwan Abu-'Ayyash: "We are in dire need of unity, and every Palestinian must enjoy the right of self-expression within the Palestinian constants. Debate must not be turned into a process of coercion or of the minority thwarting the opinion of the majority."

Umm Khalil asked about the contacts America is making concerning the Palestinian delegation, and Abu-'Ayyash answered her by saying:

"The United States has presented three options concerning the Palestinian delegation:

- "An independent delegation representing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the exclusion of Jerusalem, the PLO, and the outside.
- A joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
- A joint Arab delegation.

"Meanwhile, the Palestinian reply was that the Palestinians are absolutely free to choose their representatives, and no one on earth has the right to interfere with this right. Baker told the Palestinian notables that they were free to choose the delegation, but in a fashion acceptable to Israel."

With regard to national establishments being unaware of what contacts are being made, Umm Khalil asked that meetings be held with Palestinian notables and establishments to shed light on what has occurred through the talks in an effort to keep them up to date with what is happening so that they may be aware of what is going on in the Palestinian arena.

In the meantime, Abu-'Ayyash thanked AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI for taking the initiative to hold the panel, pointing to the dereliction of the mass media that make no effort, as the foreign media do, to reach these notables in order to hold a dialogue with them about what is going on.

Hanan 'Ashrawi on Peace Process Developments

92AE0016B *Jerusalem AL-MANAR in Arabic*
23 Sep 91 pp 9, 14

[Interview with Palestinian political notable Dr. Hanan 'Ashrawi; place and date not given; "Dr. Hanan 'Ashrawi: Palestinian Action Needs New Information Mentality, Flexible Language Distanced From Slogans"]

[Text] [AL-MANAR] There are debates that will start, or that have already started, among the various Palestinian factions and that will focus on the issue of peace and national unity. Meetings will also be held in London and you will participate in them. Do the London meetings have a connection with the issue of internal dialogue and dialogue with the United States on the peace conference?

[Ashrawi] The London meetings have been scheduled for a long time, not recently, and their activities will have nothing to do with the PNC, with the current procession, or with the internal Palestinian situation. The meetings are tantamount to an intellectual symposium that will try to analyze the situation. It is also hoped that it will develop a strategy to modify the viewpoint on whose basis the Palestinian issue is projected in the west.

[AL-MANAR] Meaning that the meetings will deal with academic studies that have no connection with implementation?

[Ashrawi] Implementation comes as a result of analysis. The real situation will be analyzed so that we can determine the problems and issues that should be projected and how they should be projected. This means that we will not be purely academic, because what we will submit is connected with the cause. This will help Palestinians develop a certain strategy. But these issues must not be underlined or highlighted [as published].

[AL-MANAR] If the issue is an issue of information that must not be concealed, then it is my duty to ask: What are the main points in the dialogue issue, especially the points connected with the presentation of information to Europe and to the West in general? In other words, what are the main pivot points?

[Ashrawi] I can offer my personal viewpoint. Each of us has his own viewpoint and his own analysis before a unified working paper is drafted at the conclusion of the meetings.

It is my opinion that the Palestinian media are deficient and have not been able to perform the role required of them to date. First, to be successful at the information level, we must understand the content and must be aware, knowledgeable of, and responsible for what goes on. Second, we must master the proper language, because the method of presentation is important at more than one level. Third, we must behave ethically, must not disdain the media and public opinion, must not employ conflicting means, and must not resort to fabrication and create things and issues just to attract attention. It is very important to be ethical in projecting the Palestinian cause. Moreover, the situation is dynamic and this requires us to be dynamic. It also requires a new method and a new projection for dealing with and presenting the issues. There are priorities and there are interconnected international issues, including the issue of human rights. So we must be a part of these issues. But we must deal sincerely, and there should be no conflicting and differing positions. We must not rely on a rigid language founded on slogans and cliches. There is a Palestinian propaganda failure.

[AL-MANAR] Are there examples of the conflicting issues, positions, and statements that do not serve the Palestinian cause?

[Ashrawi] Personally, I see that several statements have been made about the political procession by figures who we assume to be knowledgeable and experienced, including information and political figures. We often contradict ourselves and damage our cause by trying to attract the media's attention in a cheap manner, by using the media unsoundly, and by failing to present the facts to the public. There is also an ill will that seeks to distort the Palestinian position.

Right Is Not Subject to Foreign Policy Fluctuations

[AL-MANAR] You have spoken of the media as a means to present a certain concept or idea. What are the ideas that you wish to present to the public without disdain and with the ethicism that you have noted? What are the issues that will be the target of your well-considered propaganda campaign?

[Ashrawi] The truth is that the issue requires further study so that we can develop a well-considered information strategy. Therefore, it is essential that the content be clear. This is not because clear content does not exist, but because there is a lack of awareness of the method by which this content is presented. Regarding the cause itself, all believe that the content is clear. But they do not use this content responsibly and in a manner free of slogans and internal competition.

What I mean by clear content is, first, that the Palestinian cause is a cause with credibility and with an internal right.

The cause is not subject to changes of international policy, as some people try to argue whenever external political developments crop up or whenever fat [as published] political positions emerge, in order to insinuate that such developments belittle the Palestinian right. The issue is an issue of a tacit, intrinsic, and internal right, which we must safeguard and project responsibly. The core of the Palestinian cause depends on democracy and on revitalizing the people's will in these circumstances under which we live. Secondly, the Palestinian cause has embraced the strategy of peace. The truth is that there is an imbalance in presenting the Palestinian position vis-a-vis the Israeli position, for example. What we mean is that the peace strategy is not a slogan, but a content which we must present with all its momentum. The issue is not a simple issue. It is the issue of having the entire Palestinian people approve the peace strategy in the PNC. Meanwhile, others try to task us for the past!

The peace strategy itself is a historic event to us. It has changed the course of history from the direction of military confrontation or armed struggle to a political conflict with a modern content connected with international legitimacy. But I will not use this phrase because it is a slogan and a cliche.

This conflict is based on international law, on Security Council resolutions, and on respect for human rights charters. It has a dynamic and tangible concept of democracy. With our content and our resolutions, we are a part of the new world, but we still lag behind in our presentation of this content.

[AL-MANAR] This issue will be submitted for discussion at the meeting of notable personalities that will be held in London.

['Ashrawi] In my opinion, our strategy must emphasize certain issues within an important concept and we must work for these issues ceaselessly, comprehensively, and at the various levels.

There are those who have their analysis of the failure of the Palestinian media, and Arab media in general, to influence the western media. We, as Arabs and as Palestinians, have been subjected to numerous attempts to distort the truth. We continue to endure to this moment the dimensions and consequences of this campaign against us. This has put us in a weak and impotent defensive position. What I mean is that we do not accept having our image to be distorted. Therefore, we must adopt a positive strategy and present ourselves by ourselves, with our principles and content.

[AL-MANAR] Do you expect the outcome of the London dialogues to produce an official Palestinian strategy, even if there is no mandate? In other words, do you expect your proposals to be taken into consideration in developing a new official Palestinian strategy?

[’Ashrawi] I hope so, of course. We have not come to London for intellectual luxury. There is no doubt that these efforts flow in the same direction, i.e., the direction of correcting the course and providing some sort of tendencies or proposals for the future procession.

Media Challenge

[AL-MANAR] The press mentioned recently that there are 28 provisions, or steps, to build confidence. Can you confirm their presence officially, is this a test balloon, or is it a product of the new information mentality?

[’Ashrawi] This was part of the meetings and deliberations of the London session held here two weeks ago. This session was held fundamentally to consider a memorandum of understanding, or letter of guarantee, which will be requested by the United States.

One of the tasks of the team which met in London was to consider the issues of building confidence to bring about an actual change in the real Palestinian condition under the occupation. If there is something positive, it must be translated pragmatically into practical changes, because one cannot begin a peaceful procession when one's people are the captive of occupation. These steps are an attempt to prove our goodwill and the evidence of our readiness to begin the procession. But how can we begin the procession as long as the people are straining under harsh occupation and as long as there is no balance in the daily reality?

[AL-MANAR] A large part of the provisions mentioned in the press have been brought up in your meetings with Baker. You have also raised numerous points in your meetings with Baker. Is this a process to "feel" Baker's "pulse" and how far can he go with you in the confidence-building steps?

[’Ashrawi] (Laughing) This is a very weighty question. Our proclamation of these steps constitutes some sort of a challenge.

[AL-MANAR] A media challenge?

[’Ashrawi] The truth is that we wanted it to be a personal, not media, challenge. But now that it has been published, there is nothing wrong with that.

Hakam Bal’awi Expected To Assume Abu-Iyad Post

92P40020A London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 9 Oct 91 p 16

[Text] Last week Hakam Bal’awi, the PLO representative in Tunis, made an unexpected visit to Paris. He was on a mission, the first of its kind, seeking to enliven security cooperation between France and the PLO. This cooperation was supervised by Salah Khalaf (Abu-Iyad), who was responsible for the PLO’s foreign security apparatus prior to his assassination. This is what made French press circles anticipate the appointment, shortly, of Bal’awi to the primary post within the PLO, especially since he enjoys the complete confidence of the president of the Executive Council, Yasir ’Arafat.

The French began their security cooperation with the PLO in the mid-1970s following a series of political assassinations of Palestinian leaders in France and following hijackings of French civilian aircraft. The fruit of this security cooperation was a stabilization in the areas of assassinations and hijackings since the end of the 1970s.

The French and Palestinian parties were keen on deepening security cooperation, especially during the period of French hostage-taking in Lebanon. Abu-Iyad played a vital role, keeping in constant contact with French intelligence. Since his assassination at the beginning of this year, his post has remained vacant and therefore, expectations are that Bal’awi will be in charge of this mission.

ISRAEL

Settlements Develop, Integrate Rapidly

91AE0615C Tel Aviv HA’ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Sep 91
pp 4-8

[Article by Gid'on Levi]

[Text] The first thing that attracted my attention was the high tension lines. Just past the crossroads east of Kasm village, past the green line, it is impossible not to be astonished at the sight of the giant iron poles carrying giant cables eastward, as though they were bringing electric power to the stronghold of heavy industry in the Ruhr District of Germany.

Later, you see heavy trucks moving, then the signs: "Sha’arei Tikva—a Settlement in Motion," "Quality of

22 October 1991

NEAR EAST

Life in Ari'el," and endless private contractors' signs. Yes, there are still some stands of olive trees along the road bisecting Samaria. There is even an Arab village or two, but on almost every hill you already see the red Israeli roofs, or at least the heavy yellow steam shovel and tractor that remove earth, and level and prepare, and pave and build. The leaders of the settlements here mock the flagbearers of the demographic problem now: around the Samaria Bisector already live, according to their figures, twice as many Jews as Arabs. The appearance of the landscape supports the data. It is possible to say "reversible," and possible to say "irreversible"; possible to say "disaster," and possible to say "hope," but there is no way to ignore the facts.

I spent three days this week in Ari'el. Ten thousand people, a thousand immigrants, almost three thousand housing units under construction, a college, an elegant hotel, a soccer field, a cemetery, several dozen manufacturing plants, two supermarkets, three shopping centers, an internal bus line, pirated cable television, 50 kindergartens, five schools, two swimming pools, an ethnic show on Friday night, the Israel championship in arm-wrestling on Saturday nights.

Already not small, the town will double in size within two or three years, and become a city. Ten thousand very average inhabitants, with average incomes, average cars, and average political outlooks, more or less. Even the racism here is so average: the director of the new hotel says that she will not employ Arabs; the mayor once wanted to put tags on them; one woman who lived there called out that we should not photograph Arabs; all the things that could have happened anywhere in the country, west of here.

Most of them have come here free of ideology; "those improving their housing situation" is what the local real estate office calls them. After a few months here, they already oppose returning territories. Naturally. The stand you take depends on the place you live, as the American saying goes. Although we can assume that these housing situation improvers will not climb onto the barricades if it is decided to return the territories, we must not make the mistake of thinking that the subject is on their agenda at all. In the real estate offices, where there was quite a long line of interested people, there are actually some who ask "what will happen if...," but in my three days in the city, I got the impression that they were all much more interested in the yearly diary that the mayor was passing out to them, than they were in the future of the territories.

Their connection to the intifadah, too, has weakened more and more. Three years ago, these average people of Ari'el still went up to Bidia and K'far Haras to get a little revenge on the Arabs who threw stones at the highway, wrecked and burned, and cursed and destroyed. Now the intifadah and the Arabs are turning gradually into a dim memory. The features of the highway pass less and less through the Arab villages. A while more and the Samaria Bisector will bypass them all. Vegetables have not been

bought in Salpit for a long time. Arabs rarely come into Ari'el—they need a special permit. Just to clean the streets and the trash barrels—the driver of the sweeping vehicle is already a Russian—and bricks. Bricks and more bricks. Whole streets are being built. The Arabs are working overtime now. At the hotel, "Tamarisk of Samaria," the Palestinians are especially hurrying: the convention hall has to be finished—in a few weeks the "T'hiya" convention will gather here. Perhaps from this podium that they are building now will come another call for their expulsion.

There is no need to speak of lack of security here, either. Almost no rocks are thrown. They "go down," as they say here, to Petah Tikva, or Tel Aviv, day or night, with the children or without them. Ari'el is not surrounded by a fence, and it has been a long time since I have been in a settlement with so few locked doors. In every kibbutz, they lock more doors today. And there are no more armed men here than on a street in Tel Aviv. In both places, there are quite a few. Last Sunday, I walked alone in the dark night, from the city center to a hotel at the outskirts of the town, in the middle of nowhere, and nobody thought I had lost my mind. The hotel, too, by the way, was not fenced. No guard at the door and no security officer. There are many more security precautions at the Tel Aviv Hilton.

Such a normal life-style, similar to life in Rish'on Letzi'on or in Holon, has come about here quietly and imperceptibly. A very suburban life-style, almost uninfluenced by Ari'el's being across the green line, even if most of the local residents do cross the line every morning on their way to work. By chance, or perhaps not by chance, the area code here is the same as Tel Aviv's. The public transportation is "Dan," and the weekend newspapers put in the local insert for Tel Aviv. Gush Dan.

In the gas station, there already is a long list of local residents whose checks are not acceptable, and there is even crime here, just like the suburbs. Here is a selection from the last few months: one person was charged with raping his ex-wife and abusing family members; another set fire to an automobile; a local dentist was convicted of raping a retarded woman; a couple was charged with sexual extortion; the mayor was investigated for wire tapping; Pazit Brown killed her husband here. Normal.

The mayor, Ron Nahman, could fill a series of colorful articles by himself. Quick and efficient, a whirlwind, a wizard at gimmicks, his hand in everything, mayor at every moment, Ron Nahman was one of the first settlers here. When I met him for the first time, last Friday, he was in the middle of loading hundreds of yearly diaries into the back of his official 504. Every year, he goes to every house in town, I repeat, to every house in town, and distributes this yearly diary. And the town is in an uproar: who got his, who did not, I need another one for the business, I need two for my mother-in-law. We had still not really gotten to know each other, and he had already poured his charm over me, pulled out most of the

proverbs he had been scattered over the last few months, told me fluently about his successes and hardships. Last Monday, he dictated faxes over the cellular phone to the leaders of American Jewry: "Ron Nahman of Ari'el calls upon the Jews of America to boycott Pepsi Cola," which has announced that it will not sell its products across the green line. The longer I was in his presence, the more I learned to like him. In his town, he is considered a "bulldozer," he got more than 60 percent of the votes, when he is big he will be a Likud Knesset member. He is 49. The Lubavitcher Rebbe gave him his blessing. He says that if it were not for that, he would not have run. He is secular, the son of secular Jews who were among the founders of Nes Tziona.

Two Lubavitcher Rebbes are in his office, one in needle-work and the other photographed in his court. And also a prime minister; three Israeli presidents, past and present; and Arik Sharon and Dan Meridor together. Last Friday, he found on his desk a fax from Vista, in the United States. "The honorable Ron Nahman is invited to the local Rotary Club," not without their asking him to bring that photograph he had written them about. It hangs on the wall of the meeting room: a color photo that the owner of the local photography studio took, showing a vapor trail in the sky: the Scud, and two vapor trails coming toward it: the Patriots.

"This is the only photo like this in the world," says Nahman. In America, they love the photo, and he knows how to get the maximum out of this.

Here is his opening monologue, said almost in one burst: "Imagine to yourself that on this balcony where the photographer from the studio sat and photographed the Scud, Yasser Arafat is sitting instead, and in place of the residents of Ari'el there are 10,000 terrorists from Lebanon. Here, this is where my headquarters were during the war. This is where I slept. I left one nylon strip, so that [visitors] can see. I explain to Americans who come here that Ari'el is the "pupik" of the State. I say to them that it is the "belly button," and they laugh. Why do they laugh? There is no Jew who does not know what a "pupik" is. You put a finger there, and say to him "That is the pupik. Here on the map: Arad, Ari'el, and Carmi'el. Each one close to a large city, and all three very much alike. This is the rational basis for development. This is the right division of the State." The flow of words is interrupted for a minute, when one of the residents comes in—on the Sabbath, visitors from America come to see him, and he wants to give them something that will be characteristic of the settlement. Nahman signs his autograph in English on the town's English-language newsletter, which has a photo of a gas mask on its cover.

"I am trying to do what Teddy does with Keren Yerushalayim (Jerusalem Fund), and Chich with Keren Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv Fund), but it is much harder for me. No Jewish organization works here in the occupied territories [preceding words in English], not the Joint, and not Neighborhood Renewal, nobody. I have to collect it all myself. Here, in the pamphlet I put the map of Israel

over the map of California. Israel, I say to them, is like California. Have you been in Los Angeles? Then I say to them, Look at the map. Israel is similar to California. [preceding last two sentences in English] You speak English? Israel is similar to California. You call it the West Bank [preceding words in English] and we are also the West Bank. They are the West Coast and we are the West Coast. Let us imagine that this, here, is L.A.—Tel Aviv is the down town of the State. Were you ever in Bel Air? Ari'el is similar to Bel Air. We are up above on the mountain, like Bel Air. I explain to them like the San Fernando Valley.[preceding words in English] Ari'el and Bel Air have clean air. From Ari'el, you can see Tel Aviv, and from Bel Air you can see downtown L.A. Bel Air dominates Freeway no.4 or no.5, I don't remember which, and Ari'el dominates the Samaria Bisector. Whoever sits in Bel Air can shoot a cannon at L.A. and at the freeway. And someone sitting in Ari'el dominates the Samaria Bisector. That is how I explain it to them, and they understand. I tell them that from Netanya to the green line is like the Bay Bridge. Is there any American who does not know what the Bay Bridge is? And then they say, "That's all?"[preceding words in English] You don't turn him into a follower of "Eretz Israel Shlema," but at least you take out the slogans that have been stuffed into him.

"Every time Shalom Ahshav demonstrates here, we sell another 100 apartments. How do you think the Russians got here? They heard from the leftists that many Russians were being absorbed here. The biggest surge in Ari'el came after the Gulf War. During the war, 1,000 families moved here. Six people were living with me, my sister in law, my brother in law, and the twins. Each one told more people about Ari'el, and people began to come and buy apartments. I say that the fear of the missiles conquered the fear of the stones. Take the pamphlet, and look at what I write in English. Look at what I wrote in March."

He is interrupted again when another resident comes in. "How are things, Gingi (redhead)? And he is actually a redhead. "Ari'el has a representative in the Ukraine." Efraim Tzel (we will come back to him) was appointed Jewish Agency emissary to Kiev. Nahman: "They know about Ari'el there, you see?"

And immediately after that: "This morning, Shimon Peres started again to try to stick the settlements into the subject of the defense budget. He is already pass, this Shimon. I was born in 1942, but look like a kid, right? For years I worked in the communications industry, and then for the Broadcasting Authority. Have you met Shlomo Abadi? I replaced him as second-in-command to the managing director of the Authority.

"My expertise is in labor relations and large systems. I can tell you of many achievements in this period. I revolutionized fee collection for the Broadcasting Authority. Before, they used to come to your house in the morning, and if you were not home, they would leave

you a note: "Come to our office." Nu? Would you come? I introduced the use of students who come in the afternoon and evening.

"In 1976, we settled on the site. We were members of the Tel Aviv nucleus of communications workers. I call this Ari'el-H'aras, the city of Samaria. There is a letter here that Ezer Weitzman would swallow today: "I received with joy the announcement of your settling on the site. My heartfelt congratulations. Settling the land is the best solution to our problems. Because every little bit of earth from our homeland that is settled—"To you I will give it, and to your descendants forever." May you be blessed. Ezer Weitzman."

After this, Nahman had a meeting, and I went out for a first-time walk around the town.

Next to the branch of the "Otzar Hahayil" bank, the only bank in the city, people are speaking Russian. Wherever you turn, there are signs in Russian, and people speaking Russian, and newspapers in Russian, just like Natzeret Ilit or Neve Sharet. Actually, two armed men happen to be speaking Spanish, in the entrance of the bank. Seventy percent of the town's wage earners work in Gush Dan. An argument is going on in the branch: the computer is not accepting something, and it will be necessary to make a trip to Petah Tikva to straighten out the problem, and the customer is so angry! "What can I say to you?" he says to the manager, "If I have to travel to Petah Tikva for every little thing, then I am going to take my account out of here." Until 10:05, it is possible to acquire funds from foreign banks. So it says. Next to the bankomat is a sign in Russian. There was a time when the large banks did not want to open branches here. Now they are competing to do so. Nahman says that he will not let them open. "A little bank with big performance," on the wall. "The Jewish People lives, in Ari'el," on the cars parked outside.

On Nahshonim Street is the "Founder's Garden," with a wooden ship in honor of the Tel Aviv nucleus of settlers.

The inscription on the wooden sign, about rocky land and pioneers, is like a copy of a similar sign in the "Courtyard of the First Pioneers," in Eyn Shemer or Nahalal. Friday in the commercial center up the street, is like Friday in any commercial center. There is a traveling booth for printing stunning tee shirts, and the youth of Ari'el come to print "Marginal Youth" on their tee shirts. A young couple from Tel Aviv are selling their own hand-made jewelry in another corner. Last week, they sold on the mall in Nahlat Binyamin, and this week here. The man, who wears a broad-brimmed straw hat, says that the people here are terrific, and so are the businesses, and sure they will be back!

A cottage in the Eli'av neighborhood with a well tended garden is offered for sale on the bulletin board of one of the three local real estate offices, and also a sunken British cottage in Heftziba. The Ninja turtles are on sale here too. A clear majority of the shops here are groceries, there are some clothing stores, an insurance agency, but

not one bookstore, only textbooks. The roglakh [a kind of sweet pastry] in the Avraham bakery, Sha'ar Ari'el, are really excellent. In a shop carrying the sign "Ari'el Furniture", there is a special on chicken breasts. One of the Russians asks, "Where is the supermarket?" The "Ari'el Electronics" store, and the "Me'ir HaShomron Yair" (May the one who lights up Samaria keep giving light") store, are next door to each other. A particularly miserable looking and downcast Palestinian youth walks along sweeping this commercial center. He wears a shabby shirt with "American Legend" printed on it. He is from the village of Anabus, and works every day from 5:00 to 1:30. He refused to say what his wages were. He cleans the settlements.

Here is Efraim Tzel again, the Jewish Agency emissary to the Ukraine. We sit down for coffee in the "Mifgash Parliament" (Parliament Meeting Place). In Israel 25 years, from Riga, and two years ago came here for personal reasons, not ideological. I was asked so many times during those three days, to emphasize "not for ideological reasons." And this is always said with a kind of apology, as though to emphasize: We are not extremists, we are not like those religious fanatics in Gush Emunim.

And Efraim said, anyway, "This is a place which is under Israeli rule today, and I see no reason not to live here," and also, "I will not go to the barricades if there is a political solution. I can say that in extreme conditions, if God forbid we have to compromise, and there is peace, then a city like this will still have the right to exist. But I would not settle in Hebron."

He says that he loves the place more and more—because of the air and the atmosphere. "Friendly City." [preceding words in English] He has a little girl now, a year old, born in Ari'el. He takes her everywhere, day and night if necessary. In Kiev, where he works now, he tells the Jews only that he lives in a town 35 km from Tel Aviv. That is all. If they ask him, he says that it is beautiful there, like everywhere else in Israel.

Most of the immigrants from Russia, I learned very quickly, followed each other here. Nobody sends them here. Their numbers are growing here. Efraim's sister-in-law followed him to Ari'el. She is the Israeli badminton champion. Efraim says that most of the immigrants have been here about a year now. If they do not find work, they will leave. Ideological motives are hardly worth mentioning in their case, but the basic outlook exist. "For people who grew up in a society where whole populations are moved from place to place quickly, transfer of Arabs cannot be a problem. Most of them are anti-Communist, of course, but the way of thinking remains what they are accustomed to. No party can build on them.

"They lived in a state 4,000 sq km around, one/third of the earth's sphere, and for them to live in a state 12 1/2 km east to west is terrifying. Their fear that the territories will be returned is therefore tremendous. I am certain

that if the territories are returned, many of them will leave. I remember myself: in the first years, this did not give me rest. I would lie in bed and ask myself where I had come to. To live in a country you could spit across!

"True. They also do not like Arabs. They come from a country where no nationality likes another nationality. A state that waved the banner of fraternity between peoples was the most racist state in the world. This is not hatred of Arabs like the hatred of Oriental Jews, but hatred of an enemy. From childhood, they have been educated to lie and to hate. What you say at home, you do not say outside, what you say in the workplace, you do not say somewhere else, and this has very much corrupted their character.

"They pass through three stages here: the first month of enthusiasm: 'Yah, what a supermarket! What a view!' After that, the second month of fear: 'A supermarket is fine, but I have nothing to buy with, and what will become of me?' After that, four months of Ulpan and of the routine of study, and then worries about earning a living and housing and heating, just like Israelis."

Efraim Tzel is building a new house now in Ari'el. He will import it ready-made from the Soviet Union. Now he becomes my interpreter for a talk with two women from Russia. A year and two months in Israel, from Leningrad, direct from Ben Gurion airport to Ari'el, joining relatives. Klara says that she had heard that Ari'el was a beautiful place without slums. And that there was work in the industrial zone of Barkan. Meanwhile, she lives on unemployment insurance. If she finds work somewhere else, she will leave. Her sister-in-law has already bought a house here. Ari'el is the center of the country.

Where is a Jew safer, in Leningrad or in Ari'el? She thinks and thinks. During the scud attacks it was frightening here. On the bus to Jerusalem, she was shot at once, and they all lay on the floor. Lana, her sister-in-law, keeps whispering in her ear: "Say it is impossible to compare."

In the workers' co-op, the big supermarket here, there is a sale now, "Only in Ari'el", of honey. Only 5.35 shekels. The children who stand in line with their parents, at noon on the last Friday of summer vacation, are called Moran and Shiran and Liron and Neta-li, of course, just like everywhere else. "There are 11,000 items in the supermarket," says the proud manager, "Nothing is lacking. A selection like on Dizengoff, but it is worthwhile to call the spokeswoman first."

"Latvia recognizes the State of Israel," says the main headline of "Varemia," the most widely circulated newspaper here. Yefim Knizinski takes a walk with his attractive wife and their two children. For now, their market wagon contains only a copy of "Varemia." They come mainly to look. A year and two months in Israel, from Kiev. They came to join friends here. Between the shelf of household utensils and the watermelon stand, we have a little talk. They thought that it would be easier

and cheaper in Ari'el and therefore came here, joining friends. Yefim is already working in "Rav-Bariah" in Barkan, and they have already bought an apartment here. "Nice surroundings," says the child in much better Hebrew than that of his parents. And Yefim remembers a children's song: "From my window you see Red Square," by Maharshek. A famous Russian children's song. Yefim says that now he sings, "From my window you see the Jordan," and he laughs. He served in the Red Army, and says that he knows how to appraise security considerations. No, he does not feel like an invader or a conqueror. The Arabs' lives and our lives do not cross. An announcement is made at this moment: "Grilled chicken on the meat section now."

Are you in favor of independence for the republics in the Soviet Union?

"Yes. Absolutely."

They deserve a state of their own?

"Yes."

And what of the Palestinians who want a state?

Great confusion and silence. "A solution will have to be found. Perhaps logically, they should have a state too, but perhaps it is better for the two peoples to live in one state. As long as there is a terrorist organization, this is a matter of survival for us."

And for a true peace, would you be ready to return Ari'el?

"If I knew that there would really be peace, I would agree. But I do not believe that will happen, that there will be permanent peace."

Why?

"Because it is impossible to talk seriously with the Arabs. It is impossible to believe the Arabs."

How do you know?

"I see Muslims in the Soviet Union. This is another mentality. Another kind of people."

Two months ago, the Knizinski's best friend also joined Ari'el. They recommended that she come here.

Outside, it is already late afternoon, and the center is filled with people. They come here from all the settlements in the area to do their Sabbath shopping. From all the Jewish settlements in the area, that is, of course. A family with especially blond hair sits and drinks 'Spring'. Where are you from? "From Finland." And what are you doing in Ari'el? "Live here." The father of the family, an expert on Finnish houses, is building nearby Ma'ale Levona.

Only a small minority, 15 percent, of the inhabitants of Ari'el, are religious. Actually, incredibly, there is no synagogue here, only one improvised prayer room. The

people's college in Ari'el, according to one advertisement, is offering a course in how to identify a person and interpret his character from the appearance and patterns of his face. In Samaria College, on the ridge above, students study for a Bachelor's degree from Bar Ilan University. There is a sign in the textbook store: "Interested in used 'First Settlements'." A Russian family marches by in procession with a parasol, something that gives it an uncommon appearance of serenity.

Meanwhile, Ron Nahman found time to take me for an educational tour of his city. "Unlike all the lies," he says, "There is no movie theater here, and no community center worthy of the name, no tennis court and no synagogue." All the time, he says, he has to fight in the various government ministries, to receive another little piece of the budget, and another little piece of it. The Likud government does not give him any special attention in its budgets. Only when Yosi Beilin was assistant minister of finance was it worse.

Ari'el is not beautiful and not ugly. Beauty and cleanliness beyond the national norm, but in the three days, I did not see one beautiful house. Not even one. Quite crowded, a house-with-garden here is a congested two-family with a piece of lawn a table will not fit on. "Twelve kilometers long," Nahman says proudly, "like from the Holon Junction to the Country Club Junction." Everyone in town knows him, and he knows everyone.

Every morning, 500 Arabs come to build Ari'el. Nahman says that he has serious problems with their lands, with their cases in the High Court of Justice, and with PLO money that funds their battles. Once the Muhtar of Bidia said to him, he loves to tell, that even the donkey would not go up this hill of Ari'el, and here a city is going up on the rocks."

Here is the Kramer soccer field, the Soccer Federation did not want to accept the team from Ari'el, for fear this would damage its international connections. Manchester United will not play with teams from the Israeli league. Nahman threatened to bring it before the High Court of Justice. Now they are in the lowest league, can not go any lower. By the soccer field, they are building the central bus station of Ari'el now. It is true, the city lacks a real central bus station.

And here the country club will rise, 40 dunams, and here the new highway will pass, and here will be the Sick Fund, and here a new neighborhood and here a biotechnology laboratory. Nahman says that the city is planned for 100,000 people. Within four or five years, they will already reach a quarter of that. And here is Bush Avenue. Another typical Nahman gimmick: he took a section of road, twenty meters long, called it "George Bush Street" at the height of the Gulf war, and all the newspapers wrote about it. "One of the problems with the media is that you subordinate the facts to subjective feelings. Nobody has any idea what actually happens here in the territories. They say 'the settlers' villas.' Thomas Friedman from the New York Times visited me once,

and said to me at the end of the tour: "Irreversible." [preceding word in English] He wrote that Ari'el is a mixture of yuppies and concrete, and I just asked him what yuppies were."

Here the train will go through," he continues. What train? "The suburban train. It will have to go through here some day." In the nearby industrial zone they already produce everything, bagels and air conditioners, locks and plastic furniture. Development town incentives, twenty minutes from Petah Tikva. There are 3,000 workers. Nahman says that Cahane and Dadi Tzuker have much in common. They are both transferists. One wants to transfer Arabs and the other wants to transfer Jews. The settlements are sitting quietly, they are secure, and who is barking? Shalom Ahshav. They are insecure, they understand that the situation can not be reversed.

Nahman, by the way, is one of those who fear dogs most, I noticed in the afternoon, when I plodded after him on his untiring journey to pass out his diaries.

On Friday afternoon, a peaceful time, he is going from house to house, ringing doorbells sharply and opening without unnecessary delay. Happy New Year. From Etzel Street to Hagana Street by way of Uri Bar-On Street. A lot of heavy smells of Sabbath dishes, especially cholent, quite a few sleepy faces. Mommy, get up! The Mayor is coming! Na'amit and Ya'akov Kahlon of Bar On Street came here a week ago. The sold a 54 square meter apartment in Tel Aviv for \$77,000, and bought 103 square meters in Ari'el for \$79,000. "This is the State of Israel here. Everyone speaks Hebrew and there is a mayor and a school, and everything. Is this not Israel?"

The television is turned on in almost every house we enter, even though the English-language news is on right now.

They take \$500 a month from Russians for a 60 square meter apartment. Two Russian families stuffed inside, old people and children, into a bare, neglected apartment. They sit now and gaze vacantly, not understanding what the man with the red diaries wants from them.

On 1 Etzel Street lives the Shamir family. On 28 Etzel, they request another five diaries for the commander of Samaria prison. "A woman lives here who was visited every day by an Arab from Salfit, until we stopped it. We simply informed him that he was forbidden to enter any more. See what a weeping willow we have here in the courtyard!"

A pair of kibbutzniks from Kibbutz Hasollelim lives in a large house. They are expanding it right now, and in the courtyard there is some kind of terrible stench, nobody knows from where. "This is the only place we could get quality of life," says Yehiel Amihai, the ex-kibbutznik.

The sun slowly sets, a ball getting redder and redder in the west. The center is empty, Ari'el withdraws into itself, as the Sabbath comes. All the tickets to the ethnic show this evening are sold out.

This picture was astounding: in the assembly hall of the Aliza Begin School last Sunday, 740 school children in white blouses stood and sang Yankele Rotblit's "Song of Peace." The song that has meant so much in our day, especially the desire to give up territories in exchange for peace, a song that was forbidden to be broadcast or sung, sung now by Ari'el's students at their back-to-school pageant.

Who was Aliza Begin? I ask a girl named Sivan. "A lady who loved children." What is the Arab village across the way called? "I ask a instructor in a blue dress." "I have no idea," answered the instructor, who passes here every day and sees the minaret and the houses right below her.

Sami Me'ir, head of the education department, is proud of his department. He lives in Rehovot, travels in a transport and tends to the education of the children of Ari'el. There are 3,000 children in the city. Now he must prepare for the boom expected here in the 1991-92 school year. Another 100 pupils expected to join when their parents move to Ari'el in the coming year. The schools—I was in almost all of them—are just as crowded as Tel Aviv. Only in the kindergartens did I count more computers than one might see in other places.

"America protects us" is written on a wall of the Malkin School.

But real nationalistic symbols are rarely found here. Just a few biblical passages about our right to the Land, in the entrance of the single religious school. Shimshon, who teaches Arabic in the junior high, taught Hebrew until the intifadah, in neighboring Salfit.

Next came the sales office of the ten companies that build in Ari'el. Three rooms in a shared building at 195,000 shekels, available at the end of the year. A two-family house starts at 240,000 shekels. The mortgages here are high, there is no graduated system like there is in the city, the criteria are different, and the gap between the height of the mortgage and the price of the apartment can be tiny. A 124,000 shekel mortgage can be obtained, with another loan of 75 to 80 percent of what is left.

How is the view? I asked, like someone about to decide? "The view is incredible. Its as though you were a bird in flight looking down over the valley road. The whole Mirda region." What is Mirda? "An Arab village," answered the Tami the saleswoman, drily. "If you ask me, this is where tranquility is. This is where quiet is. And if you want to have a night out, you go to Tel Aviv. It is like traveling from Holon to Tel Aviv."

And on the building site, the workers of Abd, the foreman from Balata, have been working overtime for two weeks now. The contractor pays, just finish quickly. Palestinian workers are mobilized to carry out as quickly as possible the dream of another young couple. Below, the houses of Mirda village peep out, an apparently tranquil village, wonderfully integrated with the rocky

landscape and the olive trees. And what do they think there in Mirda about what is being built right over their heads? Up above, this seems to be irrelevant.

And far from all this, the yellow lights glow through the tops of the palm in the beautiful swimming pool of the new "Tamarisk of Samaria" hotel. The sound of the water falling in the artificial waterfalls covers the noise outside. At the filling station, they are listening to the "Voice of Peace." At night in the house of Udi Gentman, a friend from elementary school who I lost touch with 24 years ago, in the bar of his "Last Courtyard" restaurant, we drink beer from the barrel and share small talk. A diner at one table tells a diner at another table that a rock hit the windshield of his car today. The car is new and he had not had a chance to shield it. This was almost the only reminder in three days, of the fact that we are on the West Bank. The light by the emptying bar was dim, and Elvis was singing "Love Me Tender" in the background.

Finance Committee Chairman Feldman Proves Formidable

91AE0615B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
4 Sep 91 p 1C

[Article by Tzvi Zerahia]

[Text] When the 1992 budget is finally authorized, the ball will pass to the Knesset Finance Committee. This committee has already proven many times in the past that the government can decide anything it wants, but it holds the key because many budgetary decisions require its authorization.

The debate on the 1992 State budget will begin in early November, and must finish by the end of December. In the Finance Committee, they estimate that first of all the committee chairman, Rabbi Moshe Z'ev Feldman, will attend to wrapping up the matter of the "special lands" to the best advantage - from the viewpoint of his constituents.

After that, they foresee in the Knesset, committee activity will begin on the various budgetary topics, and then—toward the end of December—the subject of special funds for religious institutions will come up. And thus, on the eve of the vote over the State budget in the second and third readings, the leaders of the coalition will offer the religious factions tens of millions of shekels in return for sending the budget to the full Knesset.

In the Knesset are some who call Feldman "Abam" (etzem bilti mezuhe-an unidentified object) or "the Knesset member from Another World." Many Knesset members maintain that "someone who has little knowledge of economics, and who brags that he learned arithmetic from his grandmother," is not qualified to serve as chairman of the finance committee. When he took over the role, the leaders of the Labor faction predicted that chaos would reign in the committee and that he would not be able to control it. But according to Feldman's instructions, microphones were set up in the

NEAR EAST

meeting hall, and thus the Chairman can loudly rebuke unruly Knesset members and keep order during the meetings.

After Feldman was chosen, there were whispers in the Likud that he would be a "puppet." They explained in the Likud that officially Feldman would be chairman of the committee, but actually it would be run by the Likud coordinator on the committee, Knesset member Ari'el Weinstein. But half a year after the appointment, it has become clear that Feldman is no puppet, and that he is also succeeding in arousing the wrath of the heads of the Ministry of Housing. For instance, a few weeks ago, the Ministry of Finance asked the committee to rush the authorization of the transfer of 374 million shekels to the Ministry of Construction and Housing. The money was designated to pay contractors and finance substructure work to speed up handing apartments over to the buyers. Feldman, then on holiday in Switzerland, announced that the subject would not be put on the committee's agenda. He did appoint Knesset member Weinstein to take his place, but in the letter that he sent to him just before he handed over the role, he made it clear that every topic to be dealt with by the committee in the absence of the chairman must be checked with him by telephone. Weinstein tried to convince Feldman to let him bring up the topic for a vote, but the latter remained firm in his refusal.

The reason for this was the Chairman's anger at the Minister of Construction and Housing, Ari'el Sharon, for not allocating lands for the ultra-Orthodox. Feldman explained that agreements reached between himself and Sharon several months before had not yet been acted upon. Because of this, the transfer of hundreds of millions of shekels, to apartment contractors and substructure contractors, has been held up. Who cared that many apartments which were supposed to be occupied by the beginning of the school year are standing empty because these funds have not been transferred where to their goal?

Two weeks ago, after his return from overseas, Feldman criticized the General Director of the Office of Construction and Housing Arye Bar. He even demanded that he be fired, but after he poured out his wrath, he and Bar came to the agreement that 4,000 dwelling units would be allocated to the ultra-Orthodox population, among them 2,000 in Jerusalem.

In the Ministries of Finance and of Housing, they breathed freely, because they figured that now Feldman would work for authorization by the committee of the budgetary requests for housing. But he did not hurry. Last week, Feldman invited the Government Legal Adviser Yosef Harish to visit the committee. He apparently thought that Harish would authorize the allocation of the lands to the ultra-Orthodox associations. But Harish, who, at the beginning of last week, was asked by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to be understanding about allocation of lands for the ultra-Orthodox community, announced that he opposed allocating special lands.

Therefore, Feldman refused last week to bring the transfer of 500 million shekels for housing to a vote in the committee, and he does not understand what the uproar is about. In his words, "The committee must receive detailed explanations concerning these budget transfers, before it authorizes them." Feldman criticizes opposition Knesset members serving on the committee, who expressed support for transferring the budgetary funds to Housing. In his words, the opposition Knesset members on the committee are satisfied when bones are thrown at them, and apparently forget that their function is to criticize the government. "The opposition should be the watchdog of democracy, and not a puppy satisfied with a few bones," declares the chairman.

Incidentally, when someone reminds him of the connection between transferring funds for housing and allocating lands for ultra-Orthodox and building new apartments for that population, Feldman always ends up by saying, "The Ministry of Construction and Housing must live up to the agreements reached with us four months ago and more." He has, it seems, great sensitivity to topics connected with housing and rental apartments. Here, two days before the plenary session of the Knesset adjourned for summer recess, he called the finance committee together for two days of continuous talks about the Ministry of Finance's proposal to moderate the benefits given to encourage construction of rental dwellings. This subject, say the Knesset members, is complicated, with many implications for the construction sector. Therefore, it is best to carry on comfortable and exhaustive discussions, and not to hurry and decide on a subject as important as this in just two days. Literally at the last minute.

Feldman also tried to link general rules for allocating lands to ultra-Orthodox associations to this legislative proposal, and thus through the legislative process to get around the Government Legal Adviser's instructions on the subject. But, following the Minister of Finance's threat to rescind the proposal for the law, Feldman put aside the intention to attach the subject of the "special lands" to it. At the last moment, before the Knesset adjourned, he hoped to bring the law up for a second and third reading, and to present it as a New Year's gift to his Rebbe. But the Minister of Finance, Yitzhak Moda'i, decided at the last minute to recall the legislative proposal, because Knesset member Weinstein attached to it a proposal to abolish the improvement tax.

At this time, the improvement tax is still in force, and incentives to build rental housing have been put back in the Knesset drawers until the opening of the session at the beginning of October, 1991. And this is still not the end. According to Feldman's directive, all material dispatched to the committee is to be sent to him when it is finalized and signed. Only after he looks at it, will he decide when and how it will be laid on [the committee's] table.

A proposal by the Minister of Finance to award a grant to the Reform movement's "Hebrew Union College,"

equivalent to the added value tax of its Jerusalem investment, has been sitting on the committee's agenda for four months. When this budgetary proposal reached the committee, Feldman expressed absolute opposition to its authorization, and the Finance Ministry recalled it. Several months ago, the proposal was again submitted to the committee, but Feldman is not hurrying right now to bring it up for discussion. He explains his opposition to this budgetary transfer by saying that, "This is a case of special funds. The opposition factions that side with transferring the sum to its objective are being hypocritical and two-faced. Why does this special institution rate different treatment from the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox educational institutions?" he asks. And he also rages over the giant advertisements that the movement published against him in the newspapers, in which he was presented as "the special fund highwayman." "They defamed me, and I am waiting for their apology. Until they apologize, we will not discuss the subject," threatens the chairman.

One way or the other, the heads of the World Union College (sic) made it clear not long ago to Knesset member Avraham Shohet (Labor) that in response, they would stop United Jewish Appeal fundraising. Because of Feldman's behavior, both coalition and opposition members of the Knesset are demanding that the committee's rules of conduct be changed, so that the chairman will be required to raise topics sent to the committee by the Ministry of Finance for discussion within a week. According to this proposal, within two weeks from the day the material reaches the committee, the chairman will be required to bring it up for a vote.

The previous chairman of the Finance Committee, Knesset member Shohat, says that Feldman's behavior, where his authority as chairman is concerned, has gone beyond any bounds. "It is impossible to continue to allow Feldman to extort us. Amazingly, any criticism of him only strengthens him among the community that elected him," explains Shohat. On the other hand, Weinstein says that there must be a decision that after the committee has authorized transfer of budgetary funds, the chairman will be required to sign the authorization immediately and send it to the Finance Ministry.

Feldman rejects the criticism. "I feel a responsibility and a necessity to deal seriously with all the subjects brought before the committee. I do not intend to authorize proposals without batting an eyelash. There is a tendency to attack me in the newspapers saying I am "dosi (ultra-Orthodox)." Because I am religious the media orchestra joins the pack of barking dogs without examining the facts, and without any logic."

HA'ARETZ Discusses IDF Policy on Homosexuals
91AE0615A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Sep 91 p 2B

[Article by Tzipi Shohat]

[Text] The beginning of A.S.'s story is familiar: "For three years, I lived a double life. On the one hand I had

contacts with men, and on the other, life with my wife and children at home. Things reached the stage where she found out that I had a relationship with a man. My wife, who had suspected that I had a female lover, was in shock. I felt that the genie had escaped from the bottle, and could not be put back. After nine years of marriage, I was divorced."

"With the divorce, the process of 'coming out of the closet' began for me. Within a short time, I revealed the truth to just about everyone. I told family, friends, and the word reached my workplace. There began to be threatening looks, and gossip. When they asked me if I was homosexual, I did not deny it. At the weekend outing organized by my company, I arrived with my companion. The boss called me over afterwards, and said that I had made a serious mistake. He warned me not to do it again. This thing brought out antagonism in my fellow workers. They could not accept it, and a campaign against me began, putting on pressure to fire me from the job. At the end of the year, my contract was not renewed. I have not found work since."

"Because I had come out, the news reached the army, reached the fellows who serve with me in the reserves. There too, jokes were told at my expense, all kinds of nicknames. In the evening, when they would begin to tell stories about girls, or about their families, I would sit like a stone and not say a thing. The situation became uncomfortable, and so I came up to the mental health officer, told him I was a homosexual, and asked permission to sleep off-base. He suggested instead that I obtain a release from the army, under a profile 21, a psychiatric profile."

"I did not agree, and he said, 'You have no choice.' This has terrible implications. The licensing office, for example, requires, in a case like this, that your driving license be left with them, and it will not renew it until I am summoned to a psychiatric committee to clarify why they exempted me from the army. You can also forget about work in either a private or a public company, because there they want to know what your profile is. It is the mark of Cain, not just a stigma. I do not want to be exempted from army service, and I feel a responsibility to serve the country in which I live, and, if I am discharged, it should not be because of a psychiatric clause. I am not mentally ill!"

The army is still the hardest nut to crack for the homosexual community in Israel, which got into the headlines recently, after the Labor Party "dared" to relate to it as an electoral factor and published an election notice in one of its newsletters.

The IDF (Israel Defense Forces) tries not to address the subject publicly. On the surface, its official policy does not put any limitation on recruitment of homosexuals and lesbians into the army, but there are too many cases of soldiers who will testify, off the record, that they feel themselves forced to hide their tendencies during army service.

Many homosexuals claim that an unwritten norm prevails, according to which a soldier who declares his "undesirable" sexual tendency is not recruited for a task or a unit with top security classification, and someone who has not declared it, and is caught, faces being investigated and spied on. This ostrich policy expressed itself recently when a news report in "Yoman Hutz" ("Foreign Report") on Galei Tzahal (IDF Radio), was not aired merely because the person being interviewed said that he knew two senior officers with top security classification who were homosexuals, and that those responsible knew about their tendencies but ignored them.

According to Y.M., a soldier in the reserves serving in Intelligence, a field security officer used to gather the soldiers of the unit together twice a year and announce to them that they must report any homosexual among them, giving as a reason that soldiers of this kind endanger State security. "During those times," Y.M. says, "I was on the verge of paranoia. I was afraid that they would identify me. It seemed to me that they were all looking at me, that maybe they knew, maybe they would hand me over. A friend of mine in the same unit who was also hiding his sexual tendency took this harder. He was overcome by terror." Y.M. hides his sexual identity. He was awarded the title "Outstanding Soldier" in 1982, and it is doubtful whether he would have received the citation had he come out of the closet.

In spite of the IDF's denials, an IDF permanent order of 1983 (Collection of Permanent Orders of the General Staff, Army Manpower Division, Movement of Manpower, 31/11/01/K) says clearly that assignment of soldiers in the regular army, standing army, and reserves shall be limited because of their sexual tendencies, and "homosexual soldiers or military workers shall not serve in encoding and camouflaging." Another clause says that a soldier suspected of homosexuality shall be sent to the mental health center, and that he shall be under the supervision of field security during the entire time of his service or work in the army.

Two senior officers confirmed for me that a soldier whose sexual tendency is suspected is sent immediately to the unit doctor, who decides in coordination with them what the army career of the "suspect" will be. Considering this background, the response of the IDF spokesman that "a [homosexual] tendency is not a mental illness or a perversion, and therefore a soldier like this will not be disqualified or limited in advance," is somewhat puzzling. Words like these contradict the actual policies, whether official or unofficial, of the army.

But the reality in the IDF, and the conflicting messages that it transmits, only reflect social norms in society as a whole. Outside of the army too, the homosexual community wins only crawling recognition. A reminder of this was supplied by the small storm that broke out in various political circles, following the advertisement the Labor Party placed in the homosexual and lesbian

monthly "Maga'im" (Contacts), which called to homosexual voters to join their ranks. The range of reactions, ranging from quiet dissociation, through evasion, to coarseness ("Now we can expect the Ma'arakh to print the same kind of notice in the newspaper for the impotent," according to Knesset Member Korfu) testifies to the fact that Israeli society is still having difficulty carrying out the principles it has declared.

The homosexuals themselves, who in the last years have adopted the example of the homosexuals in the West, and organized almost like a trade union, have been pleased that a debate is going on. In spite of the raised eyebrows of Knesset members from several parties, "This is a [sign] that there is awareness in this population," says Hadar Namir, spokeswoman for "Otzma," the lobby for equal rights for lesbians, homosexuals, and bisexuals. "We use every opportunity to let people know that there is a group like this, and that it should have rights." Not that any of them were persuaded to join the ranks of the Labor Party after what they call a "media gimmick." Many of them think that what the Labor Party did was too little too late.

"Otzma," the political arm of the Association for the Rights of the Individual, was founded, after the law concerning homosexual sex was abolished in 1988, two months before the elections, with the aim of putting pressure on Knesset members. A contribution from a rich American Jew gave them a permanent building on Ahad Ha'am Street in Tel Aviv, and they are supported by membership dues and contributions from the "New Fund for Israel."

The Association has 250 registered members, among them a group of religious homosexuals, who have a special circle, "Hod" (*homosexualium datuum-religious homosexuals; "hod" also means "glory"*), which meets in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. One of them volunteered not long ago to serve on the "white line," the telephone counseling service of the Association, to answer the dozens of telephone calls from religious men and Yeshiva students asking to share their struggles with their sexual orientation with the organization. Names of members of the Association and details about them are confidential.

The offices of "Otzma" are in two modest rooms. In the kitchen hangs a poster of a male sex organ, the caption calling for war against AIDS. During our visit there, a telephone call comes from one of the female members, who asks that the poster, which offends her sensitivities, be removed. The organization tries to reconcile the self-stereotypes, which more than once have passed over the border into pornography, as they are reflected in the lesbian and homosexual posters and newsletters. From this focus of power, the activists send letters to various organizations, protest, give interviews to the media, organize events attended by Knesset members, sign petitions, and recently also work for reform of the "Equal Employment Opportunity Law" to have it forbid discrimination based on sexual preference.

The latest expression of the success of organizing in Israel was the setting up of defense shifts in Independence Park. A group of homosexuals equipped themselves with means of defense (electric shock devices) and communications equipment, and began to patrol the park. The police, who until then were indifferent or even violent, are cooperating now, they say.

The homosexuals and lesbians make up about 10 percent of the population. Not only the Labor Party appreciates their electoral power—50,000 homosexuals and lesbians in the Central Region alone—the local papers, too, are giving much coverage of late to their every step, and their case won significant legitimacy when the newspaper "Davar" gave them a regular column.

"Otzma" takes the credit for this change. Namir says that in the three years of the lobby's activities, they have been working toward the legitimization of the homosexual community. In her opinion, the AIDS phenomenon increased the recoil from homosexuals, and the government offices dealing with the matter do not allot the necessary resources for publicity and war against the disease, perhaps because of the common and mistaken idea that it is a disease that hits only a minority group. The signs of openness apparent of late, especially in the media, are not connected to the AIDS phenomenon, says Namir.

Ten years after the breakout of the AIDS epidemic, the local community is more united. They have two newspapers, "Netiv Nosaf" and "Maga'im," a telephone counseling line and an umbrella organization. It is true that they are at the beginning of the road, but a change in style is already apparent, as in the United States, where AIDS has killed more than 50,000 Americans.

In the United States, as in Israel, there is agreement that AIDS has accelerated homosexuals' political awareness. In the homosexual community there, they tell about the time author and playwright Larry Kramer came to a homosexual nightclub in New York and screamed in front of 300 people: "You may die within five years! What do you plan to do about it?"

But the American activists for homosexual rights are more militant, and during the "outing" [preceding word in English] that drew outrage even from within homosexual groups, revealed the names of well-known people in order to force them out of the closet. Their latest important victory, three weeks ago, was forcing the Pentagon spokesman, Pete Williams, out of the closet. They supported the step by saying they had to fight the excommunication the army had put them under as far back as 1943, when the Pentagon decided that homosexuality was not compatible with army service.

Until 1988, Israeli law saw homosexual relations as a crime punishable by ten years in prison. Every suggestion to abolish the mandatory law (already abolished in England in 1968) was deferred because of opposition from the religious parties. Just three years ago, when the compilation of laws concerning sexual crimes was

reviewed, did Shulamit Aloni, Amnon Rubinstein, and Uriel Lin succeed in eliminating from the compilation the clause forbidding homosexual sex between adults. "At this time, there is no legal limitation," says Hadar Namir, "but there is discrimination in almost every area. People fired because of sexual inclinations, lack of recognition of homosexual partnerships, even after a couple has shared a household for more than ten years. There has still been no decision in the court case of an El Al air host who requested a ticket for his companion."

Coming out of the closet is not easy even although there is some openness in the media. "I am afraid to come out, because I am in line to receive an appointment as a lecturer at the university," S.L. says. A media personality testified that he lives in a bubble, which lets him fulfill his sexual preferences, and that he does not encounter discrimination at work, or social isolation. "In spite of my declarations and my acceptance of the situation," he says, "I have not come out to avoid hurting my parents. The few times that I have come out of the bubble, coming face to face with the Israeli reality, I have been overcome by depression."

JORDAN

Impact of Economic Problems After War

91AE0621A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
3 Sep 91 p 11

[Article by Fayiz Sarah]

[Excerpts] Amman—Anyone arriving in Jordan's capital after a long absence inevitably notices significant changes in the economic and social situation in the country. The prices of goods and services are steadily increasing. Amman's hotels are so full that a visitor might not find a place to spend the night. Tourism sites, including restaurants and coffee houses in Amman's neighborhoods, are also crowded, especially in the evening.

Closer observers of Jordan's situation are aware of finer indicators of the country's economic and social conditions, which are the topic of in-depth conversations at summer evening get-togethers in Amman between visitors and well-informed observers. Perhaps the most important issues being discussed among persons concerned with Jordan's economic situation are the following two: The first concerns the government's measures and plans to improve Jordan's relations with the Arab countries and worldwide, and to invigorate the country's economy by stimulating the production and service sectors, especially tourism services. The second concerns the effects of more than 120,000 Iraqis in Amman, including many who intend to settle and invest their funds in Jordan.

Another topic of discussion between some visitors to Amman and well-informed observers concerns the effects of the economic and social changes that have

NEAR EAST

befallen Jordan, the key to whose improvement is primarily a Jordanian political opening to its external milieu, particularly the Arab milieu. Some in Amman link possible changes in Jordan with remedies for the political situation in the region, whether regarding the Gulf crisis or the process of settling the Arab-Zionist conflict and the Palestinian problem.

Socioeconomic Structure

Jordan is considered a small Arab country with limited capabilities and resources compared to the Arab countries surrounding it. The area of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (the east bank) is slightly over 89,000 square km. The population is about 3 million, according to the most recent estimates. Only 12.5 percent of the country's area is populated, and 60 percent of the population lives in urban areas, while the remainder live in Jordan's countryside and desert.

Fifty-five percent of Jordan's population lives in the Capital Governorate of Amman, where the majority, and most important, of the country's economic activities are necessarily concentrated. Thus, services, utilities, and a few industries and professions are concentrated in Amman and its environs. A similar situation exists in other Arab and Third World countries.

It is obvious and generally recognized that Jordan's economic structure is weak and brittle. In general, the country lacks the resources for a stable economic existence. Its water resources are extremely sparse, its arable land is very limited, it lacks minerals and raw materials that have an economic yield, and its geostrategic position offers no advantages. These factors together make for a weak economic structure.

Irrigation-based agriculture exists only in the northern and central Jordan Valley. Irrigation operations are carried out with water from the Jordan River, most of which the Israelis try to control and deny to Jordanian farmers on the east bank of the Jordan River and Palestinians on the West Bank, channeling it to Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley. The irrigation of agricultural land in Jordan outside of the Jordan Valley relies mostly on groundwater or the few water projects that exist in Northern Jordan, including the Jordan Valley [al-Ghawr] Canal. The rest of Jordan's agricultural land is unirrigated, and the country generally has low rainfall averages. Therefore, most of Jordan is desert.

Jordanian industry is made up of light industries, most of which are manufacturing industries that rely on imported equipment, machinery, raw materials, and sometimes, basic expertise. Very few Jordanian industries rely fully or partially on domestic raw materials, because Jordanian industry functions basically to attempt to provide the market's needs.

Industries did grow and develop under the special circumstances of the Iraqi-Iranian War. However, they began to contract noticeably after that war ended. The

situation worsened with the Gulf crisis, as the limited number of Jordanian industrial products lost their markets in Iraq due to the blockade imposed on Baghdad.

To complete the general description of Jordan's economic structure, it should be pointed out that the Jordanian commercial sector is limited in terms of domestic commerce because of the country's small area and population. Foreign trade is also limited. There is limited activity under ordinary circumstances involving the transport of goods from Turkey and Syria to the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. There was also activity in transit goods arriving at the Red Sea Port of al-Aqabah destined for Iraq during the Iraqi-Iranian War. However, commercial transit activity has almost ceased. Jordan has a land transport fleet, and Jordanians are now asking themselves what can be done with it.

In contrast to these economic indicators, which reveal a strongly deficient country with modest capabilities, there is an important indicator regarding Jordan's labor force, which is estimated at between 600,000 and 650,000, half of whom are classified as "resident manpower" and the rest "emigre manpower." Emigre manpower was officially estimated in 1990 at between 300,000 and 338,000 workers, most of whom were working in the Arab Gulf countries.

Jordan's labor force, especially the emigre labor force, is characterized as outstanding and possessing expertise and advanced professional skills. Half of the labor force has advanced degrees. These qualifications have become in demand in the oil countries, which, among other factors, has caused Jordanian workers to refrain from accepting jobs in the services or public utilities in Jordan, which explains the high unemployment among Jordan's labor force (more than 20 percent) at a time when about 150,000 foreign workers are working in Jordan's labor market, including some Arabs and many foreigners from the Indian subcontinent.

The resident labor force is distributed throughout the basic economic sectors and utilities as follows: 7 percent work in agriculture; 8 percent work in the stone quarries, mining sector, and industry; 8 percent work in transportation, storage, and communications; 13 percent work in the building and construction sector; 11 percent work in the wholesale, retail, and restaurant trade; and 50 percent work in collective, social, and personal services and public administration. These percentages are taken from the 1983 Jordanian labor force survey, which is the most recent official survey.

Data on Jordan's emigre labor force indicate that the labor force has played a significant role in Jordan's economic and social structure, especially during the previous decade, through its remittances, which peaked at 475 million Jordanian dinars (about \$1.5 billion) in 1984. However, remittances dropped in subsequent years due to the drop in oil prices and the difficulties that it caused the oil countries, which compelled them to reduce the number of Arab workers and decrease the

wages of those whom they retained. Remittances dropped to about 336 million dinars in 1988, and to an estimated 220 million dinars (\$320 million at the current exchange rate) in 1989.

Despite the sharp drop in the volume of remittances by Jordanian workers abroad, remittances have constituted about 80 percent of Jordan's foreign currency resources in past years.

Remittances by workers abroad have been channelled into one of three conduits, all of which have a limited effect on the country's real development: expenses and financial assistance for the worker's family; the purchase of consumer goods; or investment in land, houses, and commercial establishments.

According to an Arab economist, emigre workers have not been motivated to channel their remittances in the three above-mentioned ways out of a middle-class fear of losing their life savings, which is an entrenched fear in Jordan, as well as other Arab countries. Rather, they have done so because of objective factors related to the structure and administration of Jordan's economy, both of which are backward. One finds several expressions of this backwardness in the preponderance of factors that favor investment abroad rather than in Jordan. One factor is the lack of mechanisms and regulations for incorporating expatriate capital into the Jordanian national economy. Finally, an important factor is seen in the losses incurred by several large investment programs in Jordan during the past two decades.

Another important component of Jordan's economic and social picture is aid from Arab and foreign countries. Arab aid alone totals between \$400 million and \$500 million per year. Foreign aid perhaps exceeds these figures at times. Foreign aid is thus an important, influential factor in Jordan's economic and social structure. [passage omitted]

Short-Term Expectations

Short-term expectations regarding Jordan's economy generally reflect the current picture. However, Jordan has begun to move by formulating economic reform plans, accompanied by political reform based on the following:

- An increase in national savings and the limiting of consumption, especially the consumption of luxury items, through financial and monetary policies, rather than administrative measures.
- An increase in investment averages and the channelling of investments to promote projects related to the development of raw materials, agriculture, and export projects.
- Efforts to achieve a domestic and foreign balance by reducing the general budget deficit and strengthening the balance of payment, so that a stable dinar exchange rate and stable prices can be maintained.
- Action to achieve security based on the balanced distribution of the burdens of a comprehensive, national economic reform program.

These approaches, together with foreign aid, will help Jordan transcend its economic ordeal.

KUWAIT

Minister on Rebuilding, Improving Communications

91AE0629A Paris *AL-DUWALIYAH* in Arabic
26 Aug 91 p 21

[Interview with Information Minister Badr Jasim al-Ya'qub by Antoine Nufal in Kuwait: "Our Media is Arab; Censorship Is Temporary;" date not given]

[Text] In this interview with AL-DUWALIYAH, Kuwaiti Minister of Information Dr. Badr Jasim al-Ya'qub defined the broad lines of a new information policy to be implemented by Kuwait, now that it has returned to normalcy, especially since the Iraqi occupation has destroyed 95 percent of Kuwaiti information facilities.

[Nufal] You say that Kuwait will need the help of its sister countries in implementing its new information policy. What sort of help do you seek?

[Dr. al-Ya'qub] Indeed, Kuwait has always sought advice and support from those whom it trusts whenever it embarked on new action, be it political, economic, or having to do with information. We must now view information differently than we did in the past, because Kuwaiti and Arab media were based on mutual trust, objective debate, and serious and calm discussion that advocated certain slogans in which we all believed. However, it became apparent after the invasion that Iraq used incomplete information and resorted to debate and political intervention. In the aftermath of the vicious Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and now that Kuwait has been liberated with the backing of all the benevolent powers in the world, we must view information in a totally different manner. Our information should not be confined to Kuwait, Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states, or even the Arab world. Kuwaiti information should address all the peoples of the world so that others may see us as we truly are, and to give them a true picture of Kuwait and the Kuwaiti people, who garnered the support of all nations. We must acquaint the world with Kuwait's civilization, history, and policies.

There is no doubt that Kuwait can not properly convey this message to the world singlehandedly. To bolster its information, Kuwait must seek the help of those who are more experienced with information, and [enlist the services] of writers, authors, scholars, and information specialists from all over the Arab world. We intend to preserve the reputation Kuwait gained during the invasion by infusing Kuwaiti information with such supportive Arab, Muslim, and world-class specialists.

[Nufal] How does Kuwaiti information fare today, after the destruction wreaked upon press houses and the information media in Kuwait?

[Dr. al-Ya'qub] Upon our return to Kuwait, we found that all information [media] were destroyed. I said on more than one occasion that 95 percent [of media installations] were destroyed and that we suffered 277 million Kuwaits dinars (about \$1 billion) in physical damage. The Iraqi regime destroyed the four major broadcasting stations, and the Voice of Kuwait is therefore no longer heard in the Arab world or in major world capitals. I believe that Kuwaiti information [media] today is capable of covering the domestic field, and the GCC states to a lesser extent. However, the Voice of Kuwait must be restored in order to be heard all over the world, I hope.

[Nufal] In an interview with the crown prince on the definition of information, we said that information is installations, personnel, and news. How about the news?

[Dr. al-Ya'qub] I believe that in their quest for news, Arab citizens do not necessarily depend on Arab media, but also listen to foreign broadcasts in the belief that Arab newscasts are subjective or inaccurate. It therefore behooves us to ensure that the news is accurate and objective in order to create confidence in our media, and consequently, attract Arab listeners. It is now important to render news that is meaningful to listeners and to do so accurately and truthfully, even if the content is disquieting. We have already embarked on this effort and the Kuwaiti information media are now able to transmit the news well and in an expressive fashion. Kuwaiti newscasts may not be all that we want them to be, but at least they are taking steps in the right direction.

[Nufal] Let's talk about censorship. The quest is not to reduce censorship but to lift it completely.

[Dr. al-Ya'qub] I believe, in principle, that the press should be free to write what it wants but security considerations dictate censorship—which could be called temporary—in order that we may navigate the current situation by preventing the publication of anything that would undermine the nation's unity, security, and overall strategy, and by avoiding personal attacks and denigration. Those are the parameters of our censorship. Aside from that, all are free to publish what they wish.

[Nufal] Do you have any plans for external information?

[Dr. al-Ya'qub] We realized during the invasion that external information is important and effective. We are convinced that we should maintain our openness to the world. Most importantly, Kuwait should be the center of guided information that addresses all the citizen's needs of culture, ideas, economics, etc. We shall begin, God willing, by establishing information centers in some capitals. We also lean towards building a major television station with correspondents all over the world to

provide Kuwaiti citizens with first-hand reports on world developments. This is to be our current priority.

[Nufal] One last question on Kuwaiti information. Will it be strictly Kuwaiti, limited to the Gulf, or will it be more comprehensive?

[Dr. al-Ya'qub] I believe that Kuwaiti information should be Arab in scope, which it will be, God willing, because we are oriented towards the Arab world. Any allusions to the contrary are manipulative and patently false. No matter what happens, and regardless of certain postures, the Kuwaitis are an Arab people first and above all. Some Arab nations opposed us during the blitzkrieg, but others stood by us and put forth blood and money in the service of the Kuwaiti cause. I am certain that Kuwait will remain an Arab land—Arab in its heart and Arab in its orientation.

LEBANON

Historical Overview of Conflict Among Maronite Leaders

91AE06204 London *AL-HAYAH* in Arabic
28, 29 Aug 91

[Two-part article by Emile Khuri: "Political Leadership Crisis Among Lebanon's Leaders; Historical Review"]

[28 Aug p 8]

[Text] Beirut—One cannot talk of the presence of a Maronite leadership crisis or a crisis of vacuum in the Maronite political arena before talking about the political conflict between the Maronite leaders—beginning with the era of the [French] mandate and throughout the era of independence—and before talking about the armed conflict which imposed the singular authority and led to the monopolization, even confiscation, of decision-making, thus creating among the Christians a sense of emptiness, aimlessness, and absence of a uniting authority, which forms the polarizing axis and the decision-making center.

What do the Christian and Muslim leaders say about these conflicts? Have the conflicts actually led to a Maronite leadership crisis or to a leadership crisis in all sects and to a non-Lebanese authority in the absence of a uniting national authority?

Political Conflict

Political conflict between the Maronite leaders started in the era of the mandate. The French high commissioner was the third party that settled this conflict in the interest of this or that faction, depending on what he deemed fit, or fanned the fires of the conflict if it served his interests to do so. This led to intense competition among the feuding parties to win his affection. The commissioner supported this leader against that one or this faction against that one, depending on what he deemed fit and what he wished.

In the battle for independence that followed the political conflict between Shaykh Bisharah al-Khuri's faction and Emile Iddih's faction escalated, with the former supported by Britain and the latter by France in the struggle for influence between the two countries. Parliamentary elections were held at the end of the summer of 1943 under the supervision of President Petro Trad, British High Commissioner General Speares, and French High Commissioner Jean Helleu, and ended with victory for the Constitutional Bloc and its allies, led by Shaykh Bisharah al-Khuri. The new parliament elected al-Khuri president of the republic with a majority of 44 votes, with 11 abstentions.

Riyad al-Sulh's cabinet and the Chamber of Deputies began amending the constitution by omitting every reference it made to the mandate and by voiding French as a second official language to confirm Lebanon's national sovereignty. But that action culminated with French High Commissioner Jean Helleu arresting President Bisharah al-Khuri, Prime Minister Riyad al-Sulh, and a number of ministers and administration leaders and transporting them to Rashayya Citadel. The commissioner then issued a number of decrees suspending the constitution, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, and appointing Emile Iddih head of state. Subsequently, demonstrations and protest strikes spread to most parts of the country and France was compelled to back down. Helleu was dismissed from his post and President Bisharah al-Khuri and his colleagues were released.

Upon the return from Rashayya Citadel and reinstatement of the constitution, a more severe conflict developed between the Bisharah al-Khuri faction and the Emile Iddih faction. The idea of bringing Iddih to account, expelling him from the chamber, viewing his cooperation with Helleu as national treason, and stripping him of his political rights was raised. General Speares and Bisharah al-Khuri, Iddih's archenemy, were behind this idea. But al-Sulh did not respond to it because he was friends with Iddih. After a tug-of-war, Riyad agreed to strip Iddih only of his deputyship. France was compelled to abandon the idea of concluding a treaty with Lebanon as a result of pressure by the Lebanese people, who rejected that treaty. The last French soldier was evacuated from Lebanon's soil on 31 December 1946.

With the onset of 1947, the conflict between Bisharah al-Khuri and his allies, and Emile Iddih and his allies, flared up anew because of al-Khuri's wish to amend the constitution in order to be able to serve a second presidential term. Thus, the famous 25 May elections and the administration's major scandal followed, considering that the government resorted to large-scale election rigging to ensure a parliamentary majority supporting renewal of Bisharah al-Khuri's term and to thwart Emile Iddih's candidates.

The renewal enraged Maronite leaders aspiring for the presidency. Thus, they rose in opposition, led by Camille Sham'un. With the onset of the summer of 1952, the

opposition encompassed most of the country's influential forces under its banner and called for a general strike, which turned into a bloodless revolution that compelled Bisharah al-Khuri to resign from the presidency. Subsequently, the Chamber of Deputies met and elected Camille Sham'un to succeed him.

Sham'un's administration did not escape criticism, and revived conflicts and partisanship, not only between the Khuri faction and the Sham'un faction, but also between the Sham'un faction and the Iddih faction. Druze Leader Kamal Junblatt also joined the opposition to Sham'un's administration.

President Sham'un tried to destroy his political opponents' influence by any means. With the passage of the fourth year of his presidency, a number of Maronite leaders, including Patriarch al-Ma'ushi, joined the opposition ranks. When the date for the election of a new Chamber of Deputies approached, the opposition leaders rallied, forming a front opposing President Sham'un. That front included leaders of the various sects. The elections were held and the Sham'un administration supporters won by a large majority. Losers in those elections included a number of opposition notables (Sa'ib Salam, 'Abdallah al-Yafi, Ahmad al-As'ad, and Kamal Junblatt) who accused President Sham'un of manipulating the elections to ensure a second presidential term.

But the fall of those leaders did not keep them from continuing their activity to stop President Sham'un from realizing his wish for a renewed term. Consequently, the 1958 events, which started with the assassination of Nasib al-Matni, an opposition journalist, began.

U.S. forces landed in Lebanon and Robert Murphy, the U.S. undersecretary of state, arrived in Beirut. After holding contacts with a number of Lebanese leaders, it became evident to him that the solution lied in having Major General Fu'ad Shihab elected to succeed President Sham'un.

Fu'ad Shihab took the reins of power. A new cabinet was formed from opponents of the [former] administration and it was determined to "reap the fruits of the revolution." This angered the factions supporting Sham'un's administration. So, another balanced cabinet had to be formed under the premiership of Rashid Karami. It included Pierre al-Jumayyil, Raymond Iddih, and al-Hajj Husayn al-'Uwayni. This four-member cabinet hastened to raise the slogan of "no victor and no vanquished" in order to end the crisis and restore calm and stability to the country.

However, the conflict between the Maronite leaders did not halt because there were those who saw in the Shihab administration a masked military regime, especially after the army foiled the Syrian nationalists' attempt to seize power and oppressive measures were taken against those who had made the attempt. This raised the suspicions of those fearing the administration's intentions.

Complaints of the intervention of elements of the Deuxieme Bureau for political affairs escalated. Some of the bureau's officers vented their rancor against their foes and they oppressed people. The Deuxieme Bureau became another power in Lebanon and it grew in size and influence. It incited the administration opponents and increased their numbers, especially with its flagrant intervention in elections and its indiscriminate arrest of citizens. It became evident that what was behind this behavior was the wish of some Deuxieme Bureau figures to see Shihab serve a second term so that they could remain in control of the government.

Even though the chamber amended the constitution so Shihab could serve another term, President Shihab returned the constitutional amendment to the chamber, thus dashing the dreams of some Deuxieme Bureau officers. But President Shihab was able to select his successor, namely Charles Hilu. However, a year later he expressed regret for his choice.

Though President Shihab left the government and Charles Hilu took the reins of the presidency, Shihab continued to be an authority to whom politicians referred and on whose door people with needs knocked. People continued to feel that the Deuxieme Bureau was ruling behind the scenes and fanning the conflict among the leaders, especially the Maronite leaders. As a consequence of the rising complaints of the Deuxieme Bureau's continued intervention in political affairs and of its policy of taking revenge on various leaders, the Tripartite Alliance was formed under the auspices of Shi'ah leader Kazim al-Khalil. This alliance included leaders Camille Sham'un, Pierre al-Jumayyil, and Raymond Iddih. Its objective was to confront the Shihabists and the Deuxieme Bureau's intervention in the later elections and to prevent the Shihabists return to power.

Charles Hilu disappointed Fu'ad Shihab's hope that his administration would be an extension of the Shihabist administration. Hilu's administration was an administration with no known identity and one that was perplexed by all the forces pulling it in different directions, especially the Deuxieme Bureau force, which continued to dominate the administration and of which it could not rid itself. The phenomenon of duality of power surfaced during Charles Hilu's administration.

President Hilu's administration ended with conclusion of the Cairo Accord, which did not serve the country's interest and which caused Lebanese-Palestinian relations to be dominated by suspicion, confusion, and wariness. His administration ended with parliamentary elections in which the Tripartite Alliance candidate lists scored a crushing victory, and in which the Shihabist candidate lists failed. The outcome of those elections constituted the start of the defeat of Shihabism and the diminution of its influence as a result of the conflict among the Maronite leaders. This conflict reached its peak when Sulayman Franjiyah, candidate of those opposing the Shihabist course, won the presidency, defeating Ilyas Sarkis, the Shihabist candidate.

During President Franjiyah's administration, the conflict was not confined to the Maronite leaders, but went beyond them to include leaders in other sects. It also included the fight against and deportation of the Deuxieme Bureau leaders, and a Lebanese-Palestinian war which he launched in mid-term and which came to a halt when the army stopped fighting as a consequence of domestic and Arab pressures. That war resulted in turning the refugee camps into military barracks and in creating a climate of wariness and tension between Lebanese and Palestinian factions until the 'Ayn al-Rummanah incident, which took place on 13 April 1975 and acted as the spark that ignited the long and devastating war.

Subsequently, decisions were made by a single Maronite authority, namely the Phalangist authority, in coordination with the presidency, and then with a broader authority embodied in the Lebanese Front. This front's leaders included President Camille Sham'un, the National Liberal Party chairman at the time; Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, the Phalangist Party chairman; and Abbot Sharbil Qassis, head of the Maronite monastic orders. The front was then joined by former president Sulayman Franjiyah after he had handed over the presidency to President Ilyas Sarkis six months before the end of his term under the umbrella of a divided government. The Lebanese Front thus became the political leadership, making decisions in the name of and on behalf of the Christians.

Armed Conflict

This Maronite authority, backed by arms and by broad Christian support, entered the war against the Palestinians and their supporters in Lebanon, and also into a conflict with other Maronite leaders who rejected and renounced this war and called for a settlement to end it, especially Raymond Iddih and the Maronite Patriarchate, which tried to play the role of peacemaker between the moderate and radical tendencies.

The Maronite Patriarchate was close to a settlement to end the war, contrary to the monastic orders which supported the Lebanese Front, particularly the Phalangists, in the war against the Palestinian factions until Lebanon would be liberated from their presence.

The radical tendency, an armed tendency, prevailed over the unarmed moderate tendency. After being subjected to an attempt on his life, Raymond Iddih was compelled to leave Lebanon unwillingly and to live in France. The voices calling for an end to the war went silent and the sounds of guns prevailed. Calling from afar, those voices became ineffective. The war went on and the conflict, not only between Christians and Muslims, but also among the Maronites in particular, persisted.

After the war-rejecting Iddih was removed, or removed himself, the horrible Ihdin incident, which claimed the lives of Deputy Tony Franjiyah and of his family members as its victims, followed in the wake of a chain of

assassinations and incidents in the north between Phalangist elements and President Sulayman Franjiyah's supporters. The Ihdin incident constituted the first, and most serious, crack in Christian solidarity. It separated the north from Jabal Lubnan, and developed hatred and rancor among sons of the same ranks. Thus, the Lebanese Front lost one of its leaders, namely President Sulayman Franjiyah. The day of 13 June 1978 was an ill-omened day for all. It signaled the start of the Maronite leaders' liquidating each other.

Barely a few days passed after the Ihdin tragedy, when another tragedy followed. The town of al-Qa' in al-Biq'a' was attacked and a number of Phalangists were arrested and killed immediately. That seemed to have been done to avenge victims of the Ihdin operation.

With the rising leadership of Bashir al-Jumayyil, the Maronite authority, embodied in the Lebanese Front, began to weaken and retreat. Its only role became the role of providing cover for the decisions made by Bashir in his capacity as commander of the Lebanese Forces. Moreover, it could no longer make a decision and enforce it on the ground unless approved by Bashir. If it dared make a decision [without his approval], it went unimplemented.

Thus, the Maronite authority was actually transferred from the Lebanese Front, which continued to exist formally, to Bashir al-Jumayyil, commander of the Lebanese Forces. All decision-making ended up being controlled by Bashir al-Jumayyil or by the Lebanese Forces Command, which disregarded not only the Lebanese Front, but also the Phalangist Party, despite the presence of Pierre al-Jumayyil's historical leadership at the head of this party.

Under the slogan of "uniting the rifles," Bashir al-Jumayyil was able to annex the Phalangist Party's fighters to the Lebanese Forces in preparation for forcing the National Liberal Party fighters to follow suit. Thus, the al-Safra massacre followed the Ihdin massacre and Dany Sham'un was forced to leave the country. The northern al-Matin area remained beyond the control of Bashir's military power because Amin, his brother, objected to this monopoly. The Armenian area, specifically the Burj Hammud area, also remained beyond Bashir's control. This resulted in armed clashes between the Lebanese Forces and the Tashnaq Party fighters, who were resolved to remain neutral in the ongoing war in Lebanon.

The Lebanese Forces became the authority in the eastern areas. Despite all the endeavors made, it was unthinkable that Bashir al-Jumayyil would cede to Ilyas Sarkis' legitimate government or that he would hand over to this government the authority he had gained by virtue of his control on the ground, because it was Bashir's dream to rule. He gained control of power by a magician's charm, but fell quickly. He was assassinated before he could assume the presidency.

The Maronite leadership has been subjected to liquidation or to deportation by force of arms since 1975. In wake of the Ihdin operation on 13 June 1978, there was the al-Safra operation of July 1980, which led to the liquidation of the National Liberal Party's military organization at the hands of the Lebanese Forces. The split between the northern Maronites and the Jabal Lubnan Maronites turned into a split between two allied parties within the same region. Then came the 12 March 1985 uprising, when a faction of the Lebanese Forces rebelled against its command and against the Phalangist leadership, making President Amin al-Jumayyil its target. Thus, the conflict was transformed from a conflict between two allied parties in the same region into a conflict within the same party and the same region. Then there was the 15 January 1986 activity, when the split moved into the Lebanese Forces leadership and, to be specific, turned into a split between Dr. Samir Ja'ja' and Eli Hubayqah. In the confrontation between the two, a number of people were killed or wounded. What became known as the "abolition" war between General Michel 'Awn and Dr. Samir Ja'ja' on 31 January 1990 was the most violent and most serious confrontation. It split East Beirut into two East Beirluts and resulted in the heaviest human and material losses.

These wars and uprisings have shaken, divided, and fragmented the Maronite sect and have weakened its presence and its influence in the political arena. In these wars, the combatants resorted to arms to decide the struggle for power, to control the Maronite sect, and to determine the sect's position in regional plans and accords such as the Tripartite Accord, the 17 May Accord, and the al-Ta'if Accord.

Certain regional and international parties benefitted from these wars and conflicts, which deported Raymond Iddih to France, subjected elected President Bashir al-Jumayyil to assassination, forced President Amin al-Jumayyil to leave the country, claimed the life of National Liberal Party chairman Dany Sham'un, eliminated President Rene Mu'awwad by assassination, and forced Michel 'Awn to seek asylum in the French Embassy in al-Hazimiyah and Dr. Samir Ja'ja' to withdraw into the shadows and remain silent in his headquarters in Ghadras, watching and waiting.

Maronite internecine fighting is not a new phenomenon in the sect's history. It has recurred throughout the Maronite history whenever one strong leader tried to negate the power of another and whenever it became impossible for two leaders to coexist in the same area. The beneficiary of such internecine fighting has always been a third party, whose rule has been favored over the victor's rule. In 1655, Shaykh Ahmad 'Aya'ah, a Shi'ah, became prefect when intense conflicts erupted among Maronite leaders over the prefecture of Bsharri area and when none of them would cede it to another. The provincial governor was a foreigner, because it had been impossible to agree on a Lebanese governor. Today, as in the past, the patriarchate has usually been incapable of

uniting the sect and of ending the internecine fighting. It has contented itself with offering advice and guidance and expressing regret.

The Maronite conflicts and splits have assumed a political character at times and a military character at others. From 1943 to 1975, the Maronite leaders' conflicts, especially the conflicts just before or immediately after a presidential election, were political in nature. But the war in 1975 militarized the Maronites. The traditional leaders began to lose ground to the radical or armed Maronite parties led by either a generation of veterans, such as Sulayman Franjiyah, Camille Sham'un, and Pierre al-Jumayyil, or a new generation, such as Bashir al-Jumayyil, Samir Ja'ja', and Michel 'Awn.

The question raised now is: In whose hands is the Maronite decision-making, and who is the sole Maronite authority whose decisions are binding for all? Does it belong to the presidency, whose powers and authority have diminished with the new constitution? Does it belong to the Maronite Patriarchate, whose role has been weakened by the Maronite leaders' wars and by the domination of armed leaders? Does it belong to the parties, organizations, and associations that have lost a large part of their presence, influence, and credibility? Is the Maronite sect actually facing a leadership crisis or are the sect's leaders in a crisis? What do the leaders to whom we have addressed these questions say and what are the causes of this crisis, if it actually exists?

[29 Aug p 8]

[Text] Former Minister Joseph al-Hashim says that there really is a Maronite leadership crisis in Lebanon and that its causes are numerous and intertwined. Some of the causes are tied to the Lebanon crisis scheme. One of this scheme's methods has been to strike at the prominent leaders of the various sects. Other causes are tied to the struggle-for-power scheme, which has used the weaker Maronite forces to strike at the influential Maronite forces.

The Maronites waged the first two-year war under the slogan of the cause. But they then got embroiled in side battles under the slogan of personal gain and monopoly. Maronite violence against others was no less violent than inter-Maronite violence.

If we cast a fleeting glance at the targeted three Maronite leaders—Raymond Iddih (exile), Sulayman Franjiyah (the Ihdin massacre), and Camille Sham'un (the al-Safra operation)—the scheme to mesh what the "fish crave with what is attached to the hook" would become obvious to us. In the absence of reason, the foreign struggle aimed at the homeland got tied to the domestic struggle that was aimed at the authorities.

We say this without holding the Maronites responsible for the war. Their weak points were exploited. Each sect had its weak spots and foreign elements manipulated and exploited them.

The Palestinian element was the Sunni sect's weak spot and the Iranian element was the Shi'ah sect's weak spot. Meanwhile, the Druze sect manipulated the weak spots of the other three sects. But because the issue at hand concerns only the Maronite sect, we will disregard the various negative considerations concerning the other sects and leaders, and we will move on to the more serious development witnessed by the Maronites—a development which worsened after the death of Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, whose role had been partly obstructed while he was still alive. With his absence, the last moral controls restraining the Maronite military disappeared. Subsequently, the Maronite forces lived in a state of chaos and of absolute loss of control. The desire for power spread dangerously and without any restraints. One faction confronted another. The confrontation was within the Phalangist Party at times, and between armed factions at other times. The wars of abolition were launched in more than one direction and the Maronite political forces' role was obstructed with material and psychological pressure. Amin al-Jumayyil was exiled and the Maronites entered the arena of a feverish bloody conflict between the army and the Lebanese Forces. Bkirki [the Maronite Patriarchate] was the only remaining Maronite moral power. But it, too, was targeted and drained.

These successive ordeals created what became known as the "Maronite tendency" or what was called "Maronite secular fundamentalism" which tried, through the phenomenon of General Michel 'Awn, to regain what Maronism had lost at the national level and to restore the Maronite political presence. But as it turned out, this phenomenon led the wounded Maronism into another shock and into a state of a desperate and rebellious vacuum.

This clearly explains the current Maronite condition, which has developed as a result of the low level of leadership, which has led to psychological and political frustration. This is in addition to what the Maronites considered a diminution of their constitutional powers as a consequence of the al-Ta'if Accord. The appointment of their representatives in the government and in the Chamber of Deputies did not compensate for those powers by virtue of the quality of the representation. Rather, they consider this appointment to be in conflict with their will, and imposed on them and on the Maronite authority in the regime.

The broad Maronite base is currently wary of those who consider themselves leaders. This base has withdrawn into its shell in the context of a silent majority that is swept by a wave of boredom with politics and politicians. Moreover, it is experiencing a repressed feeling that is inclined toward rejection.

This base needs extraordinary care that is ordinarily provided by historical leaders. Because such leaders are missing, this base needs to create for itself a reliable leadership of a different kind, and one that is formed of experienced and knowledgeable people, provided that

the "non-historical" learn from history and realize that forceful usurpation of the Maronite leadership will inevitably lead to abolishing both the leaders and the Maronite presence.

Attorney Munir al-Hajj, the Phalangist Party deputy chairman, views this issue from a different angle and sees that a distinction must be made between two things that people often confuse, namely command and leadership. Command has its prerequisites, including leadership, whereas leadership requires some of the prerequisites of command. If we realize this distinction, then we find that that the crisis of true command among the Christians is an old crisis, not a new one. The Christian community has seen numerous leaders that it imagined to be great commanders. Some of these leaders did meet the prerequisites of command to a varying degree. Here, the discussion leads us to the prerequisites of true command. Following are some:

- Comprehensive and sufficient education.
- A balanced and complete intellectual system.
- The belief that politics is a science.
- Experience in the proper political reading of international, regional, and domestic developments.
- Morals; loyalty; devotion; courage; and finally, leadership, which is an outcome of the preceding characteristics.

Command prerequisites do not come from other sources contrasting with these characteristics, such as feudalism, political slavery, popular demagoguery, sect manipulation, imposition by force, or creation by the media. In this age, the media have become capable of creating anything, including leaders. From a review of Lebanon's modern history, we find that leaders possessing command characteristics are rare and that most of the existing leaders owe their existence to the maladies that I have mentioned.

Lebanon's history abounds with figures that have met the command prerequisites, except for leadership which remained inaccessible to them because they refused to adopt the popular means of attaining it and because the people were entrenched in their political backwardness and not attracted by such beacons.

For more than one reason, certain political leaders have disappeared from the theater. But the vacant theater offers a golden opportunity for an endeavor to fill the void with true commanders. We hope that the bitter experience will motivate society to awaken and to encourage those who possess command qualities to rise to the ranks of leaders and to choose from among them a select band that acts in solidarity and equality as a collective moral authority that maps for this homeland a credible existence and that seeks to achieve for it, through a scientific approach, unique aspirations which entrench the justifications for its existence and that ensure its freedom, dignity, and prosperity.

One of the national Maronite commands sees that the current Maronite command crisis has assumed a serious

dimension because of the developments in the Lebanese arena and because of the following:

First, the lack of a single strategy among the Maronite leaders. Very few of these leaders see salvation in an alliance with Syria. Others see it in an alliance with the Arabs, and some see it in an alliance with the United States. Some of them understand strategy as the flip-flopping of positions and alliances according to what is dictated by circumstances. They have thus lost friends and have gained no enemies.

Second, selfishness and the lust for power: All or most Maronite leaders have tried to attain power by various means, even at the expense of the people's principles, values, goals, and interest. It is unnecessary to recount what has happened in this regard from 1975 to the present time.

Third, lack of coordination, the love of monopolizing opinion, and the absence of a single strategy, except during some emergencies, when efforts were coordinated for a certain objective. But coordination ended when the objective was achieved.

Fourth, the Maronites' difficult life and the danger to their existence throughout history have turned them into vigorous and individualistic people. This is why they have waged wars with rare valor, winning the wars but losing the peace.

This is the condition of the Maronite leaders in the past and now. Perhaps the most eloquent description of this condition is given by Dr. Kamal Salibi in his book "Lebanon's Modern History." Reviewing the 1860 incidents, the book says that the Maronite leaders are selfish and put their personal interest ahead of the public interest, and are almost always feuding with each other.

This condition gives rise to two questions: Do the Maronites actually have commanders, and can this frustration continue? A commander is one who gives the example in sacrifice, loftiness, self-denial, and loyalty to the people and the cause. Do the Maronites have commanders and leaders of political blocs or of tribal and sectarian blocs? Will the Maronites' frustration continue and last?

No. The Lebanese in general, and the Maronites in particular, experienced an Ottoman occupation that lasted 400 years. They stood fast. The Ottomans departed and Lebanon has continued to exist. History will repeat itself and the Maronites will regain their originality, their strength, and their confidence in themselves and in their country. Sooner or later, a commander will emerge from the womb of developments.

Basil al-Hashim

Abbot Basil al-Hashim, the general chairman of the Maronite Order, says: "We did not feel the absence of authority and did not think of authority until we all failed and until we started talking about it as if it were the savior. The fact

is that authority is not a certain individual, not the presidency of the republic, not Bkirki, and not a certain party or front. All these can be projected as authorities when all reach the point of discussing the means of salvation and of how to restore a united army and an effective political presence in Lebanon."

Dialogue among all factions under the canopy of a united legitimate government is the path to salvation and the way to draft a strategy to which all adhere. When this strategy is drafted, Bkirki will watch vigilantly to see that it is implemented carefully. Any movement made by any individual, party, or circle on its own will not constitute an acceptable authority whose decisions are binding.

Many have wondered: Where is Bkirki and why doesn't it declare its position, considering that it is the authority to whose position all adhere?

When Bkirki said its piece on the appointment of deputies, for example, and on the issue of the Lebanese-Syrian treaty, not all the Christian deputies, not even all the Maronite deputies, adhered to this position. The deputies were appointed and the treaty was ratified. So what authority are they talking about? Let nobody try blame what has happened in Lebanon since 1975 on somebody else. All of us—government, people, and leaders—are responsible for it. What is required is that all the leaders take part in developing a strategy by which all abide. Bkirki will then become the authority watching vigilantly over its implementation.

Mikhayil al-Dahir

Deputy Mikhayil al-Dahir has refused to say that the Maronite authority is absent. Rather, he prefers a hundred times to see it absent than to see it present and making the wrong decisions, as in the case when the Maronite authority monopolized and confiscated decision-making in the name of the Christians, regardless of whether this authority was a party, a front, or a militia command.

Dealing with the country's issues wisely and reasonably dictates consultation with all. What is important is that the authority, be it the presidency, the premiership, or Bkirki, make a wise and sound decision.

Deputy al-Dahir said, "When the Maronites had a single authority confined to a party or a front, the war decision was made. This authority eliminated Bkirki's role. Radical voices overwhelmed moderate voices and the language of the gun overwhelmed the language of dialogue."

Deputy Hasan al-Rifa'i has said that Maronites are not the only sect without an authority and complaining of a leadership crisis. All sects are complaining of the same crisis, which the country has been experiencing since 1943, i.e. since the struggle for partnership in the government started. Whenever the president of the republic and the prime minister managed to coexist, the talk about partnership vanished and whenever they disagreed, this partnership turned into a crisis and whoever wished to attain power rode and exploited the wave of sectarianism.

All this has been happening since 1943 because of the absence of commanders, or rather, the absence of statesmen who put the country's interest above any other interest.

If what is meant by a leadership crisis is that former president Sulayman Franjiyah was compelled to hand over power to Ilyas Sarkis outside the presidential palace and under the umbrella of a divided government; that President Sarkis' administration was accompanied by deployment of the Syrian Army in Lebanon; that the end of Sarkis' administration coincided with the Israeli army's invasion of Lebanon and with Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil's assassination 21 days after he was elected president (he was the first Lebanese president to be assassinated); that President Amin al-Jumayyil, Bashir's brother, finished his term dramatically, being the first president not to secure the election of a successor, and thus leaving the country divided and under a semi-military government headed by Gen. Michel 'Awn; that Gen.'Awn was toppled and sought asylum in the French Embassy after the Syrian Army stormed the Presidential Palace in B'abda; that President Rene Mu'aawad was martyred 19 days after he was elected; that Bkirki has lost its role by virtue of objective circumstances because the Maronite leaders failed to preserve this role; then the war has not struck just the Maronite presidents and leaders. It has also struck the prime ministers. The first bullet, fired on 13 April 1975, eliminated Rashid al-Sulh's cabinet. The 17 May Accord ended Shafiq al-Wazzan's political presence. The war logic assassinated Prime Minister Rashid Karami, as it assassinated [Sunni] Islamic leaders, including Shaykh Hasan Khalid.

According to Karim Baqraduni, the Lebanese war has targeted the presidents and six of them have fallen in 16 years. This war's crises also devoured four prime ministers. Meanwhile, only two men [Shi'ites] have headed the Chamber of Deputies, i.e. an average of one speaker every eight years.

According to Baqraduni, the figures indicate that the Shi'ites have become the strongest and that the Sunnis are stronger than the Maronites. In the logic of politics, the president's position has been shaken, the prime minister's position has faded, and the position of the Chamber of Deputies has been bolstered. In the logic of history, which is harsher, the Lebanese have all lost equally. Ultimately, the war for leadership turned into a war on the leaders.

Government Said To Take on Practices of Militias

91A50238C Beirut AL-SHIR'A' in Arabic
12 Aug 91 pp 17-18

[Article by Edmond Dahir]

[Text] One of the supervisors of the Bayt-al-Din festivals stated that tourism income this season has exceeded, by a large percentage, the fees the militias collected over a year on cars passing through al-Shuf to the capital or al-Biqa'.

What is striking, adds the source, is that columns of cars and buses have not stayed away from Qasr al-Sha'b and other tourism sites in Jabal Lubnan since the decision to open the crossings. Crowds have become a regular occurrence in the tourist areas in al-Shuf, especially on Sundays and holidays.

He adds, "True, Arab and foreign tourist activity has been light. However, domestic tourism has been flourishing, because emigres have returned in droves this summer to visit family and friends and inspect their homes and property after 16 years of violence and fighting. Also, the security situation that has prevailed since areas of the country have opened up to each other has generated natural activity, far from apprehensions, psychological barriers, and factional and sectarian sensitivities."

Of course, such talk is an important incentive to pose the big question: How is Lebanon living without militias? How are the Lebanese behaving under the legitimate government after the end of the militias' fiefdoms?

A correspondent for a French magazine states in a report: "Take note! If you are somewhere in Beirut and hear sirens in the distance, do not fear and do not be dismayed. It could be a speeding ambulance or a fire truck. The sirens and car horns could also be those of an armed procession escorting an official personality or a member of the nouveau riche." The correspondent adds, "Believe me readers, the Lebanese Government has taken on the militias' customs and practices instead of acting to erase their effects from the people's memory and the homeland's consciousness!"

Is it true that the state has assumed the militias' characteristics instead of erasing their effects?

Interior Minister Staff Major General Sami al-Khatib: "Hundreds and perhaps thousands of police and internal security personnel have been assigned to protect this leader or that minister or deputy, or that personality or party or union head, in addition to ministerial buildings, official offices, embassies, diplomatic organizations, special missions, or missions subordinate to specific countries!"

Of course, security requirements might require the mobilization of such a large number of personnel to protect official, political, and syndicate personalities. However, this phenomenon has taken root, becoming the norm or a display of pomp and self-importance to attract people's attention and interest in the persons being escorted, even though most of them certainly need no protection, because they are not targets or people do not recognize them!

Even the function of policemen or traffic policemen has changed. During the time of the militias, bombings, and violence, they counted the number of dead and wounded in the hospitals. Now, they handle reports of violations, deal with the public as representatives of the law, and enforce the law under the auspices of the second republic.

These policemen are evidence of a life with which we are becoming reacquainted after years of tribulation. Even the police station in the quarter or the district has regained its standing. People are again turning to it with their complaints, after having previously rushed to the headquarters of the parties and armed militias to obtain their due through violence, force, and coercion backed by armed violence.

Fast Transition

What is said about security also applies to the health services. It suffices only to mention the press conference held several days ago by Health Minister Dr. Jamil Kibbi, in which he announced the provision of new health services, including the treatment of heart diseases, strokes, and kidney diseases, and necessary surgery at the Health Ministry's expense. Of course, no doubts can be raised about such remarks. However, even if they are somewhat lacking in seriousness, the fact that they have been made at this specific time underscores how matters have changed and how quickly services in Lebanon have shifted from the militias' jurisdiction to the state's jurisdiction.

In the era of the militias, the citizen had to resort to any party or organization that had seized an official or private ambulance to transport a patient to the hospital. The patient would be transported amid gunfire in the streets. Upon arrival at the hospital, the escort groups would take over the hospital, including its physicians and administration, who would then treat the patient under intimidation and threat. The escorts would then leave the hospital in the same manner, amid the din of weapons and the firing of shots in the air to prove their existence and to open the way for the procession!

This picture has now changed. Normalcy has also spread throughout this sector, albeit slowly. The hospitals have been returned to their owners and administrations. The Health Ministry is again playing an effective role and is being heard, even if its capabilities are weak and its funds are relatively limited compared to the immense bills that have to be paid!

What is said about the hospital sector also applies to other service sectors, such as the water, electricity, and telephone sectors. True, efforts in these sectors are not shining examples and have not been devoid of chaos, bribery, and favoritism. On the other hand, citizens can now turn to an administration or an authority to demand their rights and needs, whereas during the time of the militias, only "strongmen" could assault main offices of the telephone, water, or electricity utilities to resolve their situations, at the expense of others, without being called to account!

Normal life has resumed flowing in the arteries of the Lebanese body and state organizations, offices, and sectors, albeit slowly and far from perfectly. In any case, the current situation is much better than the lack of restraint that prevailed during the time of the militias,

when big fish ate little fish without blinking an eye or experiencing any twinge of conscience.

Even political life has changed. Something resembling a quasi-organized exchange between citizens and officials has developed.

A number of reasons and motives can be taken into account in treating this sensitive subject, such as the parliamentary appointments, the return of several party and militia leaders to government and decision-making positions after they abandoned their speckled [camouflage] suits for smoking jackets and Lanvin [cologne]. The following observations are salient in this regard:

1. The return of ministers and deputies to their political districts after a long absence due to emigration and displacement. This phenomenon began to grow after roads and crossings opened and regions began to open up to each other. Events had forced many of these ministers and deputies to leave their districts over the years. They either moved to Beirut or went abroad to seek relief from the hardships of the bombings and violence.

Deputies, ministers, and politicians did not return to their districts during the militias era, when killing, knives, and fear reigned supreme.

2. Ordinary citizens, especially in areas far from the capital and in rural areas, have begun again to approach leaders and deputies as a first step "to seek explanations for their conditions and to demand services" from "the construction of a private road," to a "tar truck to pave the intersection in front of the house," to "repairing the water system in a small village," to "mediation with the police station for leniency regarding a minor building infraction," and other requests!

What is striking is that citizens have begun to go to deputies' and politicians' homes in the countryside every weekend to "make requests of the bey or shaykh, who must fulfill them to boost his popularity, as if elections were imminent!"

3. Deputies have resumed touring the villages and municipalities in their electoral districts to congratulate citizens on happy occasions and to console them on sad occasions, especially in response to invitations!

The Ruler of His Era

This phenomenon was customary before the war, when citizens measured leadership by these superficial criteria, i.e., the extent to which a deputy or politician is in touch with his popular base, the extent to which he visits it and is visited by it, and the extent to which he is the "ruler of his era," disregarding his academic or political qualifications and his national service, which is consistent with the country's highest interests!

This phenomenon ceased completely during the time of the militias and the civil war. However, it has returned to rear its head again, especially among residents of districts far from the capital and in the countryside. There

are two reasons for this: The Lebanese blind adherence to a tradition, regardless of how negative it is; and the citizen's aversion to the militias and new faces, and his nostalgia for traditional faces after having experienced the "flippancy" and practices of the youths when they gained control of the country's resources. In adopting this attitude, the rural citizen is applying the following proverbs: "Something old that you know [well] is preferable to something new and errant with which you are familiar!" and "preserve what you have that is old; what you have that is new will not last!"

4. Deputies and politicians have resumed following up on citizens' and "voters'" requests in the official offices of the ministries of public works, interior, health, telecommunications and posts, and [natural] resources. This has gotten to the point where these offices have become crowded with deputies and politicians—one pursuing a transaction with an official, another requesting an appointment to meet with the pertinent minister, another studying the capabilities available for carrying out a specific project in his district, and others pursuing other requests and concerns!

"In any case," states one deputy of the districts, "this is the Lebanon that we know, the Lebanon of calm and stability and the return to heritage and tradition. Time and events have proven that a Lebanon composed of fiefdoms and militias cannot survive. A Lebanon of subjugation and the monopolization of the people's interests, property, and honor cannot survive. This is demonstrated by the experience of years of grim violence, when the state disappeared, or was made to disappear, to be replaced by chaotic fiefdoms that encroached upon honor and resources for a long time. However, upon the first recovery of consciousness, propriety returned, clearly signalling a sincere desire to avoid repeating past errors and for the long ordeal to serve as a warning to those who have not learned their lesson, so that we can build the state of Lebanon, not the country estate of Lebanon!"

Overview of Arms Trafficking Situation

91A50238B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 9 Aug 91 p 8

[Report by Tariq Ibrahim]

[Text] Beirut—Weeks ago, news of a large cargo of arms loaded onto ships bound for Yugoslavia from Lebanon again focused concern on the arms trade inside Lebanon and the export of arms from Lebanon to foreign markets. Although most Lebanese organizations, mainly the Lebanese Forces and the Progressive Socialist Party, hastened to deny any connection with the shipment, pieces of information derived from Yugoslav and European security sources agree that the shipment originated in Lebanon and was bound for Yugoslavia, specifically Croatia and Slovenia. These are the two republics that decided to secede from the Yugoslav federation and

form their own armed forces to counter military operations which the predominantly Serbian federal Yugoslav forces might undertake to forcefully prevent the two republics from seceding.

The establishment of independent armed forces is now a top priority for the Croatians and the Slovenians, whose defenses are limited to volunteers, elements of local militias, and the police, who are equipped primarily with light arms captured from the Yugoslav Army.

The arms detected coming from Lebanon are considered ideal for equipping the armed forces being formed by the Croatians and the Slovenians. The fact that most of these weapons are Soviet-made or Soviet-designed, and thus similar to those used by the Yugoslav Army, will ease training on and use of them for conscripts organized in the two separatist republics.

Based on available information, the shipment detected in Yugoslavia, which is valued at about \$335 million, is sufficient to equip an army of 100,000 soldiers. It includes eight French Gazelle helicopters, about 50 Soviet T-54/55 tanks, 122-mm and 130-mm field cannons, numerous missile launchers ranging from 107-mm to 122-mm, anti-armor weapons, antiaircraft weapons, mortars, machine guns, and large quantities of different types of ammunition.

European security sources have yet to positively identify the party behind the deal. However, the most widely circulated account says that Iraq sent the weapons to the Lebanese Forces about two years ago during the armed struggle in Lebanon, and that after the militias in Lebanon began to disband and disarm, the Lebanese Forces decided that it no longer needed the arms and sold them on the international market, from where they apparently found their way to Yugoslavia.

In any case, international sources believe that in the near future, Lebanese organizations are likely to attempt to dispense with their arsenals by offering them for sale on international markets to benefit from the proceeds.

The arms trade in Lebanon is seeing a recession following the dissolution of the Lebanese militias and the withdrawal of heavy and medium Palestinian weapons from the refugee camps in the south. The arms trade faced similar circumstances in 1977, 1982, and 1983. Nonetheless, the prevailing view among major arms dealers in Beirut, Juniyah, and the security zone is that the Lebanese Army's current and subsequent consolidation of its authority over most of Lebanon will be particularly difficult for many reasons, the most significant being the difficulty in reconciling between the local militias and "the absence of internecine fighting." These dealers acknowledge that the international arms trade mafia has notified them of the difficulty of coming days in Lebanon. The dealers most affected by the recession are those who sell heavy and medium artillery, combat boats, armored vehicles, tanks, signal equipment, light radars, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

It was well-known in Lebanese militia circles that there is a group of "arms lines." The major ones are the Cyprus/Juniyah line, the Cyprus/Sidon line, and the Cyprus/al-Naqurah line. This does not mean that Cyprus has been the source of the arms trade as much as it means that the international mafia has designated it as a stopover en route to Lebanon. Throughout the civil war in Lebanon, most of the heavy weapons—artillery, tanks, and missiles—originated in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, former West Germany, the United States, Spain, Belgium, and France. A number of diplomats of these countries played a role in facilitating trade in medium and personal weapons during their service in Beirut. Most of them had links with arms middlemen connected to the Lebanese and Palestinian militias, especially the Lebanese Forces, the Fatah Movement, the National Liberal Party, and the Lebanese Communist Party.

Arms Supply Lines and Major Dealers in Leadership Positions

The first actual arms deal in Lebanon was undoubtedly in 1970, when the Phalangist Party purchased about 3,000 7.62-mm Czechoslovak Slavia machine guns through international middlemen at a price of \$100 per machine gun. Interest in this machine gun was lacking due to competition posed by the Soviet AK-47 rifle, known in the Arab world as the Kalashnikov. When Palestinian organizations entered Lebanon in 1969, they armed their elements with the AK-47. Until early 1980, the AK-47, in its different Russian types, especially, the "iron arch type," which was designed in 1965, was the most expensive of comparable Chinese, Polish, and East German machine guns and more prevalent than the Belgian-made FAL rifle and the German-made G-3 rifle. When the PLO left Jordan in the summer of 1970 for Lebanon, the Palestinian organizations had to replace the personal and medium weapons which they had lost by buying on the black market.

In that period, the Phalangist Party began to acquire its first FAL and Israeli Uzi rifles and machine guns from the black market. Concurrently, the U.S.-made 5.57-mm M-16 rifle emerged as a real competitor to the AK-47 after the Lebanese Army adopted it as a basic weapon instead of the Belgian Fal.

In 1981, Beirut attracted the attention of arms mafias, because it offered smuggling routes over international borders by land, sea, and air. These mafias mostly engaged in activity under false commercial names. They strengthened their position among armed Lebanese and Palestinian organizations amid the escalation of the civil war and these organizations' constant need for arms in the wake of repeated domestic and regional policy shifts beginning in 1975. By 1977, major arms dealers in Lebanon had obtained core leadership positions in political and military organizations of the Phalangist Party and the National Liberal Party.

The lines of the arms trade in Lebanon were clearly etched in 1980, as follows:

The Israeli and Western arms trade was active on the Cyprus/Juniyah line. Offices were established in Cyprus,

Tel Aviv, Brussels, Bonn, and Paris. These offices supplied heavy and medium arms and light and medium war boats to the Christian organizations.

Active on the Cyprus/Sidon line were the Palestinian organizations, specifically Fatah; the [Palestine] Liberation Front, which is backed by Iraq; the Lebanese Communist Party; and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.

Active on the al-Naqurah/Cyprus line were Israeli dealers comprising retired Israeli officers linked closely with the Mossad and the Shin Bet. Their activity was not limited to the arms trade, but also included drugs, counterfeit currency, and the facilitation of the passage of Israeli goods to the Lebanese market.

Fatah and the Mossad

Abu-Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), Yasir 'Arafat's military deputy, emerged as a professional buyer of advanced weapons on the world market to equip Palestinian forces. Israeli spy units pursued his elements from place to place and assassinated some of them. Abu-Jihad, for his part, was able to hit back at these units and the Mossad by obtaining arms that were on the "forbidden" list, such as French anti-tank Milan missiles and U.S. TOW missiles. In 1981, Abu-Jihad's middlemen were able to obtain a number of high-priced missiles and transport them to Lebanon through Sidon. Fatah and the Mossad waged a naval war along the Lebanese coast from Beirut to Tyre. From 1977 to 1981, the Mossad blew up numerous ships carrying heavy and personal arms, anti-tank missiles, and aircraft. Abu-Jihad almost made a deal to acquire U.S. Red Eye anti-aircraft missiles, which would have made it easier for him to subsequently obtain more sophisticated missiles. However, the Mossad exposed the deal by chance. Fatah compensated for these missiles by purchasing a similar surface-to-air missile from the Soviet Union, the SAM-7.

In 1982, this missile proved ineffective against Israeli war planes, and Fatah turned away from purchasing [large] quantities of it. It also failed to obtain a more advanced surface-to-air missile from the Soviet Union. A number of SAM-7 missiles came into the hands of arms merchants through Fatah depots. In the same year, the Lebanese Forces acquired this missile from markets in East Europe. The SAM-7 missile became the star of military tenders among the Lebanese and Palestinian organizations in that period. The cost of a single missile with launcher ranged from \$300 to \$500.

In 1982, the Lebanese Forces tried to sell quantities of the SAM-7 missile to Palestinians besieged in Beirut at a price of \$1,500-2,000 per missile with launcher. The Israelis apparently uncovered the deal and thwarted an attempt to transport a shipment of the missiles on a speedboat bound for West Beirut from Juniyah.

In 1982, the Lebanese Forces became the biggest buyer of heavy weapons, namely 155-mm, 130-mm, and 122-mm howitzers. The Lebanese Forces were also an authorized intermediary for Western and Israeli arms in the Lebanese market. The Palestinians again became the biggest buyer of personal weapons after they returned to Lebanon in 1985. That year saw a large increase in the price of personal, medium, and heavy arms. The small dealers in Beirut, Jabal Lubnan, Kisrwan, Tripoli, al-Janub, and the Palestinian camps—based on their connections with the major dealers—became active again in smuggling personal arms to Syria, Egypt, and Jordan.

Until sometime after 1980, the small merchants preferred to transact in Lebanese pounds in the domestic market. In 1983, prices were as follows: A Degtryarev, 3,000 Lebanese pounds; a Kalashnikov, 2,500 pounds; an M-16 rifle, 3,000 pounds; a Fal, 1,500 pounds; a G-3 rifle, 1,000 pounds; a MAK, 3,500 pounds; a Goryunov, 3,500 pounds; a D Sh K [38 machine gun], 7,000 pounds; a machine gun, 500-1,200 pounds; an RPG [rocket-propelled grenade] launcher, 300 pounds.

In 1976, Fatah introduced several light arms to the domestic market, such as an RPG launcher costing 1,500 pounds and explosives such as TNT and dynamite. However, the most important of these explosives was hexagen, a high explosive which was sold at high prices and exported abroad. The Israeli forces destroyed a factory for producing this material in the 'Ayn al-Hilwah camp in 1982.

The Decline of Prices

On 13 October 1990, after the defeat of General Michel 'Awn, the former commander of the Lebanese Army, the Lebanese domestic market became filled with different types of personal weapons. At that time, it was said that the small arms dealers had purchased about 400 Swiss SIG rifles that had been in the possession of the special forces in 'Awn's brigades. Each unit was sold for about \$200, compared to \$400-500, which dealers had been willing to pay just one week earlier. The price of an M-16 rifle also dropped dramatically from \$350 to \$100 per unit, after about 4,000 of these rifles were pillaged from the Lebanese Army's depots. The Lebanese Forces obtained the lion's share of these rifles (about 3,000 rifles).

Since June 1991, the arms trade has declined by 70 percent compared to previous months. This drop quickly influenced arms prices, although dealers stressed that "their situation will flourish within less than two months" given the Lebanese' interest in acquiring small arms, such as 9-mm machine guns, pistols, and "pump action" automatic hunting rifles.

As for heavy artillery and rocket launchers, it has become impossible to sell them now. Before the Lebanese Army entered Sidon, the Palestinian organizations had only a few 122-mm and 107-mm launchers and 130-mm howitzers, because Israeli aircraft had destroyed the primary complements of these weapons in

two raids over east Sidon on 4 and 5 June 1991. The military agencies observed the destruction of two 130-mm and two 122-mm howitzers belonging to Fatah; 20 to 35 trailers carrying 122-mm and 107-mm towed launchers belonging to Fatah, the Revolutionary Council, and the Democratic Front; and heavy anti-tank artillery.

The Lebanese Forces benefitted from the respite given them before the army's entry into East Beirut last fall. They were able to sell and smuggle a large portion of their heavy weapons, especially field artillery, tanks, and war boats. Large and small dealers are whispering that the Lebanese Forces, unlike other Lebanese organizations, can absorb blows and "we will find the appropriate ways to adapt to the new reality within several months at the most."

However, in contrast to detected and other selling activity, Hizballah, the Consultative Council, and Islamic fundamentalist organizations are making efforts to buy all available personal weapons at moderate and sometimes high prices, depending on the weapon type. The leftist Lebanese organizations, on the other hand, have no heavy weapons in general. However, they no doubt possess large quantities of personal weapons and anti-vehicle rocket launchers, which calls for optimism on the part of arms dealers regarding the future of their trade in Lebanon.

Smuggling Activities at Al-Naqurah Viewed

91A50238A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
9 Aug 91 p 11

[Report by Tariq Ibrahim]

[Text] Beirut—The port of al-Naqurah is unique in being the safest opening for major smugglers and black market merchants in Lebanon and Israel.

The port became more important after the legitimate Lebanese Government gained control of all Lebanese ports from Tripoli in the north to Tyre in the south, and closed the illegal ports subordinate to the militias of the Lebanese Forces, the Amal Movement, the Progressive Socialist Party, the Muradah organization, and the Popular Nasirite Organization.

When Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in 1982, they quickly upgraded the port of al-Naqurah to adapt it to military logistical needs and rapid transit from al-Naqurah to the port of al-Juniyah east of Beirut. Until early 1991, the al-Juniyah/al-Naqurah line was one of the most active domestic shipping lines in Lebanon. In the past two months, al-Naqurah's docks have seen a conspicuous concentration of ships carrying weapons and materiel for the Lebanese Forces. These weapons and materiel, which were withdrawn quickly from eastern Beirut, were moved to the occupied border strip and, in some cases, from the strip to Cyprus and a number of African states.

An officer of the UN emergency force [UNIFIL], who has become accustomed to seeing brisk commercial activity in the port of al-Naqurah from his command headquarters, describes the port as "a Lebanese Hong Kong, where everyone works quietly and quickly, and through which black market merchants cross into the Lebanese market."

Although the Israeli forces do not like to hear such statements, they are making efforts to perpetuate the "Lebanese character" of the port of al-Naqurah through the customs [offices] of the Israeli-backed South Lebanese Army [SLA]. It seems that the international mafias have created a large apparatus of agents, representatives, merchants, and smugglers. The priorities of this apparatus include facilitating deals between numerous Mediterranean ports and the port of al-Naqurah.

In almost every case, Cyprus is the port of call immediately preceding al-Naqurah. The ports of Cyprus have become harbors for imaginary companies that operate on the Cyprus/al-Naqurah line. These companies enjoyed a golden age brought on by the expansion of activity between Cyprus and the Lebanese ports of Tarabulus, al-Juniyah, Sidon, and Tyre when these ports were controlled by Lebanese and Palestinian militias. Despite the end of the militias' control of these ports, these companies are not facing any crisis now in the sale of smuggled goods and commodities. On the contrary, they are facing an increase in demand.

The international mafias have gained greater control of supply and demand within the Lebanese market. "Competitors have become few and the needs of the merchants in the black market in Lebanon have become great." Commercial middlemen spread out and deploy in the Lebanese interior through the port of al-Naqurah and the border crossings.

Although the legitimate Lebanese Government has extended its influence following the Lebanese Army's deployment in southern Lebanon, dealers and smugglers who were upset by the deployment nonetheless have not made any major changes in their smuggling methods, given the lack of stringent laws prohibiting the importation of goods through the border strip. Even if such laws existed, "dealers and smugglers can circumvent them because of their experience and extensive contacts in Lebanon."

A close examination of the constant commercial activity at the port of al-Naqurah shows that the goods most in demand at present are food, alcoholic beverages, household appliances, and tobacco. Well-informed sources in al-Naqurah disclosed that tobacco smuggling from Cyprus to the port of al-Naqurah has become the most profitable commercial activity involving the fewest losses.

These sources state that dozens of containers are transported at night from the port of al-Naqurah on large trucks belonging to a number of large merchants in the border strip. The containers are distributed through

border strip crossings, especially in the districts of Marj 'Uyyun and al-Shuf, from where they are transported to Beirut, northern Lebanon, and al-Biq'a'. The market in southern Lebanon is considered the base of this trade, because it is easy to get into it. In this context, we should point to the prominent role of Hanna Dahir, a businessman in the occupied village of [al-Qali'ah]. He owns large warehouses in the border strip for the storage of smuggled tobacco and has become known as a link between Maj. Gen. Antoine Lahd, the SLA's commander, and major dealers and smugglers in the strip. The prevailing belief there is that all commercial relations and large deals are undertaken under the supervision of Lahd's observers, who charge a percentage to cover the SLA's military expenses.

Another prevalent belief is that the U.S. Philip Morris Company, which exports many kinds of tobacco, has established a relationship with Lahd through the international mafia resident in Cyprus and through Israeli middlemen in the United States.

"Well-informed sources" estimate the price of each container of smuggled tobacco at about \$100,000, which is doubled when it is sold on the Lebanese market. From 1985 to 1987, international antiquities dealers were active through local agents. Dozens of sarcophagi stolen from Tyre and historical statues found in excavations in a number of southern villages were seen being transported. The Israeli forces facilitated the trafficking of such goods, because most of the dealers were Israelis. More than once, Israeli forces confiscated antiquities "with biblical origins."

After 1987, the smuggling of antiquities shifted from the port of al-Naqurah to the ports of Tyre, Sidon, al-Jiyah, and al-Junayyah. It happened that the Lebanese authorities had arrested a number of domestic dealers in the previous year as they were transporting statues from the south to the port of al-Junayyah to be smuggled abroad.

The port of al-Naqurah is obviously the main station for smuggling drugs from Lebanon to the United States, Egypt, and Western Europe now. The Israeli forces have no objection to various smuggling operations as long as they supply substantial income to the SLA—income that would have to be made up by the Israeli Army if these operations did not exist. It is easy to detect secret relations between dealers, smugglers, and the Israeli forces at the port of al-Naqurah.

Lebanese workers in the port relate that they have observed many deals between Israeli officers and Lebanese businessmen, such as Amin al-Hajj and others from the Lebanese Forces and from other Lebanese organizations. These businessmen are usually described as having good relations with officials of the Lebanese militias and veteran customs officials in the ports along the Lebanese coast. Last summer, one of them was able to bring into Sidon an estimated 10 tons of tomato pulp, on which Hebrew writing was plainly visible, which required the

impoundment of the pulp in the warehouses of a major businessman in Sidon, because of its Israeli origin.

Weeks later, the pulp was sold in Lebanese markets under a new name. Since then, Lebanese merchants have had to be more alert in examining the origins of imports brought to Tyre from al-Naqurah.

Commercial Scandals

On numerous occasions, the people in charge of the port of al-Naqurah have covered up commercial scandals that almost destroyed them. Most of the scandals have been related to the infiltration of Israeli goods such as salt, onions, eggs, and toilet tissue.

The port of al-Naqurah does not present the only instance of the persistence of illegal trade between Lebanon and Israel. In a number of occupied villages, especially in 'Ayn Ibl, Marj 'Uyyun, and Rumaysh, small industries have been established with Lebanese-Israeli capital for the export of different materials.

Thousands of Israeli-made plastic chairs unmarked by any specification of the producer country pass through the Batir/Jazzin crossing. The Lebanese market is now filled with different types of such industries.

Trucks carrying Israeli chairs have been stopped repeatedly at the Kafr Tibnit crossing in al-Nabatiyah. However, several hours after being stopped, they pass through because of interventions.

The Israelis regard the border strip as the "safest area for Israeli goods and products." Until 1986, about \$1.5 million in goods passed into Lebanon through Israeli ports and the port of al-Naqurah, in addition to \$1 million in purely Israeli goods.

However, these numbers are not firm and are subject to changes in supply and demand. They can be expected to double if merchants and smugglers continue to outsmart Lebanese laws to benefit from the geographic and economic intermeshing of areas of Lebanon with Israel, due to the civil war and implicit condoning by many Lebanese officials, given the absence of Lebanese governmental authority over the border strip and accessibility to it.

Israel approves of the strength of Lebanese businessmen in international markets and economic centers who agree to ship their goods through Israeli ports, such as the port of Haifa.

Israelis in the border strip stress the need to regulate Lebanese-Israeli trade relations and legalize them in the future.

The facts show that Israel has created substantial commercial networks in the Lebanese market, and that the border strip and the port of al-Naqurah are mere way stations in an organized economic invasion of Lebanon through all legal and other means.

SAUDI ARABIA

Fahd, Ministers Discuss Policy, Law Changes

91AE0611B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
28 Aug 91 p 4

[Text] Jiddah, Saudi News Agency—The Custodian of the Two Holy Places, King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, emphasized, while presiding over a Saudi cabinet meeting at the Palace of Peace in Jiddah yesterday, Saudi Arabia's adherence to its policy of reflection and balance in dealing with every event. During the meeting, the cabinet reviewed the latest Arab and international developments.

Yesterday, King Fahd received a letter from Republic of Guinea-Bissau President Joao Bernardo Vieira, which was conveyed by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Marcelino Lima.

After the meeting, Information Minister 'Ali al-Sha'ir made the following statement to the Saudi News Agency: "After quickly reviewing current events and examining a summary of reports on the most important new political and security developments in the Arab and international arenas, King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz informed the cabinet of the outcome of meetings which he held with several envoys to Saudi Arabia and the messages which he received. These messages included a message from King Hasan II of Morocco, delivered to King Fahd by Dr. Abdelhadi Boutaleb; and a message from Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, the emir of Kuwait, conveyed by Shaykh Salim Sabah al-Salim, Kuwait's deputy prime minister and foreign minister.

"Against the backdrop of the rapid, continuous developments in the international arena, King Fahd presented a comprehensive analysis and the historical background of current events in different regions in the world, both East and West. In this context, he emphasized Saudi Arabia's desire to continue its policy of reflection and balance in dealing with every event, so as to preserve its vital interests in different political, economic, and commercial realms, based on its principles, which are firmly based on the development and strengthening of its relations with friendly countries and the tightening of its fraternal bonds with other Arab and Islamic countries.

Al-Sha'ir added: "The cabinet then examined several domestic issues that had been raised for discussion. After hearing the opinions of the pertinent ministers on those issues, the cabinet referred them to its general committee to finish formulating them for presentation at the next session."

Minister al-Sha'ir stated: "Upon examining the items on its agenda, the cabinet issued several decisions, including:

I. Based on the agenda item originating with the administration of the premiership, which includes a royal decree that provides for the establishment of a general

regulation for the interrogation of corporate bodies regarding acts committed by their members in violation of regulatory and contractual provisions, and for the determination of penalties and measures for implementing them; after examining the anti-bribery regulation promulgated by Royal Decree No. 15 of 7/3/1382 A.H. [9 August 1962]; and after examining the anti-forgery regulation promulgated by Royal Decree No. 114 of 26/11/1380 A.H. [21 May 1961], the cabinet decided the following:

1. The addition of the following text to the anti-bribery regulation promulgated by Royal Decree No. 15 of 7/3/1382 A.H., which shall be Article 12 *bis* of this regulation: "The agency concerned with the adjudication of crimes of bribery is required to impose [on a convicted party] a fine not to exceed ten times the value of the bribe, and/or a prohibition against entering into contracts to sell goods to, and implement the projects and public works of, government ministries, offices, or public bodies corporate. If it is proven that a crime stipulated in this regulation—which has resulted in the conviction of the director or a member of a private national or foreign company or organization—was committed in favor of that company or organization, the cabinet may reconsider the said sentence pertaining to prohibition no less than five years after its issuance.

2. The addition of the following text to the anti-forgery regulation promulgated by Royal Decree No. 114 of 26/11/1380 A.H., so that Article 12 of this regulation reads as follows: "The agency concerned with the adjudication of crimes of falsification is required to impose [on a convicted party] a fine not to exceed 10 million Saudi riyals and/or a prohibition against entering into contracts to sell goods to, and implement the projects and public works of, governmental ministries, offices, or public bodies corporate. If it is proven that a crime stipulated in this regulation—which has resulted in the conviction of the director or a member of a private national or foreign company or organization—was committed in favor of that company or organization, the cabinet may reconsider the said sentence pertaining to prohibition no less than five years after its issuance. A royal decree has been drafted regarding the preceding, and its text is attached.

II. Based on the commerce minister's letter regarding the draft regulation on professional companies, the cabinet decided the following:

1. Approval of the attached text of the regulation on professional companies.
2. Publication of this regulation in the official gazette, six months after which it shall go into effect. A draft royal decree has been prepared accordingly.
3. Approval of the attached text of the clarifying memorandum regarding this regulation."

Projections for Role of International Firms

*91AE0611A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
16 Aug 91 p 34*

[Text] The growing development of the Saudi economy is creating competition among international companies to supply products and equipment to Saudi investors, who continue to be successful thanks to strong backing and support from the government of the Custodian of the Two Holy Places.

Officials responsible for exhibitions in Riyadh have drafted an ambitious plan to embrace this international competition in a number of international exhibitions to be held at the exhibition grounds in Riyadh.

The season begins on 8 September 1991 with "The 1991 Saudi Electricity Exhibition," which will be combined with "The 1991 Saudi Air Conditioning and Cooling Exhibition." Ten exhibitions will follow, ending with "The Riyadh International Trade Exhibition" in February 1992.

During 8-12 September 1991, "The Third Saudi Electricity and Electronic Engineering Exhibition" will be held.

The kingdom is considered one of the largest international markets for modern goods, equipment, and technologies for increasing electricity output. Strategic estimates indicate that the future modernization and expansion of electricity supply sources throughout the kingdom will cost between 2,625 million and 3,000 million Saudi riyals per year.

The Industry and Electricity Ministry is determined to select the newest technologies for its energy program, which is considered extremely important for achieving the kingdom's economic objectives.

Saudi Arabia's rapid industrial growth has generated a pressing need to expand the country's electrical power supply sources. Primary electricity installations must be expanded constantly to respond to the great demand for energy. The construction of new power plants and complexes is a central item in development plans authorized by the Saudi Government against the backdrop of the decision by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to link their electrical grids. The sum of 6,375 million riyals has been allocated for this project, for which the Gulf Investments Organization is serving as a consultant, based on the award of a contract worth 4,725 million riyals to conduct a feasibility analysis of the initial phase of the project, which will link the electrical grids of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi electricity plan is based on four [as published] main points:

- A continuing rural electrification project;
- A continuing operation and maintenance program;
- The maintenance of generating, transmission, and distribution grids.

Numerous projects for electrical expansion are also being set up. In the western area, generating projects are being planned for al-Ta'if and Tabuk. Also, the Public Electricity Authority is expected to supply electricity to the entire central region by the start of the 21st century, in addition to fulfilling its commitments to provide electricity to the kingdom's factories.

The Saudi Public Electricity Authority is also making efforts to introduce new technologies to its electricity grids in the form of diagnostic equipment.

The fifth five-year plan (1990-1995) places priority on the supply of electricity to defense and security, health, and agricultural facilities; and designates large, new allocations for this purpose. The plan provides for the replacement of old equipment with new technological means and service, and maintenance support.

"The Third Saudi Electricity and Electronic Engineering Exhibition" will be filled with much state-of-the-art technical equipment exhibited for the first time, such as alternating current generators, air-conditioning systems, reverse transformers connection systems, security and warning systems, electronic testing equipment, broadcasting and transmission equipment, programmed control equipment, remote-control instruments, safety instruments, etc. To date, 280 international companies covering five continents will be participating in this exhibition.

The second exhibition, "The 1991 Saudi Computer Exhibition," will be held 22-26 September 1991. This exhibition is expected to attract the public's attention, in addition to government officials and specialized companies. All Saudi state agencies, facilities, organizations, and private companies are moving toward computer applications. Even individuals are starting to use mid-size computers. The demand for these systems in 1991 is estimated at 843 million riyals. In the short term, the market growth for computers, peripherals, operating software, and office automation is certainly due to new operations that have been started to support current industrialization activity.

Specialists estimate that the use of personal computers is growing by about 30 percent per year. The number of personal computers has increased from only 321 systems in 1981 to more than 4,285 in 1990, valued at 400 million riyals. These specialists expect that activity in computer peripheral systems will rise by about 20 percent per year, i.e., by 104 million riyals in 1991.

The use of communications and information transmission equipment is rising by 27 percent per year, supported by the excellent, expanded Saudi communications network. Demand in this area is expected to reach 253 million riyals in 1991.

Demand for operating software in the Saudi market is increasing as a result of the development of bilingual,

Arabic-English input and output programs. The estimated cost of these practical programs, which constitute about 60 percent of the total software market, is 823 million ryals in 1991.

This year's exhibition includes much in the way of up-to-date computers and office automation equipment, including processing equipment, peripherals, operating software, operating software applications, business communications systems, accounting systems, security systems, etc.

Saudi Arabia is the Middle East's largest education and training market, which is not surprising, given the policy of broad educational progress which King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz has embraced since being education minister in 1952.

The current five-year plan anticipates that 575,000 Saudi citizens will complete their studies and try to find jobs in early 1995. According to the plan, 294,000 will find employment in new jobs, and the remaining 281,000 will move into positions currently occupied by non-Saudis. Return programs are definitely progressing in all government and private sectors. Saudi Arabia has allocated 140,959 million ryals to develop the labor force during 1990-1995, i.e., 35 percent of government expenditures until 1995.

The Saudi Government considers the training of the domestic labor force among the kingdom's most important social and economic issues. Plans to establish technological, industrial, commercial, and agricultural institutes are being implemented and supported by large state investments. The kingdom's seven universities and 8,000 schools have contributed to substantial development in the area of general and higher education.

The Saudi Government is taking serious steps toward a new educational policy that is consistent with technological developments, including the following:

- The development of general education to cope with rapid economic, social, and anticipated technological developments;
- Ongoing efforts to expand technical education;
- The exploitation of new developments in technical education and principles for assessing educational guidance;
- The ongoing review and development of educational curricula, teaching methods, and training programs.

The exhibition will be concerned with furnishing tools and means suited to the new trends in Saudi education and which provide youths and trainees with the most up-to-date international means to prepare them to enter the international technology race.

Also in September, a new international exhibition to serve Saudi Arabia's market for air-conditioning, ventilation, heating, and cooling systems will be held for the first time in the city of Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia is among the largest markets for air-conditioning equipment and the [largest] consumer of such equipment in the Middle East. Air-conditioning equipment worth 410 million ryals is sold annually, and the demand for it is growing by 5 percent annually.

During 20-24 October 1991, a Saudi construction exhibition will be held. Maintenance and interior decorating will be added to the exhibition this year, in keeping with the shift in focus in the kingdom's programs away from infrastructure toward maintenance and building upgrades. The current development plan allocates 750 billion ryals to the facilities sectors. Allocations for the construction sector, the facilities sector, the maintenance sector, and the municipalities sector total about 1,575 billion ryals, including 112.5 billion for infrastructure, 4.2 billion for housing projects, 39 billion for the municipalities, and 528 million for facilities and the repair of mosques in different areas. Maintenance and operation activities are experiencing the greatest growth in the Saudi economy, given that climatic conditions in the kingdom require higher-than-average investments in this area. The volume of sales to this market exceeds an estimated 90 billion ryals annually. These operations require numerous materials, services, and consulting services.

Attention is now being focused on interior planning and decorating, such as ready-made kitchens, upscale bathrooms, lighting, wallpaper, floors, ceilings, and other interior decorating products. A national company and international companies from 18 countries will participate in this exhibition. During the same period, 20-24 October 1991, a new international exhibition on industrial security, fire protection, and industrial safety will be held under the heading of "The 1991 Saudi Risk Control Exhibition." The kingdom is considered one of the largest markets in the world for industrial security, fire protection, and industrial safety equipment, making purchases worth an estimated 1,575 million ryals in this area. The kingdom is interested in protecting its investments and large development-related installations built over the past 15 years. These industrial installations and buildings require the same concern and investment as that enjoyed by new projects, but in the form of replacements for old industrial security and fire protection equipment, or the addition of new safety and fire equipment. There is also growing concern for industrial security in the two industrial cities of al-Jubayl and Yanbu'. They, like ARAMCO, have an enormous need for safety and security equipment and systems.

Saudi Arabia is now giving priority to industrial safety with the establishment of a centralized authority for industrial safety in the Interior Ministry. It is concerned with developing this important sector and furnishing essential installations in the kingdom with the most up-to-date engineering technologies in the fields of industrial safety and protection from fire and other dangers. Many public administrations have hastened to increase their budgets to cope with the pressing need to improve the safety of governmental installations and

buildings, airports, radio and television stations, ports, electricity stations, water desalination plants, and water resources.

Again, this reflects a shift in the concerns of Saudi public and private programs in the area of construction and facilities away from infrastructure development to the upgrading, renovation, modernization, and maintenance of old buildings.

One of the most important factors in this regard is undoubtedly the addition of fire protection equipment.

As part of the kingdom's concern with reducing its reliance on crude oil, it has taken a major step to diversify its industrial foundations. The kingdom has established more than 2,500 factories, which constitute a brisk market for a very wide range of industrial safety products, from protective clothing to pollution control equipment.

The Saudi Food Exhibition will be aimed at a large market, whose food and beverage import requirements are valued at more than 30 billion riyals. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has ranked Saudi Arabia as the largest Arab market in this sector, and the Saudi food market continues to expand and change yearly. It is expected that the Saudi population, currently 14 million, will double in the next 20 years, and that economic growth will continue at an annual rate of 5 percent during the next five years. These developments will confront the food processing and sales sector with enormous purchasing power and new and different tastes.

Domestically, the meat and dairy products, baked goods, confections, and grain industries are becoming larger. Owners of these industries are now moving to diversify their products to cover categories now covered by imports. Saudi factories, such as Ikhwan Confectioner, United Food Industries Company, Sonbola, the Arab Confections Production Company, and Saffola, are planning major expansion programs.

The Saudi food exhibition is considered a dais for the presentation of new technologies for the canning and packaging industry and the food preparation industry. It is also a place for industrialists to meet with the suppliers and producers of these technologies. Participating in the food exhibition will be 455 companies from 28 countries.

Economic specialists indicate that directions for economic growth are becoming more numerous each day. During the next two years, 400 new factories will be established (for a total of 2,600 factories), which will expand the capacity of oil installations and export outlets for oil products. In addition, a distribution network for oil products will be developed, the pipeline network will be lengthened to [as published] 334 km annually, and storage capacity will be increased to 29 million barrels, compared to the current level of 21 million barrels.

In mining, activities are continuing in mineral exploration and encouraging private and public explorations. A study is being evaluated on the extraction of phosphate at [Jilamid], bauxite at al-Zabirah, and iron in Wadi [Sawawabin]. A new upswing in the kingdom's economy is expected during the nineties, as a result of these many oil and mineral discoveries.

This optimism supports the expectations of the international oil market, which will favor the kingdom. In addition, the kingdom is at the threshold of a cycle of large investments in developing the oil industry to ensure it a leading market position.

SUDAN

Ministry Issues New Regulations on Foreign Press

*91AA0610A Khartoum AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH
in Arabic 21 Jul 91 p 1*

[Text] Tonight Staff Col. Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah, member of the Revolutionary Command Council, deputy chairman of the Political Committee, and head of the Peace and Foreign Affairs Department, will meet at the Hilton Hotel in Khartoum with foreign journalists and correspondents of world newspapers and news agencies in the ceremony organized by the Foreign Information Department at the Ministry of Culture and Information on the occasion of issuing the regulations governing the work of correspondents of foreign newspapers and news agencies.

Al-Mahbub 'Abd-al-Salam, head of the Foreign Information Department, told AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH that the new regulations aim to develop and boost relations between representatives of foreign news agencies and newspapers and the Foreign Information Department and to achieve objectives that would be beneficial for the work of foreign journalists in Sudan. During the past years, he said, this matter was not clearly defined, but with the issuing of the new regulations, this has been clarified and it has become possible for representatives of any press establishment to deal with the Ministry of Culture and the Foreign Information Department in a clear manner.

He said the new regulations are in response to the demands which representatives of these establishments have long made. These include equal treatment with their counterparts, representatives of the local establishments, and the opportunity to regularly cover the various state and social activities.

Al-Mahbub said that today's meeting between the foreign correspondents and Col. Khalifah will mark the beginning of meetings with officials responsible for important affairs and issues. These will begin with a meeting with Col Khalifah, who is responsible for peace affairs and whom the administration considers to be fully understanding of the mission of the foreign media.

He can be regarded as the model official who understands the dimensions and significance of the modern press' mission.

Responding to a question on the impact of the ministry's recent changes in the Foreign Information Department, al-Mahbub said these changes have given the department greater independence and backed it with a budget separate from other departments. He added that the coming period will witness the activation of the National Council on Foreign Information, which represents all quarters concerned with the administration of foreign information.

SYRIA

CP Leader Bakdash: Jews Behind Ruin of Communist State

91AE0618A Beirut AL-KIFAH AL-'ARABI in Arabic
29 Jul 91 pp 25-28

[Interview with Syrian CP (Communist Party) leader Khalid Bakdash by Nabil al-Milhim; place and date not given]

[Text] Before we say Khalid Bakdash, we must recall a life full of glories and tragedies.

He met his destiny in 1930 when communist Fawzi al-Za'im took him by hand and told him, "Be a communist." In 1931, he was the editor of the magazine "The Hammer and Scythe," the organ of the Syrian Communists, who no longer have an mouthpiece. At the end of World War II, the Red Army was victorious; its victory brought the man stature and eminence.

In 1954, he entered the parliamentary elections. Khalid Bakdash won against Khalid al-'Azm. Faris al-Khuri said then: "Those who elected Khalid Bakdash are not communists." "Yes," Khalid Bakdash retorted, "they are not communists, but they know that I am a communist." He was the parliament's number-one orator. He was a friend of Dimitrov, interlocutor of Maurice Thorez, close to Togliati, and an adversary of Adib al-Shishakli. He has known Stalin and was a companion of Farajallah al-Hilu. Nikula al-Shawi was closest to his heart. He followed news of Fidel Castro and joined the Comintern. In the seventies, he began to see cracks in his party. Khalid Bakdash still dreams of two things: the triumph of international communism and the decline of the United States.

He was the son of an artillery officer known for his toughness. The elder Bakdash left the army general staff, so as not to join the bourgeoisie Syrian General Command, which sympathized with the French occupation, and he became a simple employee in the sanitation department. Khalid was like his father, but had a sense of humor and did not lack astuteness. He was a skilled operator. He knew how to deal with probabilities and was a shrewd maneuverer and tactician. He would keep

for himself a margin of safety. He was a man of literature and made no linguistic mistakes.

He decided not to be a kamikaze, but became a well-known Arab leader. In his youth, he led a dangerous life, but when he reached his peak, communism was at its nadir.

His adversaries pelted him with rocks. When they accused his followers of Bakdashism, they were, in fact, raising his stature.

He would walk a tightrope, but would keep his grip on the balancing pole. He could be the last of the Arab communists, just as he was among the first. He becomes angry when we say so.

He glorified Stalin, respected De Gaulle, recalls Fakhri al-Barudi, and attacks the Jews. We engaged him in a dialogue, and he would ramble and elaborate. He was also a skilled operator, keeping an eye to safe distances, which was always one of his characteristics. We interviewed him after his party congress re-elected him general secretary, after hardly any time was left [of Bakdash's life], and after comrade Gorbachev prostrated himself on the White House steps. The Bakdashists would remind us that when the Nazi armies were conquering nations, Khalid Bakdash was wagering that Hitler will commit suicide. Today he wagers that the path leading to the rise of America is blocked because the forces of attraction are opposed by the forces of repulsion.

[al-Milhim] Mr. Khalid Bakdash, until the mid seventies, the Soviet Union was the primary supporter of Arab and world liberation movements. Many believe that after perestroika, this supporter has broken his allies' back. In your writings, you hinted at the role of Zionism in starting the fire of the destruction of the socialist state. What is the truth regarding this role and this destruction?

[Bakdash] Zionism played a fundamental role in the efforts to ruin the Soviet Union, the first socialist state in history. This destructive Zionist role is ancient. Marx predicted it in his famous booklet "On the Question of Judaism", in which Marx says that a Jew's worldly god is money. Consequently, he is the bitter enemy of socialism, in which the godliness of money is nonexistent.

[al-Milhim] What's the evidence?

[Bakdash] The evidence is: Who opened fire on Lenin in August 1918 in an attempt to assassinate him? It was a woman called Fanny Kaplan who opened fire at him after the triumph of the October Revolution as he was emerging from a public meeting. It transpired that a worldwide Zionist movement was behind her.

Trotsky, who opposed Lenin and denied the possibility of building communism on the remains of czarist Russia, came up with the theory of the "continuing revolution." Wasn't this Trotsky a Zionist Jew?

Zionism will not forgive leaders of the October Revolution, foremost of whom is Lenin, for having excluded Zionism and Zionists from command and sensitive positions in the Soviet Union, and for refusing to allow Zionism to operate as a legal movement in the new socialist state.

The Zionists continued their underground activities, trying to infiltrate all aspects of Soviet life. In 1952, they committed numerous crimes against the strugglers through medicine, foremost of whom was Kuybyshev, the noted leader, who suffered a heart attack in his office. They took him several floors upstairs in order to send him home instead of letting him rest. And so he died. Their most recent activity was a secret internal newsletter in the Russian language, which they published in 1987. Copies of it fell in the hands of our comrades in the Soviet Union. They say in it that their prophets have promised them that they will rule the whole world. It is not necessary, for example, that the president should be one of them, but that presidents and leaders should be surrounded by people from among them by all means possible, including the use of Zionist women through marriage or otherwise. The newsletter is full of deep hatred for all the Russian people. Last year the magazine MOLODAYA GVARDIYA KOMSOMOL published by the Komsomol said: "Zionism wants to liberate Palestine from the Arabs and Russia from the Russian." As for the apostates and the revisionists in the Soviet Union who are not Jewish, they are allied with the Zionist movement. They pave the way for its representatives to occupy key posts in the country and make it easy for them to reach such posts. They also help them to change their names into Russian names. So, if one is called Bernstein, his name becomes Popov or Yakovlev. Undoubtedly you have noticed that the new regimes in the formerly socialist East European countries are rushing to restore diplomatic relations with Israel, receive its envoys, and send delegates to Tel Aviv.

[al-Milhim] It appears that you blame Zionism for the collapse of the socialist state. But we know that there are other reasons, which include bureaucratic bottlenecks, the alienation of the party from the masses, the question of democracy, the influence of the imperialist West, and even the hamburger.

[Bakdash] The attempt to justify abandoning socialism because mistakes were made here and there in implementing it is unacceptable. The man who makes no mistakes has not yet been born and will never be. It is clear that mistakes can be rectified and prevented within the context of socialism and not by denying socialism and reverting to capitalism. Lenin has frequently warned of the danger of bureaucracy in building a socialist community. This danger has in fact occurred, but it can be averted by expanding democracy, and not by retreating and opening the way to the capitalist bureaucracy, which is far worse.

[al-Milhim] The stronger the alliance between the right and the capital becomes, the greater the disintegration of

the left is. The United States is the single axis, and the allied forces are on the same boat with it. On the opposite side, the Communist Party has become several parties, and the communist countries are breaking up. What must the Arab communist movement do in the face of what is happening and the aforementioned facts?

[Bakdash] What you call facts are not established facts on the basis of which the future can be predicted. It is true that, at first glance, there appears to be a capitalist alliance that has reached its apex under the leadership of the single axis, that is, Washington, but contradictions between the monopolist capitalist states, especially the big capitalists, were not evident, because the alliance stood "united" or "semi-united" in the face of what they used to call "the red menace" which the Soviet Union and East European countries allegedly posed. The European countries looked at the United States as their protector from this alleged menace. But now that such "menace" no longer exists, what was lying underneath will now come to the surface. The single axis theory is a temporary one and will vanish. Just as there is no single axis in nature, there cannot be a single axis in human society. This is the future, and the signs of this future are now emerging. Europe wants a presence and a say in the Middle East settlement. The United States is obviously trying to block Europe's path in this sphere, through Israel and through other means. The United States is following, with a sense of unease, even the general attempts to strengthen and consolidate European unity. In the meantime, many European countries feel that they no longer need the United States to protect them; they are not proceeding exactly as Washington wants them to. Also, the European countries fear the increasing German economic, political, and military power, as Germany is inclining toward reverting to Bismarck's policy, which is to rely on the East in facing West European competition. Examples and situations of this are numerous. But briefly put, the conflicts between imperialism and its spear—the United States—and the liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America will grow worse, because imperialism in general, after what happened, will become even more ferocious in its persistent attempts to subjugate these peoples and further plunder their wealth. Our Arab world, like other worlds, is targeted; it is even more so because of its oil wealth and strategic position.

[al-Milhim] What are the future opportunities, particularly for the Arab communists?

[Bakdash] The available opportunity is to work for a broader Arab solidarity between all the Arab nationalists and progressives, and to work in two directions [as quoted]:

To form the broadest Arab solidarity possible in the face of the Zionist and imperialist attempts and designs, and to work for expanding and strengthening democracy in every Arab country.

The Arab homeland has vast economic, political, and human resources and capabilities, which, if used with boldness, prudence, and effective solidarity, will ensure that Arabism will remain protected against all possible challenges, whatever their source may be.

As for real and broad democracy, the Arab masses are becoming increasingly convinced of it. The Gulf crisis, which the dictatorial regime in Iraq brought about, has proved that dictatorship is incapable of mobilizing the people, soldiers, and officers in a real and effective struggle. In order to obtain a correct or near-correct view of the unforeseeable future, we must keep in mind two major things:

First, that conflict between labor and capital still exists and will never go away. Rather, it will become more acute.

Second, that socialism will not end after the events in East Europe and the difficulties which the Soviet Union has been experiencing. Indeed, it is alive and all the peoples will come to it in one way or another.

[al-Milhim] Nevertheless, we are now in a decisive stage. The coming blow could be a hard one as far as we, the Arabs, are concerned. It might concentrate on Syria. The U.S. policy could be in need of some clarification. What is your evaluation of the present U.S. policy toward Syria? If Syria is a tough nut, is it possible to define what is needed to keep it tough?

[Bakdash] It is well-known that French colonialism occupied Syria for about a quarter of a century, but did not enjoy one single day of calm. Gen. De Gaulle, one of the French bourgeoisie's cleverest representatives, once said verbatim: "He who thinks it is possible to subjugate Syria is deluded. After achieving independence and the evacuation [of French troops], Syria resisted all the colonialist plans, such as the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the Four-Point Plan. And recently it stood firmly against the Camp David agreements [as published]. Now the goal is to crush this tough nut. Now Israel is charged with this task, as is evident from Israeli officials' statements and impudent threats. They would not have been able to do this if it were not for U.S. imperialism's support for them. This is something well understood. World Zionism is seeking to make world opinion believe that Syria's stand is the only obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East, while, in fact, it is Israel's intransigence that is the basic obstacle, as is becoming clearer to world opinion. As for Syria, it has asserted that it wants a just and comprehensive peace in the area. The Central Command of the Nationalist Progressive Front has held a meeting under the chairmanship of President Hafiz al-Asad, in which it studied President George Bush's message and approved a positive response to the message that includes an explanation of Syria's clear support of the peace conference on the basis of UN resolutions, particularly UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In any case, and whatever the developments may be, cracking the tough

nut is not an easy task, neither for Tel Aviv nor Washington. The components needed to maintain this toughness are attainable. It is a must, and it is possible to strengthen these requirements through reliance on Syria's ancient national struggle, on a strong economy, on a closely knit domestic front, on broad popular support, and on support by all the honorable people in the world, which has now become possible. Israel is importing Jews from all parts of the world who are brought together neither by common history nor by common language. On the other hand, Israel protests against the treaty between Syria and Lebanon, the two countries that have a common history, common ancestry, one language, and one Arab affiliation. In short, the requirements to maintain toughness still exist and are in our hands.

[al-Milhim] Let's move on to the questions of your party. The congress devoted most of its work to the Palestine problem, as if war is imminent. What conclusion do you draw in light of the reality in the Arab area, reality in the Arab regime, and reality of the balance of power?

[Bakdash] It is natural that our congress should devote great attention to the Palestine problem, for this reflects our people's interest in it. The Palestine problem is foremost among the problems to be settled in the Middle East. The U.S.-Israeli strategic alliance is trying to exploit the painful blow that has been dealt to the Iraqi people in order impose a solution for the Arab-Zionist conflict on the terms of the rulers in Tel Aviv. This is evident in those rulers' rejection of UN participation in the settlement, of Security Council resolutions, and of withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, as well as persisting in building settlements for new immigrants in those territories. In other words, the Zionists' understanding of "settlement" is not only that the Arab countries should recognize Israel's existence, but also recognize its occupation of the Arab lands. Israel also wants to play an effective role in the area's economic life, especially in oil, in the region.

Therefore we must seek to make the Arabs speak with one voice regarding the need to implement Resolutions 242 and 338, that is, Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, and recognition of the Palestinian people's right to establish their national independent state on their national soil. This is the stand that the seventh congress of our Syrian Communist Party has adopted. In other words, the Arabs should confront the United States with a unified stand on the Palestine problem. Thus, the balance of power will tip in favor of international legitimacy, which Israel is trying to ignore and even to obliterate completely.

[al-Milhim] Your congress was held recently; it was the seventh congress in the party's 67-year history. Your congress is the congress of the Communist Party that has split into several parties, with each party having its general secretary and each general secretary having his own "historical" justifications. Do you not see that many questions arise from this question?

[Bakdash] Certainly one of the most agonizing things for a veteran communist who has witnessed the party's birth in Damascus and its spread throughout Syria, and who has marched with it on its difficult path, is to see divisions afflicting its ranks. It was not we who seceded. In our opinion, differences on this or that organizational problem can be resolved within the party. But perhaps the contagion of division that has occurred in other countries has reached our party. Perhaps everybody will learn the lesson of what happened, for this will be an incentive to achieve a strong unity that would include all the Syrian communists on a basis of principle.

[al-Milhim] Your opponents say that your rigidness—a polite word for your despotism—is the obstacle to the unity of the communist factions in Syria.

[Bakdash] With regard to rigidity, it is a relative thing. You realize that certain tribes used to call things in their opposite meaning. A sick person would be called healthy and a blind person called sighted. In the Soviet Union, communist supporters of socialism are now called conservatives and rightists, while supporters of reverting to capitalism are called reformed leftists. If sticking to a principle is rigidity and despotism, then I am a despot and rigid. Our party has always been uncompromising on its principles, but at the same time, it distinguished itself by being politically flexible. It always sought points of agreement with the nationalist and progressive forces. It is a well-known fact that our party contributed to the Nationalist Parliamentary Assembly in the fifties, and now it is participating in the National Progressive Front. It is known that an atmosphere of broad democracy and comradely frankness prevailed in all our congresses. The most recent example is our party's seventh congress, held last May, at which the delegates discussed with total freedom the various aspects of the party's policy and the mechanism of its work. Members of leadership bodies were elected by secret ballot. The delegates have elected those they deem suitable from among the candidates, who were many. I am inflexible in this regard, for I believe that party life should be based on the principles of the Leninist central democracy, whose essence lies in totally free competition within the bodies, the commitment of the minority to the majority, and total freedom in electing leadership bodies, and not on forming these bodies on the basis of deals.

[al-Milhim] The bodies elected in the congress were elected on the basis of nationality (Kurdish) or family considerations (Bakdashis).

[Bakdash] Those who were elected to leadership positions at the congress are children of this nation. They have participated in their people's and party's long march, through thick and thin. As I have already said, they were elected by secret ballot, regardless of their nationality or ideological origins. At the congress, there were heroes who took part in the October war [in Syria] and fought as fedayeen against the Israeli invasion of Syria. They include strugglers who went to jail and took part in demonstrations and strikes against dictatorships.

It is known that there are areas in Syria heavily inhabited by Kurds, such as al-Jazirah and 'Ifrin. It is natural, therefore, that there be Kurdish comrades among delegates from these areas. As for the capital, it is known that Kurds have been in Damascus since the 11th century. Thus, they are pure Damascenes who participated in all the liberation battles that our people fought, beginning with the Crusades, resisting the Ottoman rule, and ending with the great Syrian revolution in 1925. The neighborhood in which I grew up was one of the bastions of the Syrian revolution. This is a known fact to everybody, except for those who deliberately turn a blind eye to the truth, like some communists, who most unfortunately do so in an internal bulletin they publish. In this bulletin, they engage in "blood typing," ignoring the whole common history of the fraternal nationalities. Our party is secular, not sectarian. Since its inception, its leadership has included Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, and adherents of all creeds, without discrimination. This new allegation in the internal bulletin, and which is alien to our people, is only a new, old means to attack our party.

The claims by certain quarters that we know regarding relations and family ties within our party's leadership are absolutely false. For example, there is not one single comrade related to another in the politburo members. Does a similar situation exist in the other Syrian communist factions?

[al-Milhim] What about your wife and son?

[Bakdash] If the quarters you are quoting are referring to my wife Wisal Farhah, she has been a member of the central committee since 10 years ago, when the party's fifth congress elected her. There was no division then. As for my son 'Ammar Bakdash, he has been a party member for 20 years. He is a doctor in economic sciences. I dedicated him and he dedicated himself to the party. His activity won him the trust of his comrades and the delegates to the seventh congress have elected him to the central committee together with several other young specialists.

It is known that there is nothing in our party's statutes that bans the election of this or that comrade because he comes from a communist family or because his father is a communist official.

[al-Milhim] At the end of the congress you submitted your resignation. This resignation was interpreted as a ploy to test the cadres' loyalty to their general secretary, or...

[Bakdash] I did not ask to be relieved of my post as general secretary in order to test the party, as you said. Never in my party life did I resort to such practices. I was serious in my request for health reasons. I am 79 years old, of which 60 years were as a party member. I can no longer supervise the party's day-to-day work, as is required of the general secretary. But the congress insisted that I should remain and recommended that the new central committee elect me as its general secretary. This was what happened. The central committee found a

solution; it elected a central secretariat comprising young members to run the day-to-day party affairs, and kept me as general secretary to participate with the comrade members of the politburo in drawing up the party's policy platform.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

German-Arab Center Planned To Promote Commerce

91AE0612B London *AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT* in Arabic 3 Sep 91 p 9

[Article: "Opening of German-Arab Center Office in UAE Discussed"]

[Text] Abu Dhabi, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau—'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Mubarak, the deputy minister of economy and trade of the United Arab Emirates [UAE], met yesterday with Dr. Makki 'Umari, director of the German-Arab center in the city of Bochum in the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen. After the meeting, Dr. 'Umari said that he discussed the center's activities with the deputy minister. The government of Nordrhein-Westfalen founded the center in June of last year to stimulate economic cooperation between Germany and the Arab countries.

He added that the center plans to open a permanent office in one of the Arab countries and that the UAE is a possible choice as headquarters of the center. Dr. 'Umari said that the goal of the center is to link Arab and German businessmen and investors and provide them with information about economic possibilities in Germany and the Arab countries. It also organizes meetings and participates in exhibitions.

Dr. 'Umari said that the center serves nearly half a million small- and medium-sized German companies—companies similar in size and resources to companies in the Arab homeland. He explained that although the center will deal with all Arab countries, it will concentrate on the Gulf region, as it represents the center of economic weight in the region.

He said that a joint Arab-German advisory committee will be formed to supervise the center's work and follow its various activities.

Seaports Handle Record Number of Ships

91AE0612A Dubayy *AL-BAYAN* in Arabic 13 Aug 91 p 2

[Article: "Dubayy's Ports Register Traffic of 4,359 Ships in July, Port of al-Shandaghah Handles 1,003 Ships"]

[Text] Dubayy's ports registered a new record during the month of July for ship and steamer traffic, with a total of 4,359 ships and steamers using the emirate's ports last month.

A monthly report of the statistics department of the Nationality and Immigration Office in Dubayy said that the ports of Rashid, al-Shandaghah, and Jabal 'Ali had recorded a large increase in ship and steamer traffic during July, with a total of 1,133 ships and steamers for the port of al-Shandaghah, vis-a-vis 1,080 for the same port in the month of June, an increase of 53 ships and steamers. The port of Rashid recorded a new increase in arriving and departing steamer traffic, with a total of 516 steamers compared to 451 during the preceding month of June, an increase of 65 steamers for last month. In addition, the dry dock saw heavy traffic in steamers for service, which numbered 75, compared with 53 in the preceding month of June, an increase of 22 steamers during the month of July.

The report mentioned that the port of Jabal 'Ali also recorded an increase in steamer traffic. This amounted to one vessel over the preceding month of June. A total of 360 steamers used the port in July, against 359 during the month preceding. Only the port of al-Hamriyah recorded a slight decrease in the number of ships that used the port. This affected the year's overall total for traffic in the ports of Dubayy. A total of 2,275 ships used the port last month, whereas the total number of ships that used it in June was 3,225, a decrease of 950 ships, which affected total annual revenue for the ports of the emirate. The decrease can be attributed to low ship traffic because of the summer season.

The report indicated that the port of al-Shandaghah saw the arrival and departure of 1,003 ships last month. These included 475 arriving ships and 528 departing ships. The total for steamers was 130—66 arriving and 64 departing. Iranian ships constituted the bulk of the port's traffic, with 962 of them arriving or departing—458 arrivals and 504 departures. Next came the UAE, with 17 ships, Qatar with 12 ships, and Pakistan with two ships.

Steamers at the port of al-Shandaghah numbered 130 this July, with Panamanian steamers (55) forming the largest proportion of them. The UAE came next with 37 steamers, then Iran with 15, America and Vanuatu with four, the USSR with three, and Honduras and Bahrain with two steamers apiece.

The report added that heavy traffic by Iranian ships was also registered at the port of al-Hamriyah, with 1,101 ships leaving the port and 988 arriving. GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] ships were next, with 39 ships departing and 59 arriving. A total of 259 steamers left the port of Rashid, and 257 arrived. In addition, 38 steamers arrived at the dry dock for maintenance, and 37 others departed.

The report added that the port of Jabal 'Ali registered traffic of 187 steamers arriving last month and 173 steamers departing. Panamanian steamers, which numbered 63, formed the largest proportion among the steamers.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**Fundamentalist Deputy on Problems Facing North, South**

91AE0626A Sanaa AL-ISLAH in Arabic
26 Aug 91 pp 4, 7

[Interview with Member of Parliament 'Abdallah Sa'tar by Hamud Mansur; "I Found Mosques Filled With Worshippers at Every Prayer, I Found Warmth and Hospitality in All Southern Governorates," place and date not given]

[Text] The young engineer 'Abdallah Sa'tar is a member of Parliament whom Yemenis know from television and parliamentary debates, from his lectures and sermons in mosques and meetings throughout the republic.

There are some subjects that cannot be discussed in mosques or in Parliament. The newspaper has seen that the authority here is its own. He was frank in his answers to the paper's questions, which covered many current Yemeni issues.

[Mansur] You have visited most of the southern and eastern governorates which were, and still are, under the control of the Socialist Party. How did you find the people there?

[Sa'tar] The people of Yemen are, in general, characterized by a sound, determined and sincere nature, and the Prophet Muhammad, peace and blessings upon him, witnessed that they were faithful and wise people, that they had good and tender hearts; but he said of the al-'Asha'r people, as reported in the recognized prophetic tradition [hadith], that "the 'Asha'r people, if they were widowed by war or had little food for their children in the city, they gathered what food they had in a single platter and divided it equally among them. They come from me and I am one of them." Before unity, propaganda said that the people of the southern governorates were communists, and that the north was barbaric, without law or order. After unity, the falsity of this propaganda was clear, and I swear to God, I found mosques filled with worshippers at every Friday prayer, and found kindness and warm welcome in all of the southern governorates.

Merger Still Incomplete

[Mansur] It is plain that rule in the southern governorates is different from rule in the northern governorates. Who is in charge in the southern governorates, and why?

[Sa'tar] I found the party in control, to the point that a soldier at a military checkpoint in the Abyan governorate, asked me, "Who are you?" I told him who I was, a member of Parliament. He said, "Is the Parliament part of the government? All I know is the party." And there are still nightly house searches, as happened in Aden to Salim Ba-Hamish when we were his guests, and threats against the imams of mosques because of their

preaching and even Friday sermons, as even happened to the imam of the al-Nur Mosque in Aden, and still others in Hadramawt.

The strange thing is that the police, traffic, and security departments themselves, still belonging to the party, spread terror while the merger is still incomplete. When we asked at a search checkpoint whether the law had changed with the coming of unity, one of the security men said, "You are here in Aden and that's that."

Goods are still confiscated despite the instructions of his excellency the prime minister, and although the cabinet has formed a committee for that, coercion and despotism still prevail in some areas, and it has happened that everyone who voted yes to the constitution was banned from travel. We have a document banning three citizens from travel to Sanaa from Shabuh until they gave the checkpoint evidence that they had voted.

If it were not for our fear that the party would punish them, we would make their names and the document public.

It is noticeable there that the judiciary still applies the positive laws that contravene clear Islamic law—such as the family law that forbids polygamy.

It is a strange world where a civil officer can say: I found a member of Parliament, 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Imad, only because of his ties and his immunity in his circle [as published]. The control extends beyond ordinary citizens to officials outside the Socialist Party! I believe that these methods are a means of keeping the southern governorates hostage to the party, so that if there should be a wish to secede, it will be easy to secede from the union.

[Mansur] Who are the enemies of Yemeni unity?

[Sa'tar] The enemies of unity are those who are trying to thwart the foundations of the union. The foundations of the union are unity of the land, of creed, of language, and of government. The fourth is shaped by the government, and the first three are already reality. Anyone who tries to infringe Islamic law is aiming to create contradictory and competing factions to stir up conflict and dissension and destroy the union, like anyone who seeks to divide Yemeni territory or fight the language of the Koran.

With regard to the fourth foundation, if government jobs are divided equally between the north and the south, that is a big gap that leads to division. The basis of unity is unity of authority; divided authority is like a joint stock company with many sides—why shouldn't unification of the government, the army, and security take place, with radical change in institutions, if they are seriously trying to preserve the union?

Opposition to Koran in Constitution

[Mansur] Parliament has consented to laws contrary to Islamic law. What is your role here, you whom the people have elected?

[Sa'tar] In Parliament, there are blocs with varying ideologies. Despite the religious ruling issued by the ulema on questions relating to Islamic law, these issues are open to votes won by the majority opposing Islamic law. The Parliament is a collection of former councils, and not the result of free opinions; elections are consultative in light of the union. When we have pleaded for the Koran and the Sunna, the constitution would be brought out in opposition, and they would offer the constitution against the Koran and the Sunna, as happened with the media law, the judiciary, and the liquor factory budget. Our role is to speak out and argue, even if the media do not respect our views—the television blacks out anything that conflicts with the whims of those who oppose Islamic law, and this happens again and again. We have mentioned this in Parliament, and announced on television that this happens, but even then it's no use. The ban on views in support of Islamic law is still in effect.

Biggest Government on Earth

[Mansur] The Yemeni people are suffering from a terrible economic crisis, yet their rulers live in luxury, in great affluence. What is the cause of the crisis, and what have you done in Parliament? What, in your view, is the solution? Is the union one cause of the crisis?

[Sa'tar] I will start at the end: Unity has nothing to do with the crisis. Unity has become like Uthman's shirt [an excuse for fighting—FBIS]. The crisis does have causes, such as:

1. Fighting almighty God with usury, liquor, denying God's punishments and law, and corruption; etc., in law and in practice. Almighty God said, "God coineth a similitude: a village that dwelt secure and content, its provision coming to it in abundance from every side, but it disbelieved in God's favors, so God made it experience starvation and fear because of what they used to do."

[Koran] 16:112]

And God said, "Whosoever keepeth his duty to God, God will appoint a way out for him, and will provide for him a quarter whence he hath no expectation. And whosoever putteth his trust in God, He will suffice him. Lo! God bringeth His command to pass. God hath set a measure for all things." [Koran 65:2,3]

And God said, "And if the people of the towns had believed and kept from evil surely We should have opened for them blessings from the sky and from the earth." [Koran 7:96]

2. Multiplication of means of expenditure—this government has expanded to become the biggest government on earth, and the state now pleases some quarters by inventing new ministries, which means more employees, offices, furnishings, cars and huge loans, etc.

3. Granting jobs and salaries to the unemployed belonging to certain parties, and a decision from the prime minister to form a committee to review that;

giving legitimacy to violations by the committee not making the violations public, though it was clear—indeed, we it presented to the public as clear as day: join our party and hold rank. Who could refuse that! Some of them, if we figure his age from the day of his birth, we say he entered the military college or joined the police, but his rank doesn't make him what he is today—a waste of public money.

4. Fighting means of production. There are no spare parts for agricultural equipment, the price of diesel fuel is up, and they have opened the door to foreign products to compete with local production. They have fought national capital investment by pressuring the private sector; encouraged the failed public sector with the prime minister's admission to Parliament, which has never succeeded in any land in which it was applied; and the fierce war against investment and agricultural development is escalating every day in our country, on the pretext of creating a country of law and order.

5. The door is open to ruin through luxuries—the newest cars, furniture, and consumer goods, even going back to when we had wiped out the remains of American-imported meat from our mouth. We do not know who benefits from these commercial transactions, or who is the lucky person in them. Where do the tentacles of this destructive octopus end? Why does the government not reveal the names and numbers behind these transactions, whether of a merchant or an official obedient to his parents, or supported by a party or foreign entities?

6. The issuing of more local currency without sufficient backing or even enough to cover the minimum value of the Yemeni currency.

7. Government expenditure from the state budget on banquets, delegations, and failed public institutions, and unlimited and uncontrolled expenditure on the two ruling parties.

The solution, as I see it, is to eliminate all the above causes.

Syndicate of Expatriates

[Mansur] Expatriates are returning to their country and a great number of them are suffering from genuine crises. They cannot find housing, food, employment, or aid. What is the role of Parliament and what is the government's role? What is the solution to their problem?

[Sa'tar] Parliament put pressure on the government, which promised to do everything possible, in all sincerity, and that they would not fall short. They collected more than three hundred million riyals from citizens and merchants in the name of the expatriates, but after consulting the constitution they turned it over to cover the needs of the committees, their aides, close associates, workers, intimates, and yes-men; for retreats, posters, and frivolous programs. In my view, the government should put forth a plan to exploit oil revenues, aid, and grants to support agriculture and should spend funds as

they should legitimately be spent, without waste. The problems of the expatriates and of native sons will all be solved, God willing.

I advise the expatriates to form a syndicate for themselves only, to track their interests and create plans and programs to solve the problem. They should benefit from their past experience, and not pin their hopes on the government.

Where Did You Get This From?

[Mansur] Bribery has been a spreading disease in our country lately. What is the solution, in your view?

[Sa'tar] The solution is to examine every official—"Where did you get this from?" Wealth exceeding his legitimate claims would be taken away and deposited into the state treasury. Corrupt officials should be punished with dismissal, not with a transfer to a cushier job. And public announcements in the media to show that it is a reckoning from top to bottom, not a liquidation of weak, corrupt officials with their thousand or two thousand [riyals], while millionaires are left alone.

How Can You Outsmart Police?

[Mansur] There has been an increase in security incidents, and citizens are increasingly fearful and worried about themselves, their property, honor, and children. What are the reasons? What, in your opinion, is the answer?

[Sa'tar] The reason for the security incidents is the weakness of religious restraint on the part of the perpetrators, and the criminals' confidence in the justice of the constitution and its leniency towards them.

The Solution to the Bribery Problem Is:

Enacting Islamic law and implementing its punishments, spreading religious awareness everywhere and by every means—the media, education, in mosques, and public institutions. If a thief steals a million riyals, they take from him a fine of 100,000 riyals at the most, and imprison him for a month. He is the winner. They imprison him or release him, and he is ready to reach an agreement with the state to pay the set amount and to turn himself in for arrest after every theft. As to honor—how can we ask the young people for discipline when the television instructs them in how to exchange letters with a girl, how to meet with her, how to keep her from getting pregnant; and it teaches how to rob a bank, how to disable the burglar alarm and camera, how to open the automatic vault; it teaches how to kill and hide the body and eliminate their fingerprints, and how you can outsmart the police and the courts. So what can we expect?

Constant Attacks

[Mansur] Have you ever been the object of a violent attack, and if so how?

[Sa'tar] There have been many attacks, and some have made problems for us, and we have had to draw our weapon in the governorate of Abyan, in Sanaa, in Aden, the Sa'adah Road, and elsewhere. There have been quarrels, and we have extricated ourselves from them with wisdom, patience, and self-control, thanks to the grace of almighty God.

I Am Afraid of Dying in Bed

[Mansur] Are you afraid of being murdered or kidnapped? What are your feelings?

[Sa'tar] I beseech God for martyrdom in His cause. I am afraid of dying in my house, on my bed, because I feel that I am unworthy to attain martyrdom in God's cause. But my belief in my Lord is greater than my sins; more honorable and wiser. I consider death in bed a loss for the soul, something worthless. God, only God, has granted the reward of martyrdom, as in the saying of the Prophet, "If one truthfully asks God for martyrdom ..." The stupidest of the stupid is he who flees martyrdom in the cause of God to die a natural death, worthlessly. I reassure myself and the reader that the soul departs only once and must depart at its appointed time, which cannot be brought forward or postponed. I feel happy when I hear that someone is lying in wait for me, because I work in God's cause, and I beseech Him that my work be true to Him and faithful to His law.

[Mansur] When do you spend time with your family and children, since you travel so much and work so hard?

[Sa'tar] I make time for my family when there are parliamentary sessions, on holy days and special occasions, and when the children are having their exams. Most of my travels bring me back home the same day. The truth is that help is from almighty God to man, to weigh his duty to his faith, to his family and to himself.

[Mansur] What does 'Abdallah Sa'tar read these days? When does he read?

[Sa'tar] I read the newspapers and magazines and current books, whether they deal with the struggle between secularism and Islam, or the Zionist plans to impose the new world order, or preaching and guidance. I am also interested in the subjects of development and planning, especially in the field of public services, with an effort to keep a special time every day especially for prayer and reading the Koran and its interpretation.

Islamic Caliphate Is Hope of Every Muslim

[Mansur] What are the hopes of 'Abdallah Sa'tar?

[Sa'tar] My hope is to see the Muslims in one state ruled by one caliph according to the Koran and the Sunna. I beseech God to make Yemen the first stone of the edifice of the Islamic caliphate, and allow the people of Yemen to have the good fortune to establish that state, just as their ancestors did in the earliest Islamic era.

**Police Journal on Causes of Highway Robbery,
Car Theft**
91AE0627A Sanaa AL-HARIS in Arabic 19 Aug 91 p 4

[Article by 'Abd-al-Salam al-Mu'allimi: "Phenomena of Highway Robbery and Car Theft: Causes and Solutions"]

[Text] In the last edition, AL-HARIS published excerpts from the statements and confessions of suspected highway robbers and car thieves whom the police have been able to arrest. I was given an opportunity to meet with a number of them. From the confessions and statements that I heard from them, from the dossiers and investigative information that the police have gathered about them, as well as from the reasoning supporting the sentences given the defendants, many of the reasons and motives that encouraged them to commit these crimes became obvious to me.

When we speak of the reasons and motives for their committing such crimes, it does not mean seeking excuses or attempting to justify their deeds and exempt them from society's right to impose punishment on those of its members who contribute to upsetting its security and stability. We do so only for the purpose of finding solutions and eliminating the criminal phenomena that have spread in society. We can do this only after learning the causes and motives that lead to commission of the crime. It is better for society to educate its members well than to impose punishment on them; and prevention is even better than treatment. As long as these problems exist in our society, the organs of the state, including the security and judicial systems, will stand as if helpless and confused in the face of these phenomena. Among the problems that I personally see as motives and causes for the commission of the crimes of highway robbery and car theft are the following:

The first reason is the economic problem from which Yemeni society suffers. Its negative consequences take the form of high prices, low individual income, and lack of job opportunities, especially among Gulf country returnees. This has forced highway robbers and car thieves, either employed in low-paying jobs or unemployed, to commit these acts on the pretext of improving their income and obtaining their daily bread, regardless of the legality of such gain. Thus we find that most of the people accused of these crimes are from the following classes:

- individuals with limited income (soldiers, minor officials),
- expatriate workers returning from the Gulf countries with no job prospects,
- unemployed craftsmen or laborers who have lost their jobs or cannot obtain work because of high prices and the return of a million expatriates during the Gulf crisis.

The second reason is the government's weakness and its small influence in the cities and countryside. This takes the following forms:

- lack of the means and resources that the police should have—vehicles and communications equipment—so that they can be present in Yemen's villages and countryside and monitor long roads,
- lengthy court procedures, lack of resolution for serious problems, and delay in imposing Islamic and corrective punishments,
- lack of serious investigation and careful examination by officials at military and police posts and city entrances when vehicles and goods enter or leave cities, as well as loose control over other outlets that car thieves travel when they take their booty out of the main cities.

If thieves had been arrested, tried, and punished without delay or favoritism and in a just and deterrent manner, these criminal phenomena would not have spread in a society like our Yemeni society, whose members are endowed with noble principles and values.

However, for the above reasons, the phenomena of highway robbery and car theft have spread. They have gone beyond looting and stealing to allay one's hunger and provide for one's domestic needs. Now they extend to obtaining fast profit in the shortest time. Highway robbers have gone from plundering wheat, flour, and gas, to stealing the whole vehicle with its cargo and stealing money and jewelry from travelers. Car theft has developed from stealing a single old car into stealing several new-model ones. Carrying theft to an extreme, thieves boldly steal from the police and the army. This sort of thing is, by its very nature, an open challenge to the state and its main organs. Everyone now has proof that undiscipline and laxity exist in the systems of order in the major cities.

The third reason is lack of coordination between the police and judicial systems. Often the police arrest the criminal and turn him over for investigation and sentencing, only to be surprised by his release after a brief period. This must be considered a cause for disturbance and unease on the part of policemen and citizens. The former lose their interest and energy in carrying out their duty. The latter cease notifying and cooperating, when the accused might go free to take revenge on police and citizens alike.

The fourth reason is that citizens do not cooperate with the police. Because of the weakness of the police system, its meager resources, and citizens' fear of violence by criminals, we find citizens cooperating with car thieves and highway robbers by buying stolen cars and goods, covering up for the thieves, and hiding the places where they stay.

The fifth reason is the lack of subsequent care of convicts after they leave prison. Modern prisons in most countries educate convicts during their period of incarceration. They put them to work and train them, so that they

emerge into society with a trade from which they can earn an honest living. However, what happens in our country is that the convict leaves prison having learned new ways and superior methods of committing crimes. Most car thieves and highway robbers are therefore graduates who have spent time in Yemen's prisons.

Solutions: It is important for society to treat its problems and give its members a good, patriotic upbringing. Before we demand execution of the punishments mandated by civil and religious law, citizens must be provided a decent living. Jobs must be created. Corruption,

laxity, bribery, and favoritism must be eliminated. The police and judges must be trained, their material level must be improved, and the resources needed to enforce the law must be provided. The principle that the law is sovereign over rulers and the ruled, officials, and citizens must be applied. Citizens regarded it as a good sign when a number of sentences and Islamic punishments [had] were carried out recently against car thieves and burglars. However, that will not be enough to eliminate criminal phenomena, as long as grave problems are not treated and the causes leading to the committing of crimes are not eradicated.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Afghanistan Seen at Crucial Crossroads

'Peace Hangs by Thread'

92AS0021A Lahore THE NATION in English
17 Sep 91 pp 1, 4

[Article by Ahmad Rashid: "War or Peace in Afghanistan Hangs by a Thread"]

[Text] Islamabad—The 13-year-old Afghan civil war, which has already claimed one million lives, could enter its bloodiest phase with the Mujahideen and regional powers, who back them, still determined to topple President Najibullah through a simultaneous coup in Kabul and a military offensive on the ground.

The U.S.-Soviet decision last week to cut arms supplies from 1 January 1992, in effect gives the Mujahideen a three and half month deadline to achieve this. However, this period could also herald a new peace offensive. For President Najibullah it will be [the] toughest time in his career.

The peace process in Afghanistan still hangs by a knife-edge. Last week, Mujahideen rockets fired on Kabul Airport killed three Afghan soldiers after exploding close to a United Nations aircraft carrying UN diplomats who have spent the past three years shuttling between Islamabad and Kabul, trying to achieve a peace settlement. As the plane made an emergency take-off, three more rockets landed. From Tehran, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar warned that an assault on Kabul could start a bloodbath that would spoil chances of peace. "There is the possibility of the city being attacked not only by rockets but by military forces," he said.

Western and Pakistani officials in Islamabad admit that the Mujahideen are preparing for an offensive against the city of Gardez in eastern Afghanistan, while simultaneously Mujahideen leader Gulbuddin Hikmetyar and former Afghan Army General Shahnawaz Tanai, are attempting an intra-Kabul coup through the Afghan Army. In 1989, a coup attempt in Kabul by Hikmetyar and Tanai, who was then the regime's Defence Minister, was brutally crushed by Najibullah.

Although the U.S.-Soviet accord has been welcomed by the three regional powers—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran—who back the Mujahideen and also reluctantly welcomed by the Mujahideen themselves, the accord falls far short of what many in the region would have liked it to be. In the past two years funding and arms supplies to the Mujahideen have largely come, not from the United States but from these three countries and there is still no guarantee that they will also cut off arms supplies on 1 January. Moreover, the accord falls short of Pakistan's hopes for a package deal, which would have also set up an inter government in Kabul without Najibullah.

The deadline also gives President Najibullah room to manoeuvre. He is hastily sending delegations to India and the Soviet Central Asian Republics, who might continue supplying Kabul with weapons through separate treaty arrangements. The five Muslim Republics view Najibullah's survival as crucial if they are to block a Mujahideen victory in Kabul, that could spread Islamic fundamentalism to their region.

Some diplomats view the distant 1 January deadline as a Russian concession to the Asian Republics to give them time to Saudi Arabia to back the Mujahideen for a final push against Kabul. Saudi and Pakistani officials still say they cannot contemplate having to deal with a Najibullah still in power in January.

The lack of any coherent U.S. policy over the past few months was exemplified by the Moscow accord, which solves the U.S.-Soviet equation but leaves the Afghans and the regional countries hanging in the air. The lack of U.S. direction in its policy for the next three months will allow the CIA to back any military move against Kabul. The United States is also nervous on Pakistan's growing intimacy with Iran and one way to detract from this relationship is for the United States to push for a joint U.S.-Pakistani-Saudi backing for the Mujahideen, which would leave Iran out in the cold.

Similarly, senior Saudi officials are also encamped in Peshawar attempting to bring the Mujahideen together and forge the necessary consensus to bring about a successful push by them in the next few weeks. The Saudis are keen to counter future Iranian influence in Afghanistan through the Shia Afghan Mujahideen who are backed by Tehran. In the past few weeks, the Saudis have made up with Mr. Hikmetyar, who had angered them earlier because he had supported Saddam Husayn in the Gulf war and Saudi aid is now once again flowing to the Pakistan-based Afghan Mujahideen. The Saudis have invested more in the Afghan struggle than anyone else and they are not going to see defeat snatched from the jaws of victory.

Iran has made it clear that it does not support a military offensive headed by Hikmetyar or other Pakistan-based Mujahideen. This became a major sticking point in the last round of the tripartite talks of Tehran where Iranian officials believed that Pakistan was not levelling with them on its real intentions. If there is a military push from the Peshawar-based Afghans, the Iranians will not support it and they may well make loud noises even opposing an offensive. Pakistan could well be risking its relations with Iran if it goes ahead with backing a Mujahideen offensive.

The Pakistan military is still committed to a Mujahideen victory, although in recent months, Islamabad has also stepped up its support for a UN-sponsored peace plan. Islamabad's "talk and fight strategy" has now veered to the "fight" as officials accept that after 1 January international peace efforts would be stepped up and Mujahideen disunity would prevent any major offensive.

However, senior Pakistani officials, intimately connected with Afghan policy, admit that the 1989 coup experience was a disaster and backing only one or two Mujahideen leaders would again be courting a backlash from the others. Almost all the major commanders in the field—the Commanders Shura and Ahmad Shah Masud—have publicly pledged that they would first block any attempt by the Hikmetyar-Tanai coalition to get to Kabul, even if it meant preventing a coup in Kabul. However, if Pakistan intends to back an offensive then once again it will be forced to make Hikmetyar its main instrument, despite Pakistan's own serious misgivings about his ability to pull the other Mujahideen along with him.

Any offensive will also depend on the willingness of the Jama'at and Ahmad Shah Masud to block the Salang Highway. This is unlikely. Hundreds of Mujahideen have been killed in recent months in a renewed outburst of fighting between Hizbe and Jama'at in northern Afghanistan. Masud's strategic aims appear to be dangerously at odds with the regional balance that everyone wants to preserve, especially Pakistan. For the past year, he had concentrated on taking small towns in the north to further increase his influence in Soviet Tajikistan. He has done little to help the Mujahideen change the strategic equation in the rest of Afghanistan as he attempts to carve out for himself a Greater Tajikistan and even possibly break up Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and China such an aim creates a dangerous strategic imbalance in the region, which will exacerbate ethnic and sectarian struggles for independence in Central Asia. For the Soviets it is a direct national security dilemma. For Pakistan and some Mujahideen any offensive would also be instrumental to undermine Masud and ensure the preservation of the borders of Afghanistan. But the dilemma is that without Masud's cooperation in the north, any offensive is most likely doomed to failure.

Although the January deadline will pressurise the Mujahideen to unite, whether they will be able to do so given the acute tribal, sectarian and ideological [word illegible] fighting between them is [word illegible]. Najibullah's main card is the hope that the Mujahideen will continue killing each other rather than Afghan soldiers. Afghanistan remains one area of the world where superpower accords do not bring instant peace.

Crucial in the next few months will be Pakistan's attitude to both peace and war. Afghanistan now presents a complex nightmare for policy planners and Islamabad, as the UN Secretary-General has pointed out publicly, is the key to a solution. Unfortunately Islamabad's policy makers are obviously at odds and there is still no sign of a coherent policy emerging.

Pakistan Policy Contradictory

92AS0021B Lahore THE NATION in English
18 Sep 91 pp 1, 4

[Article by Ahmad Rashid: "Crisis and Contradictions in Pak Afghan Policy"]

[Text] Islamabad—With both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan at a crucial crossroad, the lack of coordinated decision-making and rivalries within the ruling triarchy will seriously jeopardize Pakistan's ability to keep up with the fast-moving scenario on Afghanistan. Pakistan's Afghan policy remains deeply contradictory with ill-defined aims and continues to demonstrate neither vision nor clarity about what it wants to achieve.

There is a coup attempt in Moscow, the Soviet Union is collapsing, Moscow and Washington wrap up an accord on arms supplies, but Pakistan's President and Prime Minister cannot be pushed to call a meeting of the Afghan cell to coordinate policy on a crucial foreign-policy problem. The last meeting on 3 April (5 months ago) took the decision to pursue a peaceful settlement of the problem.

Sources close to the PM [Prime Minister] and the President blame each other for the failure to call a meeting and it is apparent that domestic tensions such as the passage of the 12th Amendment through parliament remain a source of friction between the two. In the meantime Afghan policy, such as it is, operates on a sort of remote control which is increasingly looking self-defeating.

The contradictions are multiple and glaring. While Pakistan is keen to send Sibghatullah Mujadeddi, President of the AIG [Afghan Interim Government] to Moscow with a Mujahideen delegation, it is also keen to continue unabated military pressure—a factor that is not likely to convince Moscow of Islamabad's good intentions.

Despite two rounds of talks in Tehran, the Iranians remain suspicious of Pakistan's Afghan policy—a suspicion heightened by renewed Saudi involvement in the issue. The Saudis are naturally suspicious that Pakistan is veering too close to Iran and giving the Tehran Mujahideen undue weight in resolving the issue. While the government claims it wants to build ties with Central Asia, it is reluctant to link an Afghan resolution to building such ties and Pakistan and the Mujahideen have offered neither Moscow nor the Central Asian republics any security guarantees.

Within the moderate Mujahideen parties, who have taken part in the tripartite talks, there is a strong suspicion that the fundamentalists are being held back in reserve in case there is a failure of the talks to achieve a common platform for all the Mujahideen groups. The moderates claim that the government and its intelligence agencies have put no pressure whatsoever on the fundamentalists to take part in the peace process.

The growing cohesion between the Foreign Office and the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] that resulted after the April Afghan cell meeting appears to have once again become distant, as both appear to be operating on diverging tracks. With the low priority that the Prime Minister gives to foreign policy issues and his apparent lack of interest and inexperience on Afghanistan, the President has said little publicly or privately that could reassure both the public and other countries involved as to what Pakistan's intentions are.

The only common denominator in all this is that President Najibullah must go, but Monday's statement by the Foreign Office that the Kabul regime is ready for talks without Najibullah appears to be more of a propaganda ploy aimed at increasing suspicions within the Kabul regime, rather than a policy statement. After the Moscow coup Najibullah offered that the Mujahideen could come forward and talk to anyone in the Kabul regime, but for serious negotiations he would nominate the one who in Kabul, could carry out such negotiations.

Although the U.S.-Soviet arms accord was long expected in Islamabad and has been welcomed by Pakistan, there is no commitment as yet by Islamabad to go along with Iran and Saudi Arabia to be part of the arms cut-off accord starting 1 January. Monday's statement that Pakistan would only take the decision on implementing negative symmetry when the time comes will hardly reassure either Moscow or Kabul.

Pakistan now has a unique opportunity to push for peace but only if the government is prepared to make and face crucial decisions, which it has continuously side stepped so far. If Pakistan is to be the "guiding hand" behind the Mujahideen, (as the Foreign Office said on Monday) then it must exert the necessary pressure to push them to offer something more substantial than they have done so far. Unless Kabul is reassured that there will not be a bloodbath there, expecting the regime to surrender all its negotiating positions, will be unrealistic.

For starters, Islamabad can privately pressurise the Mujahideen on a number of counts—firstly that Pakistan will also implement negative symmetry on 1 January and it will persuade Iran and Saudi Arabia to do the same. Even if this is not publicly stated in order to maintain the pressure on Najibullah, it still could be made clear to the Mujahideen in private. It should also be made clear to them that Pakistan will not be playing favourites after 1 January and those who are on board a negotiated settlement will be supported and those who still reject it will not be given the necessary political support.

Similarly, the Mujahideen have to be told that an intra-Afghan dialogue, which all the parties have carried on with various factions in Kabul in secret for many years, can no longer be publicly rejected. The Mujahideen have to be persuaded that they have to announce talks with

Kabul, even it is not with Najibullah. But they have to be made to realise that Pakistan's position has dramatically changed on this score.

Pakistan could also exert further pressure on the Mujahideen by joining hands with Iran and Saudi Arabia, either through a specially formed committee or through the OIC [Organization of the Islamic Conference] to persuade them to begin an intra-Afghan dialogue.

At the heart of the problem for both Pakistan and the Mujahideen is Islamabad's inability to convince itself, the Pakistan public, the Mujahideen and the world at large that the various factions within Afghan policy-making are truly united and determined to end the war. Unless these reassurances are given, there will be continued international and domestic suspicions that Pakistan's policy makers are pursuing different aims and objectives and that the rejectionist Mujahideen can continue to successfully play off one Pakistani side against the other.

Iran Role Limited

92AS0021C Lahore *THE NATION* in English
12 Sep 91 p 7

[Article by Ghulam Sarwar: "Afghanistan and Regional Perspectives"]

[Text] War in Afghanistan has not confined itself within its borders. Its impact has been felt on the entire region. India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia have been especially affected. India's role during the recent Afghanistan crisis (1980-88) has been down-right inimical to the Mujahideen cause. Its main aim has all along been to strengthen and legitimise the Kabul regime and as such, it was congruent with the Soviet objectives. India followed this policy in order to establish a pro-Soviet rather than Islamic regime in Kabul, thereby preserving the Kabul-Delhi axis. Secondly, it wanted to ensure that Soviet withdrawal took place only after the consolidation of the Kabul regime. India, thus, hoped that American military aid to Pakistan would then decline. In the framework of Indian thinking, there was no imminent possibility of any Soviet threat in South Asia. Instead, India felt that there certainly existed the threat of the internationalisation of regional conflicts through American involvement, either directly or indirectly.

India openly accepted the Soviet justification for the invasion. True to its tradition, it, however, put forward its neutral stance. The world, however, was not prepared to accept its duplicity. Instead of condemning the Soviet aggression, India blamed Pakistan and the United States for the consequences of the Soviet action. It attributed the escalation of regional tension into an East-West issue as the direct outcome of U.S. intervention. India raised false alarm against Pakistan's military build-up and made desperate efforts for the withdrawal of Soviet troops only after the consolidation of the Kabul regime. India's apathy towards the Mujahideen cause could be judged from the fact that it abstained from voting for the

UN's annual resolution condemning the Soviet invasion. India also supported the Kabul regime within the Non-aligned Movement, whose seventh summit was held in Delhi and the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] which India supported Kabul's candidacy in 1988.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan came as a rude shock for India. It held the view that the establishment of an Islamist and pro-Pakistani government in Kabul would be a major setback to its own interests. This development was in no way acceptable to India. So, true to its policy of duplicity, on the one hand, it continued extending support to Najibullah and on the other, it started fostering contacts with those groups of Mujahideen and other individuals, who were less favourably disposed towards Pakistan. India, in a state of panic, went to the extent of sending its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Natwar Singh, to the former King Zahir in Rome in January 1988.

Here in Pakistan, over the years, foreign policy was based on extending whole-hearted support to Mujahideen and exposing duplicity of India. It also continued to develop close links with Muslim countries and also with China for winning support in favour of Mujahideen. It will be recalled that when General Zia proclaimed martial law in July 1977, all military aid from the United States had been cut. By early 1980, however, General Zia could, under the new circumstances, afford to reject as "peanuts," the U.S.\$400 million aid offered by President Carter in 1982. Then a package of U.S.\$3.2 billion in civil and military aid for five years was sanctioned by the U.S. Congress. It was followed by a new five-year package of U.S.\$4.02 billion in 1987. Pakistan acquired weapons which could withstand any aggression from North or from India. Sanctions on the issue of nuclear proliferation, were also shelved, although temporarily.

For Pakistan, the Soviet invasion, in a way, provided good opportunity to resolve the Pushtunistan issue. Pakistan has since developed happy understanding with the Pushtun tribes. On the Western side of the Durand line. It has achieved this success by dealing directly with the local Mujahideen commanders. There have, however, been certain setbacks as well in the process. For instance, army trading and drug smuggling added many menacing administrative problems for Pakistan. Pakistan is still struggling to curb these evils.

Some time back, Pakistan's ex-Chief of Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, floated the idea of forming a strategic consensus among Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran so that, besides other advantages, it could give Pakistan the strategic depth it lacks in front of India. To achieve these objectives, Islamabad needed to have friendly relations with the future government in Kabul. Towards this end, Pakistan tried to oblige the Soviets to withdraw by helping the Mujahideen. It also tried to ensure that future government had friendly ties with Pakistan. The key to this policy was Hekmatyar. As a

radical Islamist, Hekmatyar was regarded as the most effective Afghan politician. He had complete understanding with the Pakistani leadership.

When it became obvious that the Soviets were going to withdraw, Mujahideen made desperate efforts to form government of their liking in Afghanistan. This strategy was implemented at two levels. The first objective was to establish the AIG [Afghan Interim Government] in Peshawar and to put this government in charge by taking Jalalabad. The second aim, according to Olivier Roy, was to ensure the dominance of Hekmatyar. For this, bulk of the help was given to him.

As regards Iran's role in the Afghanistan crisis, it can be said that Iran seldom tried to address the Sunni majority in Afghanistan. Its strategy in Afghanistan was to obtain control of the Shi'a minority through pro-Iranian Shi'a groups and to use this as a leverage to obtain Soviet goodwill in the Gulf, without confronting the USSR directly. It also wanted to maintain a foothold in post-war Afghanistan.

The Soviet withdrawal of 1989 totally changed Iranian perception. Since then, the main danger, in Iran's eye has been the Saudi influence and not the Soviet Union. In this backdrop, the interest of Tehran and Moscow coincided not only in Afghanistan, but also in the Caucasus and Central Asia. During their meeting in Moscow in June 1989, Gorbachev and Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the President of Iran, made an informal deal to ensure territorial stability in Central Asia. Also, Moscow and Tehran expressed their willingness to form a coalition government in Kabul, which would include all the Mujahideen groups and the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan]. Again, Iran succeeded in obtaining from Moscow the recognition of the Islamic identity of Afghanistan.

Iran had two options. It could either play the ethnic card, uniting the Shi'as and the Persian speakers against the Pushtuns, who were more influenced by the Pakistanis and the Saudis, or preside over a reshuffling of the alliances. It initially opted for the latter.

Iran's role today in Afghanistan is somewhat limited because, after a decade of low key involvement, it has no means of building a strong base in the country. Tehran never provided substantial military support to the Mujahideen. The delivery of limited batches of light weapons has been made only to the Shias. The weakness of the Iranian position in Afghanistan enticed Tehran to advocate a "government of coalition" including the Kabul regime. Iran has no interest in a Lebanonisation of Afghanistan and in fact, is more of a stabilising factor than a trouble-maker.

As regards Saudi Arabia role, it is a fact widely known that it has been helping the Mujahideen since 1979. Its specific policy priorities have, however, shifted since then. Initially, the main aim was to oppose the Soviet invasion but by 1988, it was to counteract any Iranian influence.

A broad over view of the Afghan imbroglio is that although it would be risky to consider the Soviet invasion as the cause of the current events in Central Asia, it undoubtedly embodies a turning point in the historical trends of Soviet Asia. It has put an end to both the centuries old Russian drive towards warm waters and Moscovite domination in the area. It also encompasses both the emergence of modern Islamic revivalism and its inability to overcome tribal, sectarian, ethnic and national divisions, so far. This scribe feels that the vacuum created by the Soviet withdrawal can be filled only by a broader consensus of major contending parties. Their internal in-fighting has already caused them irreparable damage. Better sense must prevail on them now.

Further Jihad Unnecessary

92AS0021D Karachi DAWN in English 24 Sep 91 p 15

[Article by Brigadier A.R. Siddiqi: "Afghanistan: Time for Peace, Not Polemics"]

[Text] Karachi—U.S.-USSR agreement on arms cut off to the Afghan combatants—U.S.-backed Mujahideen and the Soviet-armed Kabul regime—can best be described as something "better late than never." The so-called negative symmetry was first offered by the Soviet Union on the eve of its withdrawal from Afghanistan under the Geneva Accord signed on 14 April 1988.

The United States spurned the Soviet offer hopeful of a quick Mujahideen victory against the Najibullah regime—once the Soviet troops were gone.

Contrary to high hopes, however, the Mujahideen's Jalalabad offensive would not make much headway to pose a direct threat to Kabul and the Najibullah regime there. Ever since, a sort of a ding-dong, sporadic and largely sterile military effort, between the warring sides, has been in evidence, without materially influencing the course of the hostilities—except in continuance.

The situation following the 13 September agreement on negative symmetry is one of a wary acceptance by Pakistan and a divided opinion among the Mujahideen group. The three leading militant groups led by the Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen) Engineer Gulbadin Hekmatyar (Hizb-i-Islami) and Maulvi Yonous Khalis (breakaway Hizb-i-Islam) have all but rejected the latest move as a part of the UN peace plan of 21 May.

Influential Group

The only influential group to have accepted the peace move, in principle, is the Jamiat-i-Islami of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani—a militant-moderate group—in the vanguard of the Afghan Jihad largely untouched by the polemical and ideological extremism of the other fighting groups.

The remaining three headed by Syed Ahmad Gilani (Mahaz-i-Milli), Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi (Harkat-i-Inquilabi) and Sibghatullah Mujaddedi (Jabha-i-Milli) supporting the UN plan—had too little to contribute to actual fighting to mean much in the success or failure of the UN peace plan. The hard liners must therefore join forces with the moderates for enduring peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Foreign Secretary, Sheharyar Mohammed Khan, while reaffirming Pakistan's commitment to the UN plan, would not seem to be too happy with its being implemented piecemeal as seen in U.S.-USSR agreement on negative symmetry. He would have preferred a package rather than a piecemeal approach to the UN Plan. He would have also liked to know more about the modalities of the proposed intra-Afghan dialogue and the formation of a transitional government in Kabul (without Najibullah) for holding free and fair elections.

Approach

The Foreign Secretary's approach is somewhat reminiscent of the late Gen. Zia-ul-Haq's resentment over the signing of the Geneva Agreement without first ousting Najibullah and setting up an interim government in Kabul. In his characteristic rhetorical vein he wondered whether Pakistan had "blackened her face" only to secure to Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan with Najibullah still in the saddle.

Polemics only helped to throw Afghanistan deeper into the vortex of a bloody civil war even after the Soviets were gone. The situation persists and remains grim as ever.

A polemical approach in the style of the pre-Geneva Agreement diplomatic hair-splitting more than advancing the peace process could actually hamper, even forestall it, if not seized by both hands. And the time for it is now.

The real cause for anxiety is the looming prospect of an escalation in hostilities within the Afghan groups between now and 1 January 1992 when the arms cut off will come into effect. Heads might roll in the meantime and leave a legacy of bloodshed to make a mockery of negative symmetry in the end. Concerted efforts for an early end to hostilities must be launched therefore to pave the way for a full and meaningful implementation of the intended arms cut off.

Future

It is to be noted that the future of Afghanistan will depend on and be shaped largely by the intra-Afghan dialogue and inter-Afghan harmony. A grand national reconciliation is the only way to insulate the country against foreign interference and ensure its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Now that the Soviets are out of Afghanistan, there is no cause for further internecine conflict and bloodshed in the name of Jihad.

Jihad against whom? Against an expendable, disposable individual called Najibullah.

In matters concerning peace and war, the profit-loss ratio must be worked out and balanced in terms of total national security rather than a partial victory. An over-expenditure of effort for a fixation—either in the form of an individual or an idea—even if justified by the end-result would still be bad strategy and wholly counter-productive.

The Peshawar-based Mujahideen, moderate and radical groups must hasten to seek an early, political solution of their national crisis. The longer they wait the greater would be the likelihood of their becoming practically irrelevant to the situation. Those actually waging the jihad from inside Afghanistan will have little respect for them and a larger say in the final settlement of the issue perhaps at the cost of a united Afghanistan.

The country may well split apart, even without marked recognised borders, on the basis of the existing lines of actual control separating various warring groups. The existing war zones may well turn into permanent spheres of influence and fiefdoms to throw up a divided Afghanistan with a diluted central authority.

Urgent Need for Peace

92AS0021E Karachi DAWN in English 21 Sep 91 p 11

[Article by Shameem Akhtar: "Afghanistan: Time for Peace"]

[Text] It was after a two-year stalemate in Afghanistan that the parties came painfully to the conclusion that they could not force a military solution upon each other. The massive assault mounted on Jalalabad by the Afghan Resistance from bases in Pakistan during the early 1990 having proved abortive, it became clear to all and sundry that the Kabul government could take care of itself.

Its viability became unquestionable, the fall of Khost early this year notwithstanding. Najib government also overcame the rebellion led by its former defence minister General Tanai. And on top of all, the two superpowers made a deal over Afghanistan so that it could revert to its former neutral status based on some form of pluralist system.

As the superpower detente deepened, the erstwhile Marxist-Leninist PDP deideologised itself to become a bourgeois nationalist alliance known as Watan Party. Washington figured out that communists were lesser evil than Muslim fundamentalists. This was confirmed when Hikmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami and a few other groups proclaimed support for the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in Jihad against the infidel West.

It was no comfort to the Bush administration that a majority of the Peshawar-based resistance groups which had been receiving money from Saudi Arabia and United States itself, had vowed to send volunteers to

defend Iraq against the U.S.-led invasion. The United States cut off assistance to the Afghan Resistance which during the eighties rose to \$600 million annually. The Bush administration had appointed a special envoy Tomsen to the Peshawar-based Afghan interim government but now the U.S. interest has waned in the so-called war of national liberation and consequently its camp followers, Britain, Canada and Japan, have told the Afghan rebels that they could not provide huge funds to the Afghan refugees if there was no progress towards a settlement.

Even the UN relief agencies have reduced their humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees. Now both the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to stop supplying arms to all sides in the Afghan civil war from beginning of the next year. This will discourage the combatants from settling their scores by force of arms.

At the instance of the United States, Asia Watch, a human rights organisation, accused the Hikmatyar group in particular of killing the civilian population of Jalalabad and other towns in order to terrorise the Afghans. The report, which was doubtlessly inspired by the U.S. administration, alleged that the Mujahideen had confessed that they were forced by the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan to carry on indiscriminate terrorist attacks upon the innocent Afghans in towns and villages.

In fact it was the CIA operatives who had infiltrated into the ranks of the Afghan Resistance and ordered them to blast the peaceful settlements across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

When Pakistan would not abandon its nuclear programme, the Bush Administration abruptly stopped all economic and military assistance to Islamabad and decided to "wage peace" in Afghanistan in concert with Soviet Union. Apart from the rapprochement between Washington and Moscow, another reason for the superpower peace drive was the increasing ties between Iran and Pakistan. If Iran and Pakistan were to coordinate their strategy towards Afghanistan, the outcome could not be influenced by the superpowers.

Under no circumstances would the United States and Soviet Union permit the feuding Muslim countries to patch up their differences without their mediation. Did not the United States pre-empt the settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict by the Arab League and pressured its Arab allies to invite American troops in the region?

Whatever the motive of the superpowers, their peace initiative was widely acclaimed. It may be recalled though that in the past the United States defeated all conciliatory efforts of the Najib government. Since 1986 Najib had been offering ceasefire and negotiations aimed at power-sharing with the Resistance. He wrote to the Saudi monarch to host a peace conference at Makkah. He offered a power-sharing formula that conceded even the top government position to the rebels.

In 1988 the Afghan leader offered one-third seats in the government to the insurgents only to be rejected by Ahmed Shah Masoud. He also offered to appoint the rebel commanders as governors in the areas under their effective control. He proposed to hold an internationally-supervised referendum on the future government of Afghanistan if the rebels agreed to a ceasefire. All these proposals were turned down by the Afghan Resistance because of American pressure.

Even the Cordovez Plan was put into the cold storage. It envisaged the formation of an interim government consisting of neutral elements in Afghanistan. These men were to state on oath not to accept any position in the future government of Afghanistan. During the brief transitional period of six months they were to make arrangements for forming a government by consensus or by electoral process. The modalities were to be worked out by the leaders concerned. A government that would emerge after the transitional period would be deemed to be legitimate. The plan could not find favour with the Afghan Resistance.

The 21 May five-point Perez plan is along the lines of the Cordovez formula in that both reiterate the right to self-determination of the Afghan people, the cessation of hostilities and establishment of interim government in the run-up to elections. Perez recommends the involvement of some international agency during the transitional period to oversee the electoral process. These are mere outlines of a peace formula and, as Shahryar Khan has rightly pointed out, need to be worked out in specific details at an intra-Afghan dialogue.

There have been certain positive developments in the situation. The Pakistan and Iran-based Afghan Resistance leaders have formulated a unified position although the power-sharing between the two has yet to be sorted out. It was like cutting the Gordian knot since about 90 per cent of the resistance elements have come together, ready for negotiations with the representatives of Najib but not with Najib himself and Kabul's consent to send some representative other than Najib to the peace talks is a major concession.

No less significant was the meeting between the high-powered three-man Soviet delegation headed by Ivnovich Kozeyrev, the ambassador-at-large of Soviet Foreign Ministry, and the resistance leaders representing a broad spectrum of Mujahideen with the exception of three extremist factions. Although Kozeyrev had earlier met Rabbani and certain Soviet diplomats came in contact with the Resistance leaders on the occasion of the arrival of Russian mothers who had come in connection with the release of their sons held captive by Afghans, there was no formal conference to resolve the conflict such as the 12 August Islamabad meeting.

The release of Qurban Ali, a Soviet prisoner of war, by the Rabbani group on that occasion has laid the groundwork for exchange of other prisoners; Russians and Afghans presently held by the Afghan Resistance and

Kabul. Three resistance groups, Hazb-i-Islami (Hikmatyar group), Jamiet-i-Islami (Rabbani group) and National Islamic Front (Gilani group) are believed to be holding the Russians captured during the fighting.

On the other hand, the Afghan Resistance leaders claim that the Kabul government has been holding tens of hundreds of their men as prisoners. It is a double hostage situation. Therefore, both the Afghan insurgents and Najib government have to engage themselves in direct talk whose scope should be extended to the repatriation of the prisoners of war and not just the Russian POWs. For, the Mujahideen claim to have captured a number of pro-Kabul Afghans during the civil war.

Iran and Pakistan would be playing the key role since they exercise decisive influence on bulk of the Afghan Resistance force. However, three important Afghan Resistance leaders Hikmatyar, Yunus Khalis and Abdul Rasool Sayyaf have boycotted the Tehran meeting. Certain militants may be tempted to escalate the fighting in order to negotiate from a position of strength. Iran and Pakistan will have to curb any precipitancy on the part of militants based on their territories. The most effective step would be the cessation of fighting when the negotiations are in progress.

The most difficult part of the settlement is going to be the formation of an interim government. Najib's earlier offer of one-third seats has been turned down by Afghan Resistance. For their part, the rebels demanded 14 seats out of 28 for themselves, 7 for Afghan refugees and 7 for good Muslims among the local Afghans.

Needless to say that the Mujahideen were to decide who was a good Muslim. Obviously this leaves no room for members of the Najib government whom they do not regard as Muslims. Such a stance will get them nowhere at the negotiating table.

Other problems would also crop up; how much seats should the Shias get in the national government? They claim to constitute one-third of the population but this is disputed by most Peshawar-based Resistance leaders.

It may be recalled that during early 1989, Sibghatullah Mujadidi met the leaders of the Iran-based 8-party Afghan Resistance Alliance and reached an agreement in Tehran allotting 100 out of more than 400 seats to Shias in the Shoura. But the Supreme Council of the Pakistan-based Resistance turned it down on the ground that it was in excess of the proportion of the Shia population. The problem is that these claims and counter claims cannot be verified because there has been no census in Afghanistan so far! But since Iran and Pakistan have been working so closely on the Afghan peace process, it will not be difficult for them to sort out this problem if they have not already done so.

It will be in the self-interest of both Iran and Pakistan to have this conflict resolved peacefully since the 12-year stalemate in fighting has shown the futility of armed struggle. The willingness of certain hardline resistance

leaders to talk to the members of the Kabul government other than Najib amounts to its *de facto* recognition.

The Cambodian model could be relevant to Afghan situation. The Hun Sen government had to agree to sit in the Supreme National Council along with Khmer Rouge and other rebel groups. The UN would exercise authority in Cambodia until the general elections while 70 per cent of the armed elements will have to be demobilised. A similar approach to the implementation of the UN Secretary General's peace plan could facilitate the establishment of a broad-based national government in Afghanistan.

True as it may be that in the post-coup period, Moscow, which can hardly prevent its union republics from seceding, is no longer in a position to continue its support to Najib government. Besides, what interest would Moscow have in maintaining communist ascendancy in Afghanistan when the Communist Party has been overthrown in the Soviet Union itself? Therefore, the declaration of the Tehran meeting to hold substantive talks with Moscow is timely. Equally important is the reiteration by the participants to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis, a trend away from the militancy which had taken Afghanistan further away from the path of conciliation.

Regional Cooperation Indispensable for Afghan Peace

92AS0008D Lahore *VIEWPOINT* in English
19 Sep 91 p 6

[Text] More than three years after the Geneva Accord—implemented only by the Soviet Union with withdrawal of all its troops on schedule—the two Big Powers embroiled in the Afghan civil war have decided to stop all military aid to the warring factions by January 1, 1992. As part of their bigger plan for overall military disengagement, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin declared, after last week's meeting in Moscow, that discontinuation of arms supplies to both sides was one of the crucial elements of their agreement to end the fighting in Afghanistan and promote the structuring of transitional institutions that will undertake to organize elections in the country. The Soviet Union and the United States have also called upon the UN Secretary-General to continue his mediatory efforts, so that an intra-Afghan dialogue can be arranged along with a ceasefire, and thus, the five-point UN peace plan, approved unanimously by the General Assembly, can help end the twelve-year-old conflict.

The latest consultations in Tehran between the Governments of Pakistan and Iran, and the concurrent visit of Perez de Cuellar to the Iranian capital, improve the chances of peace in Afghanistan. However, the future will depend on how certain crucial questions are decided during the next three months. Although the Big Powers' decision has been welcomed by the regional Powers, it is not certain how they will respond to the Moscow appeal to cut-off all military supplies to the rebels and Kabul

regime. Among the adverse factors, at least three Afghan rebel factions have declared that the war will continue until the Kabul Government is ready to surrender. This makes no sense because it seeks to pre-empt the results of the election on which most Afghan parties are agreed. However, such sabotage of the peace process by recalcitrant elements can easily be checked if the States most concerned, and this means Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, decide that the time has come to help promote a political settlement in Afghanistan. If military and related aid is actually cut off on both sides, a large majority of the warring rebel factions are likely to accept the UN's peace terms. At the same time, it is necessary to revive Operation Salam, so that the refugees can begin to return home and reasonable arrangements made for their resettlement.

Afghan factions that, for perverse reasons, want the war-like drift to continue can, and must, be compelled to abandon their dangerous design. There is talk in Peshawar's bazars about a new rebel offensive being prepared against Kabul, rumors of impending coup attempts or secret supplies of military equipment to certain rebel factions, and the repetition of glib forecasts that Kabul would fall within days or weeks. All these maneuvers are obviously meant to keep Afghans killing Afghans for the benefit of a few holy warriors. It is equally obvious that, apart from Afghanistan itself, Pakistan will suffer the most by prolongation of the conflict. Islamabad must, therefore, act decisively to end the war, so that normalcy can gradually be restored on its western border, in the tribal belt, and in the rest of the country still plagued by the spread of guns and drugs to an event that it can invite more disastrous implosions. If Islamabad takes a firm, final decision to end interference in Afghan affairs, and persuades Tehran and Riyadh to cooperate, a political settlement acceptable to a majority of the Afghans can be evolved, the country can avoid further bloodshed and destruction, and the region can be saved from continuing disorder and greater destabilization.

Tehran, Islamabad Cooperate on Afghan Peace

92AS0008E Lahore *VIEWPOINT* in English
19 Sep 91 p 10

[Text] Events of major concern to Pakistan occurred last week outside the country.

During Mr James Baker's visit to Moscow, the United States and the Soviet Union announced their agreement to cut off military aid to their supporters in Afghanistan from January 1 next, thus accepting the principle of negative symmetry that should have been enforced three years ago. A CNN bulletin received in Pakistan indicated that Washington had dropped its demand for Afghan President Najibullah's immediate ouster. Both sides agreed to help the UN Secretary-General carry out his peace plan which would pave the way for a fair election and both sides stressed the need for cessation of hostilities.

The news caused quite a sensation in the country. The Mujahideen groups seemed disturbed but some indicated their resolve to continue the military operations. Pakistan's official reaction came in a statement by Foreign Secretary Sheheryar Khan in Teheran. While welcoming the step towards a settlement in Afghanistan he reiterated Islamabad's position that transitional arrangements could not be negotiated with Najibullah. On Monday he informed newsmen that Kabul had agreed to keep Najibullah out of the inter-Afghan dialogue. Instead PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] would be represented by two other representatives. He also disclosed that Pakistan and Iran had reached complete understanding on a shared approach to the UN peace plan. Delegates of the two countries would soon meet with Mr Perez de Cuellar in New York. Iran would be represented by Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Wilayati and Pakistan by Secretary-General Akram Zaki who would be accompanied by the newly-appointed Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Siddique Kanjoo.

However, it seems that the last word on the Afghan military conflict is not yet written.

The President, Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, spent 4 eventful days in Teheran during which Pakistan and Iran took several decisions to strengthen their cooperation in many fields. Mr Ghulam Ishaq also had a meeting with the UN Secretary-General in Teheran at which they discussed the prospects for a settlement in Afghanistan. While addressing a Pakistani audience in Iranian capital the President declared that democracy was flourishing in the country despite the noise being made by the "rejected" politicians, a remark which invited criticism and rejoinders from Maulana Fazlur Rahman, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and finally from Ms Benazir Bhutto.

Unsettled Regional Scene Viewed
92AS0008C Lahore VIEWPOINT in English
12 Sep 91 p 13

[Article by Hasan Akhtar]

[Text] There has been considerable consternation in Government quarters over the reported statement by Ms Benazir Bhutto, at a meeting of the foreign correspondents group in Islamabad, on Pakistan's nuclear programme and her own stand on it. A number of Ministers have criticized her for what they regard as an act of high treason because, they allege, she had revealed secret nuclear information to which she was privy as Prime Minister.

The Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly availed of an outstanding invitation of the foreign correspondents group on August 31, at which she was closely questioned on Pakistan's nuclear policy. According to one of the participants in the meeting with Ms Bhutto, the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Co-chairperson who looked at her best fielding a volley of

questions, made no sensational disclosures. At best, she confirmed several of the known facts about Pakistan nuclear programme.

Kept Out of Touch

Among other things, she reportedly said that she was generally kept out of touch with developments in the nuclear programme when she was Prime Minister, by the President who, among the civilian Government leaders was perhaps the only one who shared closely guarded nuclear information with the army brass and those operating the programme, more precisely Dr A.Q. Khan, the head of the nuclear research facility.

Ms Bhutto is said to have informed foreign correspondents that she believed Pakistan had acquired nuclear capability which could enable it to rapidly develop "a nuclear deterrent". This is nothing new. Indeed, Dr Khan allegedly sent a similar signal to New Delhi through the Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar some years ago.

Apparently, what has disturbed the Nawaz Sharif Government is the timing of Ms Bhutto's remarks. It is argued that her statement renewed American fears about Pakistan's nuclear programme only a few days before a high-level U.S. State Department team was to visit Pakistan probably to mend fences with Islamabad. The visit has, however, been postponed and hints are being dropped that Ms Bhutto's statement was responsible for it.

Some independent sources, however, believe that Ms Bhutto had with some finesse, chosen the time for her controversial statement at the meeting with foreign correspondents and that her observations on the nation's nuclear programme were deliberate, although a clarification on her behalf later emphasized that as Prime Minister, she had succeeded in setting American fears about Pakistan's nuclear programme at rest, working together with President Ghulam Ishaq and Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, the former Army chief.

This year's Defence Day coincides with a growing militant confrontation in the Kashmir Valley which led many to think that another costly military conflict between the two countries may be round the corner. Reported armed skirmishes along the Line of Control have added to the gravity of the situation.

Both sides have claimed successes in these clashes involving loss of several lives. In the Indian-held Kashmir, pro-Pakistan Muslim elements claim to have inflicted heavy losses on the Indian security forces besides capturing many important Indian and Kashmiri personalities as hostages in order to secure the release of their comrades.

Amid Indian allegations that Pakistan is at the back of the Muslim insurgency in the valley, Pakistan has decided to adopt a distinctly vigorous diplomatic offensive against India. Pakistan, succeeded in securing a

strong condemnation of India's Kashmir policy in the Istanbul meeting of the Islamic Foreign Ministers in the face of New Delhi's accusations that Islamabad had violated the Simla Agreement by internationalizing the bilateral dispute. Pakistan was determined to have India censured over Kashmir by the Accra meeting of the Non-aligned Government Foreign Ministers. Evidently, both sides have adopted a collision course at the international level, affirming their known irreconcilable positions on the issue.

It is in this political environment that the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India are due to meet here on September 18 after a long time to discuss bilateral problems. More importantly, Pakistan would like to raise the Kashmir issue as well as the Prime Minister's five-point plan to have South Asia declared a nuclear-free zone. The Indian side is expected to argue that it is yet too premature to deal with these issues unless sufficient ground is prepared by resolving other problems like the Indian allegations of cross-border incursions by trained terrorists into Kashmir and the Indian Punjab. Pakistan has been accusing India of sending trained terrorists and saboteurs into Sindh and parts of the Punjab.

No Breakthrough

While any move to come to the negotiating table must be appreciated by those who wish to see lasting peace between Pakistan and India, it would be naive to assume that the Foreign-Secretary-level talks can achieve a breakthrough in this direction. Indeed, the danger is that such meetings may lead both sides to take a stiffer public stance. Unfortunately, at this critical juncture, both countries have weak governments. It should, anyhow, be considered a matter for some satisfaction even if the forthcoming talks agree to keep the dialogue going.

Ambassador Sattar Stresses Bilateral Understanding

*92AS0008F Lahore VIEWPOINT in English
19 Sep 91 pp 19-20, 25*

[Article by Abdul Sattar]

[Text] This contribution is based on a recent talk the author, the Ambassador of Pakistan to India, delivered at the National Defence College, New Delhi.

Ten years ago, during my first tenure in India, I was invited to address this prestigious forum of select officers on high career trajectories. I think I was the first Pakistani Ambassador to be given this honor. But I did not want to be the last. As reciprocity and fairness are essential prerequisites for enduring relations, I ensured, before accepting your College's invitation, that the Indian Ambassador in Islamabad was also invited to address the Pakistan Defence College.

I am glad that the practice has since been institutionalized, providing an opportunity for future leaders in

military and civil services to obtain, first-hand, an idea of the views and feelings of the other side.

I should not of course exaggerate the contribution such talks make. Knowledge is not lacking between Pakistan and India, especially on long-standing bilateral issues. Each side knows not only its own case but also that of the other, as well as its refutation. More knowledge can prolong arguments even more inordinately.

I am inclined to believe that while knowledge is important, the need for understanding is even greater—understanding of the other viewpoint, understanding of the equities, understanding even of our own enlightened self-interest, based on an intelligent balance-sheet of costs and benefits, present as well as future.

A new dawn illuminates the world horizon with the East and West moving rapidly from confrontation to dialogue to cooperation. China and the USSR have achieved normalization resolving problems that had divided them for three decades. Solutions are in sight in Cambodia and Afghanistan. A conference has been scheduled to address the conflict in the Middle East.

Science and technology are paving new paths to progress and prosperity. A new consciousness of the benefits of cooperation has downgraded pursuit of power.

Strategic arsenals are being scaled down. Conventional forces are being rapidly reduced in Europe.

Shall we in South Asia, too, arise to enter this new constructive epoch? Or shall we remain trapped in the nightmare of antagonism and tension, refuse to jettison the burdens of the past and deny to ourselves the benefits of friendship and cooperation?

The history of the past 44 years reads like a classic tragedy, apparently preordained but intrinsically avoidable. There was no compelling reason for conflict and confrontation between Pakistan and India. With the partition politically agreed and accepted by the leadership of the concerned parties, the two countries could have settled down to good-neighborly coexistence, with commonalities of languages and cultures fostering mutual sympathy and understanding. Instead, unfortunately, we are today saddled with a bitter legacy of communal massacres and transfers of humanity, at least two wars and countless crises, unending conflicts and an expanding list of unsolved problems.

While the Kashmir question has hung fire for over four decades, new and often unnecessary problems have been added to the bilateral agenda. A prime example is the stalemate in Siachen which continues to exact crores in expenditure and loss of valuable lives to harsh climatic conditions.

An extraordinary resistance to resolution of disputes has been compounded by failures to implement even the agreements that have been reached. The record is littered with broken promises and disappointed hopes.

The plebiscite pledge and the UNICIP [as published] resolutions, the Liaquat-Nehru pact and the Siachen understanding provide vivid illustrations. Too often have perfectly plain agreements been interpreted to death.

Twenty years after the solemn affirmation in the Simla accord, the commitment to discuss the establishment of durable peace and a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir remains unhonored.

An understandable preference for bilateral negotiations contrasts with an understandable drive to impose unilateral solutions. A cavalier attitude to the other side's views, however just and meritorious, turns talks into a dialogue of the deaf. No wonder then that bilateral negotiations have rarely resolved Pakistan-India disputes.

In the circumstances, resort to impartial means for peaceful settlement of disputes suggests itself as a logical alternative. Conciliation, mediation, arbitration, adjudications testify to progress of civilization in human society which otherwise settled disputes by threat or use of force. Opposition to such peaceful means is baffling especially because of their proven efficacy in our bilateral experience. Thus, thanks to the good offices of the World Bank, the life-and-death dispute over the Indus waters was successfully resolved, with the Bank and friendly countries contributing generously to the augmentation of irrigation supplies, to the benefit of Pakistan as well as India. Similarly, arbitration settled within two years the boundary dispute in the Rann of Kutch which had defied bilateral resolution or decades and even brought the two countries to the brink of war.

The contrary bilateral record is manifest from the fact that the residual demarcation in the Sir Creek remains pending even after twenty-three years despite countless meetings between the negotiators of the two sides. The same holds true in regard to the project India desires to construct across the Jhelum river—a problem that should not have arisen in view of specific provisions in the Indus Basin Treaty.

In February 1987, I expressed a sense of frustration to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. A totally unnecessary crisis had arisen as troops gathered close to the borders on account of Brasstacks. Although it was fortunately defused, it imposed considerable financial loss on both sides and vitiation of the atmosphere. As one involved in Pakistan-India relations for the better part of his career, I said I often felt like a child who makes sand castles on a beach only to helplessly watch them smashed by waves out of the blue.

Rajiv Gandhi was quick to remark: "We should add cement to the sand." Of course we should. The sooner the better.

The urgency for improving Pakistan-India relations is underlined by the imperatives of a future better than the past. We just cannot allow ourselves to continue with the crises, conflicts and wars that have inflicted incalculable

damage on both countries over the past forty-four years. To death and destruction and crippling diversions to military expenditures have to be added the debilitating distraction of governments and people from constructive endeavors and dilution of the commitment and concentration that the task of economic development demands.

If diversions to defence in India and Pakistan are comparatively small, we can afford them even less, given the magnitude of the poverty and other problems that prevail. That is not to deny the progress Pakistan as well as India have achieved over the past forty-four years, but to underline the fact that both remain among the thirty poorest countries in the world, with per capita incomes under 400 dollars a year. (Among countries with comparable levels thirty years ago, the figure for Thailand now is \$1600, Malaysia \$2160, not to mention South Korea at \$4400 or Singapore with \$10,000.)

Unless the growth rates recorded in Pakistan and India over the past twenty-five years are radically accelerated, both will remain in the low-income category for decades to come. Population explosion, expansion of urban slums, proliferation of crime and violence and degradation of environment could cause a further deterioration in the quality of life.

At the current rate of population growth, by 2025 India may have the dubious distinction of being the most populous country in the world. Pakistan's growth rate is even more alarming.

It is not only the large population but low levels of production that are at the root of the problem. With a fifth of the world's population, the whole of South Asia accounts for less than the GDP [gross domestic product] of Belgium and Netherlands with a population of 25 million. South Asia contributes less than one percent of the total international trade. Marginalized economically, even the large countries of the region have consequently declined in prestige and influence, international respect for them reduced because of their rampant poverty, dependence on aid, insensitivity to violence and failure to resolve internal strife and conflicts with neighbors.

In contrast, progress and prosperity, peace and cooperation, freedom and respect for human rights are taken for granted in the West, and are extending quite rapidly to Eastern Europe.

INF and START are already a reality, affecting not merely limitation but actual disarmament of a magnitude without parallel in history. So also the giant strides made in the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe, with security and confidence moderating past hostility and mistrust.

They speak of Europe 1992, economic integration of North America, cooperation in the Pacific basin, a new momentum in the ASEAN region, and further elevation in the standards of living of the fortunate people of these groups of countries.

In a piquant essay "End of History", Francis Fukuyama envisioned a new world civilization characterized by the end of ideological confrontation and the lapse of conflicts and tensions. Sadly this new world does not extend to vast regions afflicted with poverty and countries embroiled in internecine conflicts. Fukuyama consigns them to pre-history which really means pre-civilization.

The ECONOMIST of late June delivers the verdict that Asian countries seem incapable of combining democracy and fast development, though noting also that dictatorship by no means guarantees development.

One may feel provoked and think of the heartless perversity of the dividers of the world, and even believe in the impossibility for long of coexistence on our shrunken globe between affluence in one part and poverty in another, between peace and conflict, progress and stagnation. Yet, undeniably the two are in fact separated by a widening gulf.

Only the incurable optimist can confidently assume that the trends will soon reverse, the laggards will realize the imperatives of the situation, find durable solutions to conflicts, commit themselves to single-minded pursuit of development, accelerate the pace, narrow the gap and knock on the door of the new world beyond.

Unfortunately few knowledgeable futurologists project such optimistic prospects for South Asia. Indeed, there are few indications of imminent change in past trends, of solutions in sight to festering problems, of transformation of antagonisms in favor of cooperation.

Yet there is no acceptable alternative to hope. And for hope to be materialized, sterile policies and futile postures have to be rethought and a positive and purposeful approach has to be designed.

Confidence and cooperation in South Asia require conscious efforts for regeneration and a steady conduct consistent with principles of good-neighborly coexistence. If it is necessary to recall the elementary doctrines of equality of sovereignty, it is only because the past has fostered an impression of drives for predominance. Recurrent opposition to acquisition of arms or technologies by a neighbor while refusing to accept symmetrical limitations on itself, indignant denunciations of attempts to equate one country with another, and umbrage at invocation of procedures under the UN Charter for peaceful settlement of disputes are some of the phenomena unique to South Asia.

Good-neighborly coexistence implies also that differences and disputes should be resolved and not allowed to fester. The persistence of bilateral problems has always been an obstacle to complete normalization between countries. This was true between China and the USSR for nearly thirty years. It is true between Japan and the USSR today, just to quote one example. And it will remain true tomorrow also. There will be neither peace nor security, much less cooperation in the Middle East until a just solution is reached of the Palestinian question.

Presciently, the Simla Agreement directly links the establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations between Pakistan and India to a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir.

The realization is growing, hopefully in both countries, that not only our bilateral relations but even our internal economic, political and social development have suffered because of conflict and tension.

Recognizing this verity, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government has called for just and honorable solutions to pending problems so that each of us can concentrate on the urgent tasks at home and mutually beneficial cooperation between both.

It is in this context that he has proposed a purposeful dialogue with India to address the entire spectrum of issues before us. Of special importance is the Kashmir issue for both countries. Its resolution is directly linked to the establishment of durable peace between the two countries.

Last month, (July 1991), Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made an innovative proposal for efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons in our region. It calls for discussion not only between Pakistan and India but also with China, the USA and the USSR. We are prepared for negotiations aimed at containing the spread of other weapons of mass destruction. In the conventional weapons field, we have been asking for discussions aimed at mutual and balanced reduction of forces consistent with the principle of equal security at the lowest level of armaments.

Our problems in South Asia, internal and external, economic and political, are difficult but not unsolvable.

Heirs to proud civilizations, our people have the intellectual resources to discover practical, effective and honorable solutions.

The tasks are achievable. What is needed is the will to tackle them, and the commitment to mutual goodwill necessary for durable peace and expanding cooperation.

Regional Implications of Recent Soviet Changes Viewed

*92AS0008G Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
21 Sep 91 p 7*

[Article by S. M. Koreshi]

[Text] Now it seems possible to draw some conclusions regarding the implications of the recent developments in the Soviet Union on Pakistan and the region, with the caution that two facts need to be kept in view: The present Gorbachev-Yeltsin-based dual leadership is reminiscent of the Najib-Nasser combination and may or

may not be an interim arrangement except that at present it is backed by the only superpower and the most important economic-political center of power, Western Europe. Nonetheless, the situation is still fluid in the Soviet Union. There is unrest and uncertainty in the public, due to the problems of food, unemployment and lack of basic necessities of life.

Out of the Soviet internal situation have come the following repercussions on its foreign policy.

Turmoil

Soviet ability to pursue its erstwhile foreign involvements, of military and financial commitments would now have to be drastically reduced due to its internal turmoil and serious financial constraints. Even the heavy emphasis on military industries at the expense of consumer goods and agriculture industries, would have to be abandoned. So even against hard cash the Soviet Union would hardly be able to sell arms abroad. Reduction in the armed forces would lead to unemployment. It can hardly afford a 3-million-strong army. Its prospective donors are insistent that it reduce its military spendings—a demand the Soviets cannot resist. In this situation, the implications over Soviet foreign policy with which Pakistan is concerned are: the new base of Soviet foreign policy, its revised policies in Afghanistan, India and the region.

Is a semblance of union could be retained through the Union Treaty, it is no less due to the Western/American policies to help the Soviet Union to remain as much intact as possible and to confine the trend of declaration of "independence" in reality to its European areas only. The West is committed to the Soviet Union remaining a loose confederation, having common armed forces and central control of the N-weapons, plus a financial linkage between all its republics. Thus the Soviet Union is learning heavily on the West for its internal stability and financial aid. The Soviet Union would have to harmonize its foreign policies with those of the West to a great extent. To what extent this harmony will go has to be seen.

The implications of the Soviet policies in specific cases would be as follows:

Afghanistan: It is beyond their resources any longer to under-write this adventure, and would like to be bailed out from this situation even by Pakistan. The current cost of Soviet support to Najib's regime has been put at (\$300m x 12) \$3.2 billion by the Mujahideen. Even if these estimates are on the higher side, the Soviets cannot afford this expenditure when they are badly in need of \$5 to \$6 billion food aid from the West/United States. In this context, it would find identity of approach with the United States in particular. Therefore this seems to be an appropriate place to discuss Soviet Central Asia, as the two powers would view Afghanistan as linked with Central Asia.

Central Asia has always been considered as the Soviet 'soft belly'. Turkic troops deserted the Soviet Union in World War II and formed two divisions of Hitler's forces. It has always been a reluctant component of the Soviet Union ever since they were captured from their native rulers. There was Bashmachi Movement for over two decades against the Soviet Union and there has been continuous reassertion of this identity. Surprisingly (because it is at variance with the American position) the idea of Greater Turkestan has been mooted now by pro-British quarters recently. A manifestation of this romance with old history was the recent declarations of "independence" by the Soviet Central Asian Republics, more poetic than factual.

Internal

All these declarations amounted to were an independence from Moscow in some kind of internal affairs. That these declarations were not taken seriously by the parties making them is evident from this that no state was approached by them for recognition of their independence: not a single Muslim or any Third World country. This means that recognition was neither asked for, desired nor it has to be extended. It was some kind of declaration of local autonomy. These areas had been treated as colonial parts by Moscow which set up colonies of the White Russians in Brown Central Asia, who were the trusted party or government officials, etc, like Anglo-Indians during British days in the subcontinent. These republics are economically backward and dependent on Moscow. Soviet policy now is to lift barriers between this area and the outside world, permit economic and cultural relations with Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, etc, but it would view any attempt to break them away from it as a hostile act. It seems therefore that any demand for recognition of these republics is without any justification and would have serious repercussions. The more realistic approach would be to establish all the links possible in the already existing structure.

However, the Soviets would have to face this problem in the long run again. They cannot keep its tight grip on this area any longer. The "Union" is going to face the crisis of identity soon. What is this "Union" of? It is now White Russian Orthodox Christian dominated, which is inevitably going to bring its contradiction in sharp contrast with Brown Asian Turkic Muslims. How this contradiction is to be sorted out is a matter for the future. We should not try to be midwife of this new development. The racial and cultural clash with the White Russians would not be avoided. Since no recognition has been requested, not even from Turkey, it is premature to talk of extending it. We should reap the economic benefits and re-establish cultural links from Central Asia, in this context and not beyond.

The Soviets must be now trying to work out with the West/United States what regime should be established in Afghanistan, in an effort to find Najib's substitute. Just as we should let the Central Asians settle their future the Soviet Union should let Afghans decide it themselves.

This is a quid pro quo between the two of us, the Soviet Union and Pakistan. Are they thinking of installing Zahir Shah, and is it for this reason that Najib has removed the restriction from his return to Afghanistan? Is it for this purpose that they have invited the pro-Shah Mujahideen to Moscow for talks? They have indicated that Najib may not join the inter-Afghan talks, nor may he form the interim administration for the elections, but that he may stand for elections. For this purpose they want to divide the Mujahideen into two groups, and that Pakistan should not have influence in post-Najib era. But these calculations can go wrong in this attempt. There can be a coup d'état and Afghanistan cannot be fed by the Soviets, who are themselves short of food and items of daily life. They cannot rescue Najib from these difficulties. The Soviets should be well advised not to try their luck too far in this gamble. They should cooperate with Pakistan in finding a solution.

The Soviet Union is unable to twist Pakistan's arms in the present situation, nor should they depend on the United States to help them in Central Asia. It is only Iran, Turkey and Pakistan who can have much greater influence in Central Asia than the United States. Pakistan would also benefit from the Soviet inability to help India militarily. No longer can the Soviet Union sell India arms at cut prices at 2 percent interest. Nor can it now build an air bridge with India in an India-Pak conflict should it wish to do again for the Soviet Union lacks the material means for it. It seems the Soviet Union is aware of India's financial difficulties. That is why Gorby's Primakov did not include India in his trip seeking aid. His trip included not the rich countries but also those who are themselves aid recipients like Turkey and Egypt.

Of course, one adverse implication of the Soviet dependence on the West has been that Pakistan's importance has been marginalized, because it is no longer of strategic importance in the American and Western scheme of things. Nor, as I have said earlier can the United States find funds to help Pakistan now that the entire Western World would have to do rescue financing of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Then United States has promised to under-write a loan of well over \$10 billion to Israel for building new settlements in the occupied Arab lands, after the Middle East negotiations for which Secretary of State Baker, in his trip to Tel Aviv has just promised to give more than this amount after four months.

However, another direct victim of the fall of the Soviet Union within a few years can possibly be the United States' economy. In the present situation, the countries to benefit the most might be Germany and Japan and then Europe, which are much nearer to the Soviet Union. It is they who are likely to reap economic benefits by investing in the Soviet Union, and after them possibly France and Italy. This would have repercussions on the American economy. The United States became a giant economic power after the World War which had destroyed Japan, Germany and Europe and liquidated

the British Empire. The vacuum was filled by the United States. Now the USSR has collapsed economically in any case. Japan and Germany have the position to fill the vacuum created by the demise of Soviet economy. Moreover, if the cold war comes to an end, and is not opened in another arena, like the Far East or South East Asia, American industry would face shrinkage because it is 60 percent defence oriented.

Policy

Under the circumstances, Pakistan needs a new system of economic partners and security arrangements. Better relations should be established with the Soviet Union for the sake of economic benefits. Central Asian markets provide a new commercial opportunity. The Afghanistan problem should be solved at the earliest with the Soviet Union, through a package deal and Iran and China should be made security partners. East European markets should also be explored for exports. It is necessary that we adopt a pragmatic approach rather than a missionary one in our foreign policy. Export of ideology for a weak country can be fraught with dangers. Ideology at home and within Muslim countries but pragmatic approach in international relations is advisable. Otherwise, we might have difficulties even with our best friends. Trade through exports and ideology for practice at home is in Pakistan's present circumstances the best policy.

Article Urges South Asia Dialogue

*92AS0008A Lahore VIEWPOINT in English
12 Sep 91 p 9*

[Text] While newspapers were screaming about growing skirmishes along the Kashmir ceasefire line and about the armies of India and Pakistan facing one another, eyeball to eyeball, a small group of private citizens from five SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] countries met in Lahore to lay the foundation of a dialogue among themselves with a view to safeguarding their common future through mutual understanding.

The idea of such an exercise was born some time ago when academics, researchers and commentators from several SAARC countries happened to be together. They found that in all these countries there was a growing desire for discussing at non-governmental level the factors contributing to the region's failure to establish peace or to meet the people's aspirations for release from poverty and other indignities. The result was last week's meeting of the preparatory committee to organize the joint meeting of eminent citizens from the countries of the region, in Delhi later this year to discuss the common problems faced by their nations, to identify issues affecting their economies, public welfare, their bilateral relations, and their place in the new international configuration. The delegates were from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

Internal Policies

The group was acutely conscious of the South Asian countries' need to reappraise their internal policies, bilateral ties, and international outlooks in view of the fast changing global scene.

At a public gathering hosted by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, the Foreign guests briefly explained the motivation for their quest. Dr Kamal Hosain, former Bangladesh Foreign Minister, who had specially flown in from New York to attend the preparatory committee meeting, spoke of the people's expectations that had remained unrealized even after four decades of independence, but refused to be pessimistic about the future. Dr Pandey, a former Finance Minister of Nepal, emphasized that while building bridges of understanding in South Asia the outstanding bilateral issues should not be ignored. Ms Raobika Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka argued that the regional understanding and cooperation must be premised on each country following democratic principles, especially in respect of its minorities, and all equitable bilateral relations. Dr Bhabani Sengupta from India argued that both India and Pakistan had lost the capacity for war, the global cold war had ended but these two countries persisted in keeping their confrontation alive. It was time they started building up an enduring peace and ending what he described as internal colonial orders. From the audience questions were raised about Kashmir and nuclear non-proliferation treaty to which the answer was that all problems could be discussed but the dialogue group would give its view only after it has discussed these issues. A lively intervention was made by Professor M. Rashid who wanted to know how Pakistan had turned its back on the Quaid-i-Azam's ideal of a democratic, secular, egalitarian State, and how it was possible for anyone to get away with the plunder of 200 crore rupees of public money. The professor had just returned home after several months absence and was shocked to learn that the country had become "unlivable."

Another occasion for a review of the South Asian countries' plight was provided at a private dinner for the visiting delegates. Dr Akmal Husain described the extent of poverty and malnourishment in these countries and their potential for economic growth. The imperatives of regional cooperation were obvious but nothing could move till India and Pakistan resolved their differences, and at the top of the agenda was Kashmir.

Dr Pandey, ms Raobika Coomaraswamy and Dr Bhabani Sengupta elaborated on the perceptions that they had advanced at the public meeting. Dr Sengupta dwelt in some detail on the retreat of hegemonic tendencies in India and declared that India was opening up to the global economy and could in the near future guarantee its neighbors security and means of economic progress.

The Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs, Mr Akram Zaki, who had come down specially from Islamabad, was not amused. He thought Dr Sengupta's great country was putting its neighbors to sleep. But he could recall what

Thucydides had said about unequal parties and what Trudeau had said about sleeping next to an elephant. A great neighbor had to prove its greatness by showing its neighbors restraint and accommodation and not by dismembering a neighbor or interfering in the internal strife of another.

Zaki's Analysis

Mr Zaki then presented his analysis of how big Powers and empires had been crumbling since the first World War. The world having become unipolar, presided over by the United States, was an illusion. In fact the world was becoming multi-central. The socialist camp had not disappeared, only the Moscow-Washington equation had been replaced with Moscow-Beijing equation.

So far as Pakistan was concerned, he said, it had taken a number of initiatives to lower tension in the subcontinent. This was possible because a new government headed by a non-feudal had taken over in Pakistan and it was committed to self-reliance, democracy and peace. There were many points in the Secretary-General's presentation that seemed labored without justification or could otherwise be challenged, but quite a few guests kept their peace out of courtesy to the host's disposition and because Mr Zaki was not expected to deviate from his official brief.

But Mr Akram Zaki's address provided the strongest vindication of the view that it was time independent-minded citizens from South Asian countries got together to unscramble the mess created by politicians afraid of their wrongly-tutored and fickle-minded electorates and by officials scared of opening new windows into their storehouses of fossilized concepts. The regional dialogue is not likely to be easy but to shy away from a frank exchange, free from governmental fears and prejudices, will amount to compounding the misery of the South Asian peoples.

Subcontinental Neighbors Renew Tensions

92AS0008B Lahore *VIEWPOINT in English*
12 Sep 91 p 10

[Text] Soon after a fiercely firm statement by the new Chief of Army Staff that incidents along the line of control in Kashmir were not unusual and that there was no danger of war with India, references to the threat of a new clash between the subcontinental neighbors became more frequent than before.

Ms Benazir Bhutto described Gen Asif Nawaz's statement as diplomatic and asserted that the danger of war over the next few months was real. Addressing a meeting in Khuzdar during his tour of Balochistan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated that an Indian attack on Kahuta was apprehended. Later on a high-level meeting in Islamabad was said to have considered Kahutas defence. In their messages on Defence of Pakistan Day

(Sept 6) President Ishaq and Mr Nawaz Sharif both warned the nation of the threat to its integrity.

Coupled with reports of skirmishes, with casualties, along the line of control in Kashmir, these statements caused considerable anxiety to the common people. Traders reported a decline in business. All this despite an agreement among large sections of knowledgeable experts that between India and Pakistan was extremely unlikely because neither side could afford the cost of conflict.

A disturbing addition to causes of tension between the two countries was two attacks on the train carrying Pakistani passengers to India via wagha. In the first incident a woman was killed. The Indian Punjab police blamed the "Sikh terrorists."

Perhaps a greater factor of public uneasiness was a series of blasts on Tuesday (Sept 4) two persons were reported killed in an explosion near the Karachi airport and another person was killed in a blast in Jhang. On Friday a couple of bombs exploded at a public meeting organized by Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba in Lahore, which claimed four lives. A day later five 'ulema' belonging to the same organization, and also linked with Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, were shot dead while they were travelling by a wagon near Jhang.

AFGHANISTAN

Kabul To Buy Arms If Mujahedin Receive Military Aid

92AS0014A Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL
in English 19 Sep 91 p 7

[Text] New Delhi (Dispatches)—A senior Afghan diplomat warned Tuesday that Kabul would purchase weapons from countries other than the Soviet Union if Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to arm the resistance.

Afghanistan's ambassador to India, Ahmad Sarwar, told a news conference that the United States should urge the three countries to halt military aid to Mujahideen as part of the recent Washington-Moscow arms cut decision.

"We hope Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will cease the army supplies and we hope the U.S. will use its influence and force these countries to stop the aid to the opposition," Sarwar said.

"In case they do not abide by the rules, Afghanistan will explore necessary avenues for the purchase of arms," he said five days after the U.S. and the Soviet Union announced they would stop arms shipment to all warring sides in the Afghan conflict from January.

Sarwar did not say if cash-strapped Kabul had identified a source for fresh supplies in the absence of military aid from Moscow.

He said cessation of military aid to one side and the continuation of aid to the other will intensify the war instead of lessening it.

Kabul had "bitter experiences" from the Geneva accord of April 1988 because of its alleged violation by signatory Pakistan and guarantor the United States, he said, adding that Washington should negotiate with the three Islamic backers of the rebels.

A seven-party Mujahideen alliance is based in Pakistan and eight moderate factions are in Iran. Afghanistan also accuses Riyadh of arming the Mujahideen.

Under the Geneva accords, guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively, Kabul and Islamabad pledged mutual non-interference and non-intervention. They were followed by the withdrawal of the Soviet troops which had been in the country since December 1979.

Kabul-based diplomats have said the 13-year civil war in Afghanistan will be scaled down as the mutual arms cut will force the two warring sides to exercise restraint and conserve their respective firepower.

IRAN

Kuwaiti-U.S. Pact, Damascus Declaration Viewed NC1509184691 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Arabic 1630 GMT 15 Sep 91

[Station political commentary]

[Text] Commenting on the various statements made recently by Kuwaiti officials on signing a military agreement with the United States, a senior U.S. Defense Department official has stated that the U.S. Defense and State Departments have prepared a draft agreement for military and security cooperation between the United States and Kuwait and a number of countries in the Persian Gulf. The same official added that the agreement will be signed in the near future.

According to the U.S. official's statement, the draft agreement stipulates that Kuwait will put an air base at the disposal of the U.S. Air Force for military missions. The agreement also provides for storing advanced U.S. weapons and equipment in Kuwait. Under the agreement, the United States will undertake the training and reorganization of Kuwaiti troops. The agreement prohibits granting these weapons and ammunition to any third party without obtaining Washington's approval. The United States will keep advanced and multi-purpose missiles, heavy-caliber artillery, and sophisticated telecommunications systems in Kuwait.

For his part, the Kuwaiti defense minister said that the military agreement between his country and the United States aims to maintain peace and security. He said signing this agreement falls within the context of the

Damascus Declaration, which gave its signatories the right to request assistance from foreign quarters.

It must be noted here that the Damascus Declaration, which was signed among the Gulf Cooperation Council member states, Syria, and Egypt in the wake of the Gulf war, is shrouded in ambiguity because of the difference in views among its signatories over the question of dispatching troops to the region, as well as the nature of these countries' commitments and responsibilities regarding peace and stability in the region. Although some of the Damascus Declaration signatories do not admit such differences, the wish of some signatories to invite foreign troops into the region and give the West a major role to play in regional security plans casts some light on the fact that the Damascus Declaration has lost its *raison d'être*.

What is striking about the proposed post-war security plans in the region is the nature of the makeup and division of the troops which will maintain security and stability in the Persian Gulf. The presence of foreign troops in this sensitive part of the world absolutely will not safeguard peace and stability, guarantee security for its peoples, or preserve these peoples' interests. The U.S.-Kuwaiti agreement, which could include other countries as well, has stirred up a wave of concern in the region. Although, on the face of it, it looks as if Kuwait was the one which asked the United States to send troops to the region, the developments and results of the Gulf war increase the likelihood that the United States' objective in concluding such an agreement is to establish the direct and effective presence of its troops in the region to further control the tools necessary for pressuring others.

Ahmad Khomeyni Says U.S. Sowing Seeds of Discord

LD1509183391 Tehran *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network* in Persian 0930 GMT 15 Sep 91

[Text] The families of martyrs from the town of Khomeyn, together with that town's representative at the Islamic Consultative Majles, and tutors and teachers participating in the nationwide camp organized by the Islamic Propagation Organization, as well as various other groups of people, met with Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Haj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni at the Jamaran Mosque this morning.

During the meeting, Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni expounded on the situation in the region and in the Islamic world. He said that enduring an atmosphere of pessimism and discord among Islamic countries is a dangerous ploy of the colonialists aimed at promoting some of the policies pertaining to the new world order. He said: The many conspiracies hatched by the arrogance camp in the Middle East region, whether the Arab peace conference and the regime occupying Qods [Jerusalem], the killing of Muslims in Kashmir, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine or supporting puppet regimes in Islamic countries, are the

consequences of the oppressed nations turning to the pure Islamic ideology and notably its center, Islamic Iran.

He also expressed hope that the UN secretary general will make further efforts toward a peaceful solution of the Afghan problem and the establishment of the will of the people of that country.

Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni also stressed that attention should be paid to the educational affairs of the families of martyrs.

West's Stance on Soviet Asian Republics Reviewed

NC1609105891 Tehran *ETTELA'AT* in Persian 4 Sep 91 p 2

[Abolqasem Qasemzadeh commentary entitled: "Dismemberment" and Civil War]

[Text] The USSR Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow, which has 2,250 members, is trying to halt the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the republics' declarations of independence by approving a draft proposal put forth by Gorbachev and 10 republican leaders. It calls for the country to be managed by a joint committee consisting of Gorbachev and 10 Soviet republican leaders, who will prepare the Soviet Union's new constitution, which will subsequently be put to a referendum vote.

Alekseyev, head of the committee supervising the Soviet constitution, said at yesterday's congress meeting: "Following the recent coup, the Soviet Union is not only on the verge of collapse, but is actually facing a situation similar to Yugoslavia's (which is on the verge of civil war)."

At first glance, the situation in Russia is like that of an elastic band which was stretched for years by communist pressure and suppression and has now been let loose by the wave of liberation, destroying party centralization completely and getting rid of the Kremlin's domination. In other words, the Kremlin's few remaining iron walls have crumbled with the most recent coup and the success of the anti-coup movement, and everyone is fleeing to avoid being crushed by the falling debris. The declaration of independence by some of the Soviet Republics, which had been kept continually dependent on Moscow and were constantly waiting for procurements from Belorussia, is an expression of these republics' disdain towards the Kremlin and embodies their cry of liberation from the domination of the Kremlin's centralized party system—which they made even though the future consequences were unknown.

We can find an example of this in the rich area of Azerbaijan, where the planting of any strategic product (wheat, rice, and grain, among others) was prevented, and the only product supported by the government and the communist party's economic plans was the planting

of "grapes" to be made into wine and sent to the Russians. Today, Azerbaijan is giving Moscow oil, and its oil income is being computed as part of the Soviet Union's national income, while the Azerbaijanis have only their agricultural income from the grapes and the wine. As a result, they are living on the edge of poverty.

Such examples can be seen in republics throughout Soviet Asia, where the majority of the population is Muslim and looks to Moscow to supply their vital daily needs. These conditions, in addition to the republics' history, racial, religious, and national identity, combined with the years of pressure and indisputable domination from the Kremlin have all led to the natural need for a declaration of independence. We should nonetheless wait to see what kind of success will be achieved by the renewed efforts to formulate a new constitution and manage a "federal" Soviet Union, by Gorbachev's plan calling for more internal independence and the preservation of the country's integrity through a centralized "federal" system composed of republics, and by the plan for economic and political cooperation. The United States and most European countries have recognized the independence of the three Baltic Republics (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia), which want to form a new "federation" of Baltic Republics.

The United States and the West European countries, however, will have a different attitude toward the Asian Republics. This is yet another sign that Western democracy always includes the principle of "racism" in its approach to any issue. The West's position on recognizing the Baltic Republics' declarations of independence and their establishment of commercial and economic relations is at odds with that adopted on the Asian republics' declarations of independence, and this is preparing the ground for another civil war in these areas. Combined with the fact that the exploitation of racial fanaticism (Turkish, Armenian, Uzbek, Tajik, and so on) is once again surfacing and kindling the fire of a civil war, this means that we may soon be witnessing bloody clashes in the Asian Republics.

The West's recognition of the Baltic Republics has completed their separation from Moscow. Washington, however, will make a deal with Moscow when it comes to the Asian republics' independence. If it is met by resistance, a civil war and various associated conflicts will flare up in this areas and will offer Moscow an ideal opportunity to implement its plan.

Paper Urges Recognition of Soviet Muslim Republics

*NC1309201591 Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 4 Sep 91 p 15*

[Editorial: "Our Northern Neighbor and Our National Security"]

[Excerpts] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful.

The draft for a change in the Soviet government has been approved by the country's parliament and has been compiled and signed by Gorbachev and heads of 10 of the Soviet republics. [passage omitted]

A wave of independence-seeking movements has reached a crescendo in the Soviet republics and has become a normal occurrence. Nearly 40 countries, including the United States, have recognized the independence of the Baltic republics. However, it appears that in the West there is no inclination to recognize all of the Soviet republics. Maybe they do not want to take the first step and hope others will take the initiative. [passage omitted]

There is a serious danger that the situation of a disintegrating Soviet Union will directly influence international security. It is not in the best interests of the Soviet Union's neighbors for the crisis to continue. However, if there is no way out of the internal Soviet crisis and the situation becomes more critical each day, perhaps an "alternative" [preceding word in English] or a "powerful possibility" would be that "the center of the crisis" would become greater if the Soviet's neighbors accepted the republics' independence.

This is the same path that Europe and the West adopted regarding the independence of the Baltic republics, that by extending official recognition to these three republics they will remain safe from the effects of the massive maelstrom raging in the Eastern superpower's decision-making center.

In addition, we should not forget that Turkey has accepted the independence of the republic of Soviet Azerbaijan. The Turkish president has officially announced that Turkey should take steps to fill the vacuum created by the downfall of communism in Soviet Azerbaijan with a "laicist Islam" and wrest the opportunity from "fundamentalist Islam" (which is a reference to the Islamic Revolution of Iran). He has added that Moscow would favor this action by Ankara. This poses a serious threat to us which influences our "national security."

If Iran hesitates to accept the independence of Soviet Azerbaijan and other Muslim-populated republics, a path will be opened for Turkey. What this means is that a NATO member will have increased influence on our northern border with all the grave consequences that can entail. This scenario would be worse for us than the consequences of all the internal developments in the Soviet Union.

In fact, the first shot has already been fired. Officially recognizing the independence of the Muslim-populated republics is no longer a matter of "choice" for us, but would be a logical and correct reaction on our part on developments taking place in our back yard. If we do not react in a timely, alert, and dynamic way toward these developments today, tomorrow we will be in a shameful

position and woe betide, we will be forced into a situation in which we will only be able to defend ourselves on a limited scale so that we do not suffer greater harm.

Importance of Communication to Revolution Noted

NC1309142991 Tehran ABRAR (International Supplement) in English 5 Sep 91 p 12

[Unattributed Editorial: "Communications and World Developments"]

[Text] In a century of unprecedented upheavals, the downfall of Marxism and change of the Socialist system in the Soviet Union is undoubtedly the most incredible event of the twentieth century.

When the 70-year history of the Soviet Union is reviewed, the secret of history reveals itself: we should always expect change and transformation, and the world is in a constant state of flux. This is what shapes history, and why human beings are sacrificed.

Perhaps the total number of victims of establishment of the Socialist system in the Soviet Union can never be determined. Several thousands were killed in the turmoil of downfall of the Czars, and several more thousands died in the coming to power of Lenin. The number of those killed during Stalin's reign is staggering, several thousands being buried under the ice in Siberia. And so on.

Marxism had victims not merely in the Soviet Union: it also devoured lives in Eastern Europe, Cuba, Latin America, Vietnam, China, Africa and even in Iran.

History records the number of victims in the formation of Marxism until this day when its downfall has been registered and a new page added to history.

Marxism was not spread by Marx himself. Human beings spread his thoughts in a wave of communications, but never imagined that one day they would themselves become victims of a thinking whose ashes will be buried under the Siberian tundra, a place where the warm hearts of huge numbers of men were buried in the depths of the cold for the sake of its survival.

And today other generations of human beings in waves of communications are giving rise to thoughts whom no one knows on what day in the future must future generations place its ashes in the oceans.

But this time due to the extensiveness of communication, it may not take 70 years from appearance to the downfall of a school of thought. But one who takes the pulse of social communications in his hand can make public opinion accept one type of thinking or reject another.

It is not too long since the day the late Leader of the Islamic Revolution Imam Khomeini in his message to the Soviet leader predicted the downfall of Marxism, and today this is a reality. But we have not used the dimensions of communications, and it is easy for the West to

induce [as published] to the public opinion that it has emerged victorious from the fall of Communism.

However the late Imam had also predicted the fall of capitalism in the same message. But what have we done in regard to that?

Thus we must confess that despite the powerful intellectual support of Divine thought we have not succeeded in conveying our message to the world in the appropriate manner, and have not used the tools of communications to the full.

The opportunity must not be lost. World developments are speedy, and with the use of communications tools, very effective.

Velayati Meets With Air Transport Official

NC1609065191 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0330 GMT 16 Sep 91

[Text] Mr. (Konter Ezer) director general of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), met with Foreign Minister Velayati yesterday. He stressed the importance of Iran's presence in his organization and expressed the hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran would expand its activities.

This meeting was also attended by Shafti, the director general of the Islamic Republic of Iran's National Airlines Corporation, and the Foreign Minister spoke on IATA's role in broadening the field of air transport and the strengthening effect this would have on relations between countries.

Velayati expressed the hope that IATA would increase its activities, especially in ensuring the security of air transport. He also declared the Islamic Republic of Iran's willingness to cooperate with IATA.

Paper Reviews Electoral Role of Guardians' Council

NC1409121491 Tehran SALAM in Persian 28 Aug 91 p 2

[Editorial: "Is Justness a Sufficient Qualification?"]

[Excerpts] Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the esteemed president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, held a news conference with domestic correspondents at the beginning of Government Week. In response to a SALAM correspondent's question on whether the government will act on the basis of the existing law on elections or according to the Council of Guardians' recent interpretation, he said: "When we realize that the Council of Guardian's members are upright people, that they have been appointed by the imam and the leadership as upstanding mojtaheds [sources of emulation], and that they are overseeing things, we will find the best

guarantee that their actions are just. Even in the past, during the Imam's time, the Council of Guardians excluded some individuals, as the imam believed that some people were not competent. For instance, on one occasion, the imam said that someone, whom I don't exactly know or want to name, should be left out. This is something that the Council of Guardians claimed in the past but never made any official interpretation about. Now it has made an official interpretation, and we are trying, under the circumstances, to ensure that those candidates who are really competent are not deprived of their rights."

We would like to begin with the last part of the president's remarks and thank him for promising to make an effort to ensure that competent candidates are not deprived of their rights and, better said, to ensure that society is not deprived of the right to elect people who are truly competent. But the real issue is: How is a person's competence determined, and who should make this judgment? The Council of Guardians claims (of course not from the beginning but midway) that the Constitution has granted it this right. Some, including the majority of the Majles deputies, believe that the law gives the executive committees the right to judge competence and that, if these committees reject a person based on his competence, this person can complain to the Council of Guardians. If the Council of Guardians decides that the said person is competent and informs the Interior Ministry of this fact, then his name will be included on the list of candidates. At this point another question is raised: On the basis of the Council of Guardians' interpretation, if the Council rejects a person's competence, then to which institution should this person address his complaint? Naturally, as no source is recognized either in the law or in the Council of Guardians' statements, then the answer to this question is that the said person does not have the right to complain, because the Council of Guardians is supposedly composed of upright members and such people do not make mistakes or neglect anyone's rights. [passage omitted]

Is it sufficient to say that the members of the Council of Guardians are upright people and that they do what is just? Is this a convincing response? The issue is that some of the members of the Council of Guardians are also members of the Tehran Militant Clergy, and some are members of the Seminary, and that we should accept the fact that they have specific political inclinations, that they oppose one another's views, and that they consider the opponents of their views and those of their political groups to lack competence. It is sufficient simply to look at the speeches given by some of the Council of Guardians' members to see that they consider a decision made on this basis perfectly just. [passage omitted]

In other words, how can people impartially judge an issue in which they have personal interests? The other point is that, during the era of his eminence the imam, may his soul be sanctified, this very Council of Guardians was reprimanded for this very same behavior. His eminence the imam didn't recognize the justness of these

gentlemen and rejected their views and their approaches to several issues. This can be seen in the letters that were exchanged on the dispute between Mr. Khaz'ali and one of the candidates and on the Council of Guardian's views about some of the Majles' decisions, for example those on farmlands and on the issue of taxation. [passage omitted]

In conclusion, it is hoped that the esteemed president is well aware of the short- and long-term impacts such decisions will have on the management of society and that, as he has promised, he will strive to ensure the presence of competent people and to ensure that those whose competence has been approved by the people are able to participate in the elections. It is in the best interest of the nation and of the government to forbid the use of methods that are controlled by a single political alignment, because, if this happens, society's healthy political atmosphere will be polluted. It is proposed that the esteemed president order the Interior Ministry to carry out its lawful duties as the body charged with implementing the elections law, as was done in past elections.

Commentary Evaluates Nonaligned Movement

NC1609120491 Tehran ABRAR in Persian 4 Sep 91 p 2

[Unattributed commentary: "The Nonaligned Movement on the Threshold of Change"]

[Text] The Nonaligned Movement was formed during the cold war to create a world balance for countries that did not want to follow either superpower.

Thirty years after this movement was founded, it still hopes to take a path free of any alignments. Today, however, now that there are no signs of yesterday's political poles and talk abounds about a world with a bipolar economic system between north and south, the movement is facing a historic question: "What should be done?" A glance at the three decades of this movement's activities show moments most of which were characterized by reaction rather than action.

The Nonaligned Movement never had an economic arm which could guarantee the implementation of its policies. Its members—from Cuba to Egypt—which wanted to carry out economic cooperation did not have the necessary structure to do so. If America dominates the northern front, it has undoubtedly reached this point through economic planning. In other words, it holds the trump card which helps it rule.

Today, the North does not see the South as a challenging force. On the contrary, each time that it needs the South, it gives it an identity. "Consumer market, manufactured goods" and "countries with immense raw material resources" are how the North sees the South. In other words, it sees the South as an area with two different roles which should be turned upside down whenever necessary.

The Nonaligned Movement should rapidly try to gain access to a mechanism to implement its political agenda so that its member countries can, if they stand by each other, become a potential and active unit.

The Muslim countries enjoy a majority in this movement and in order to preserve their independence they should rely on Islamic ideology to clarify their foreign policy so that they will be able to reach an all-embracing pact on economic cooperation.

The Islamic Republic, which has always defended its belief in independence and has paid a heavy price for it, can play an active role in this because of its sensitive geographic position. The Nonaligned Movement should accept the fact that the foundation of current world developments is the ideological impasse that countries are facing. If the eastern fortress has crumbled, there is no guarantee that the West will not face a similar fate. Should almost 100 countries wait to see what the East and West do and then react?

If the Nonaligned Movement creates the basis for economic cooperation by relying on its Muslim and rich members it can hope to put itself in an advantageous position regarding current world affairs.

Daily Discusses Economic Plan, Implementation

NC1609153691 Tehran RESALAT in Persian
4 Sep 91 pp 1, 16

[Ahmad Tavakkoli editorial: "Greater Coordination"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Today we would like to discuss some of the steps that do not conform to the Five-Year Plan.

1. Last year, foreign purchases totaled more than the plan envisaged. The first few months of the current [Iranian] year [beginning 21 March 1991] purchases almost halted. [passage omitted]

This was apparently justified by the need to ensure speed to achieve the best production capacity and to reduce the threat of possible problems for domestic production

stemming from the Persian Gulf war. The great hope of increases in oil prices as a result of the regional war may also have played a role in increasing foreign currency expenditures. This process, which was not within the framework of the plan, had and has the following negative impacts:

- It has created new foreign currency undertakings for the country which we may, God forbid, not be able to meet and which may turn into foreign debt.
 - Since extra purchases have been made through credit transactions (usance) [preceding word in English], naturally the items purchased are more expensive. This will influence domestic inflation. [passage omitted]
2. Harnessing cash flow was yet another objective of the plan. In 1368 [year beginning 21 March 1989] cash flow dropped from 23.8 percent in 1367 to 19.4 percent. In 1369, however, this index rose again to 23.6 percent. [passage omitted]
3. On the basis of Article A, Addendum 3 of the Five-Year Plan, the government should report its activities on the plan to the Majles every six months. Only after a year and a half, in Mordad this year [month beginning 23 July], were the reports on both 1368 and 1369 submitted. A timely submission of the report can strengthen Majles supervision and can lead to more government supervision over the various institutions. [passage omitted]
4. It should be heeded that on the basis of the most conservative estimates, the implementation of the new labor law will increase the price of finished products by 15 percent. Therefore, since the expected investments and rate of production and employment will not be fulfilled in the coming years and due to the increase in the rate of inflation, this law should not be blamed for the impacts of the government's new policies and activities. A development plan can only be successful when it is coordinated, stable, and continuous. The executive officials should take care to prevent uncoordinated actions.

NTIS
ATTN: PROCESS 103

5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD, VA

2

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTS may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTS or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTS and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.